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VII Social Summit for the Latin American and Caribbean Unity
VII Social Summit for the Latin American and Caribbean Unity
By Noam Chomsky
September 30, 2008
(Caracas 9-24-08) During the past decade, Latin America has become the most exciting region of the world. The dynamic has very largely flowed from right where you are meeting, in Caracas, with the election of a leftist president dedicated to using Venezuela's rich resources for the benefit of the population rather than for wealth and privilege at home and abroad, and to promote the regional integration that is so desperately needed as a prerequisite for independence, for democracy, and for meaningful development. The initiatives taken in Venezuela have had a significant impact throughout the subcontinent, what has now come to be called "the pink tide." The impact is revealed within the individual countries, most recently Paraguay, and in the regional institutions that are in the process of formation. Among these are the Banco del Sur, an initiative that was endorsed here in Caracas a year ago by Nobel laureate in economics Joseph Stiglitz; and the ALBA, the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean, which might prove to be a true dawn if its initial promise can be realized.
The ALBA is often described as an alternative to the US-sponsored "Free Trade Area of the Americas," though the terms are misleading. It should be understood to be an independent development, not an alternative. And, furthermore, the so-called "free trade agreements" have only a limited relation to free trade, or even to trade in any serious sense of that term; and they are certainly not agreements, at least if people are part of their countries. A more accurate term would be "investor-rights arrangements," designed by multinational corporations and banks and the powerful states that cater to their interests, established mostly in secret, without public participation or awareness. That is why the US executive regularly calls for "fast-track authority" for these agreements - essentially, Kremlin-style authority.
Another regional organization that is beginning to take shape is UNASUR, the Union of South American Nations. This continental bloc, modeled on the European Union, aims to establish a South American parliament in Cochabamba, a fitting site for the UNASUR parliament. Cochabamba was not well known internationally before the water wars of 2000. But in that year events in Cochabamba became an inspiration for people throughout the world who are concerned with freedom and justice, as a result of the courageous and successful struggle against privatization of water, which awakened international solidarity and was a fine and encouraging demonstration of what can be achieved by committed activism.
The aftermath has been even more remarkable. Inspired in part by developments in Venezuela, Bolivia has forged an impressive path to true democratization in the hemisphere, with large-scale popular initiatives and meaningful participation of the organized majority of the population in establishing a government and shaping its programs on issues of great importance and popular concern, an ideal that is rarely approached elsewhere, surely not in the Colossus of the North, despite much inflated rhetoric by doctrinal managers.
Much the same had been true 15 years earlier in Haiti, the only country in the hemisphere that surpasses Bolivia in poverty - and like Bolivia, was the source of much of the wealth of Europe, later the United States. In 1990, Haiti's first free election took place. It was taken for granted in the West that the US candidate, a former World Bank official who monopolized resources, would easily win. No one was paying attention to the extensive grass-roots organizing in the slums and hills, which swept into power the populist priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Washington turned at once to undermining the feared and hated democratic government. It took only a few months for a US-backed military coup to reverse this stunning victory for democracy, and to place in power a regime that terrorized the population with the direct support of the US government, first under president Bush I, then Clinton. Washington finally permitted the elected president to return, but only on the condition that he adhere to harsh neoliberal rules that were guaranteed to crush what remained of the economy, as they did. And in 2004, the traditional torturers of Haiti, France and the US, joined to remove the elected president from office once again, launching a new regime of terror, though the people remain unvanquished, and the popular struggle continues despite extreme adversity.
All of this is familiar in Latin America, not least in Bolivia, the scene of today's most intense and dangerous confrontation between popular democracy and traditional US-backed elites. Archaeologists are now discovering that before the European conquest, Bolivia had a wealthy, sophisticated and complex society - to quote their words, "one of the largest, strangest, and most ecologically rich artificial environments on the face of the planet, with causeways and canals, spacious and formal towns and considerable wealth," creating a landscape that was "one of humankind's greatest works of art, a masterpiece." And of course Bolivia's vast mineral wealth enriched Spain and indirectly northern Europe, contributing massively to its economic and cultural development, including the industrial and scientific revolutions. Then followed a bitter history of imperial savagery with the crucial connivance of rapacious domestic elites, factors that are very much alive today.
Sixty years ago, US planners regarded Bolivia and Guatemala as the greatest threats to its domination of the hemisphere. In both cases, Washington succeeded in overthrowing the popular governments, but in different ways. In Guatemala, Washington resorted to the standard technique of violence, installing one of the world's most brutal and vicious regimes, which extended its criminality to virtual genocide in the highlands during Reagan's murderous terrorist wars of the 1980s - and we might bear in mind that these horrendous atrocities were carried out under the guise of a "war on terror," a war that was re-declared by George Bush in September 2001, not declared, a revealing distinction when we recall the implementation of Reagan's "war on terror" and its grim human consequences.
In Guatemala, the Eisenhower administration overcame the threat of democracy and independent development by violence. In Bolivia, it achieved much the same results by exploiting Bolivia's economic dependence on the US, particularly for processing Bolivia's tin exports. Latin America scholar Stephen Zunes points out that "At a critical point in the nation's effort to become more self-sufficient [in the early 1950s], the U.S. government forced Bolivia to use its scarce capital not for its own development, but to compensate the former mine owners and repay its foreign debts."
The economic policies forced on Bolivia in those years were a precursor of the structural adjustment programs imposed on the continent thirty years later, under the terms of the neoliberal "Washington consensus," which has generally had disastrous effects wherever its strictures have been observed. By now, the victims of neoliberal market fundamentalism are coming to include the rich countries, where the curse of financial liberalization is bringing about the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s and leading to massive state intervention in a desperate effort to rescue collapsing financial institutions.
We should note that this is a regular feature of contemporary state capitalism, though the scale today is unprecedented. A study by two well-known international economists 15 years ago found that at least twenty companies in the top Fortune 100 would not have survived if they had not been saved by their respective governments, and that many of the rest gained substantially by demanding that governments "socialise their losses." Such government intervention "has been the rule rather than the exception over the past two centuries," they conclude from a detailed analysis. [Ruigrok and von Tulder]
We might also take note of the striking similarity between the structural adjustment programs imposed on the weak by the International Monetary Fund, and the huge financial bailout that is on the front pages today in the North. The US executive-director of the IMF, adopt ing an image from the Mafia, described the institution as "the credit community's enforcer." Under the rules of the Western-run international economy, investors make loans to third world tyrannies, and since the loans carry considerable risk, make enormous profits. Suppose the borrower defaults. In a capitalist economy, the lenders would incur the loss. But really existing capitalism functions quite differently. If the borrowers cannot pay the debts, then the IMF steps in to guarantee that lenders and investors are protected. The debt is transferred to the poor population of the debtor country, who never borrowed the money in the first place and gained little if anything from it. That is called "structural adjustment." And taxpayers in the rich country, who also gained nothing from the loans, sustain the IMF through their taxes. These doctrines do not derive from economic theory; they merely reflect the distribution of decision-making power.
The designers of the international economy sternly demand that the poor accept market discipline, but they ensure that they themselves are protected from its ravages, a useful arrangement that goes back to the origins of modern industrial capitalism, and played a large role in dividing the world into rich and poor societies, the first and third worlds.
This wonderful anti-market system designed by self-proclaimed market enthusiasts is now being implemented in the United States, to deal with the very ominous crisis of financial markets. In general, markets have well-known inefficiencies. One is that transactions do not take into account the effect on others who are not party to the transaction. These so-called "externalities" can be huge. That is particularly so in the case of financial institutions. Their task is to take risks, and if well-managed, to ensure that potential losses to themselves will be covered. To themselves. Under capitalist rules, it is not their business to consider the cost to others if their practices lead to financial crisis, as they regularly do. In economists' terms, risk is underpriced, because systemic risk is not priced into decisions. That leads to repeated crisis, naturally. At that point, we turn to the IMF solution. The costs are transferred to the public, which had nothing to do with the risky choices but is now compelled to pay the costs - in the US, perhaps mounting to about $1 trillion right now. And of course the public has no voice in determining these outcomes, any more than poor peasants have a voice in being subjected to cruel structural adjustment programs.
A basic principle of modern state capitalism is that cost and risk are socialized, while profit is privatized. That principle extends far beyond financial institutions. Much the same is true for the entire advanced economy, which relies extensively on the dynamic state sector for innovation, for basic research and development, for procurement when purchasers are unavailable, for direct bail-outs, and in numerous other ways. These mechanisms are the domestic counterpart of imperial and neocolonial hegemony, formalized in World Trade Organization rules and the misleadingly named "free trade agreements."
Financial liberalization has effects well beyond the economy. It has long been understood that it is a powerful weapon against democracy Free capital movement creates what some international economists have called a "virtual parliament" of investors and lenders, who can closely monitor government programs and "vote" against them if they are considered irrational: for the benefit of people, rather than concentrated private power. They can "vote" by capital flight, attacks on currencies, and other devices offered by financial liberalization. That is one reason why the Bretton Woods system established by the US and UK after World War II instituted capital controls and regulated currencies. The Great Depression and the war had aroused powerful radical democratic currents, taking many forms, from the anti-fascist resistance to working class organization. These pressures made it necessary to permit social democratic policies. The Bretton Woods system was designed in part to create a space for government action responding to public will - for some measure of democracy, that is. John Maynard Keynes, the British negotiator, considered the most important achievement of Bretton Woods to be establishment of the right of governments to restrict capital movement. In dramatic contrast, in the neoliberal phase after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the US Treasury now regards free capital mobility as a "fundamental right," unlike such alleged "rights" as those guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: health, education, decent employment, security, and other rights that the Reagan and Bush administrations have dismissed as "letters to Santa Claus," "preposterous," mere "myths."
In earlier years the public had not been much of a problem. The reasons are reviewed by Barry Eichengreen in his standard scholarly history of the international monetary system. He explains that in the 19th century, governments had not yet been "politicized by universal male suffrage and the rise of trade unionism and parliamentary labor parties." Therefore the severe costs imposed by the virtual parliament could be transferred to the general population. But with the radicalization of the general public during the Great Depression and the anti-fascist war, that luxury was no longer available to private power and wealth. Hence in the Bretton Woods system, "limits on capital mobility substituted for limits on democracy as a source of insulation from market pressures." It is only necessary to add the obvious corollary: with the dismantling of the system from the 1970s, functioning democracy is restricted. It has therefore become necessary to control and marginalize the public in some fashion, processes that are particularly evident in the more business-run societies like the United States. The management of electoral extravaganzas by the Public Relations industry is one illustration.
The primary victims of military terror and economic strangulation are the poor and weak, within the rich countries themselves and far more brutally in the South. But times are changing. In Venezuela, in Bolivia, and elsewhere there are promising efforts to bring about desperately needed structural and institutional changes. And not surprisingly, these efforts to promote democracy, social justice, and cultural rights are facing harsh challenges from the traditional rulers, at home and internationally.
For the first time in half a millennium, South America is beginning to take its fate into its own hands. There have been attempts before, but they have been crushed by outside force, as in the cases I just mentioned and other hideous ones too numerous and too familiar to review. But there are now significant departures from a long and shameful history. The departures are symbolized by the UNASUR crisis summit in Santiago just a few days ago. At the summit, the presidents of the South American countries issued a strong statement of support for the elected Morales government, which as you know is under attack by the traditional rulers: privileged Europeanized elites who bitterly oppose Bolivian democracy and social justice and, routinely, enjoy the firm backing of the master of the hemisphere. The South American leaders gathering at the UNASUR summit in Santiago declared "their full and firm support for the constitutional government of President Evo Morales, whose mandate was ratified by a big majority" -- referring, of course, to his overwhelming victory in the recent referendum. Morales thanked UNASUR for its support, observing that "For the first time in South America's history, the countries of our region are deciding how to resolve our problems, without the presence of the United States."
A matter of no slight significance.
The significance of the UNASUR support for democracy in Bolivia is underscored by the fact that the leading media in the US refused to report it, though editors and correspondents surely knew all about it. Ample information was available to them on wire services.
That has been a familiar pattern. To cite just one of many examples, the Cochabamba declaration of South American leaders in December 2006, calling for moves towards integration on the model of the European Union, was barred from the Free Press in the traditional ruler of the hemisphere. There are many other cases, all illustrating the same fear among the political class and economic centers in the US that the hemisphere is slipping from their control.
Current developments in South America are of historic significance for the continent and its people. It is well understood in Washington that these developments threaten not only its domination of the hemisphere, but also its global dominance. Control of Latin America was the earliest goal of US foreign policy, tracing back to the earliest days of the Republic. The United States is, I suppose, the only country that was founded as a "nascent empire," in George Washington's words. The most libertarian of the Founding Fathers, Thomas Jefferson, predicted that the newly liberated colonies would drive the indigenous population "with the beasts of the forests into the Stony Mountains," and the country will ultimately be "free of blot or mixture," red or black (with the return of slaves to Africa after eventual ending of slavery). And furthermore, it "will be the nest, from which all America, North and South, is to be peopled," displacing not only the red men but the Latin population of the South.
These aspirations were not achieved, but control of Latin America remains a central policy goal, partly for resources and markets, but also for broader ideological and geostrategic reasons. If the US cannot control Latin America, it cannot expect "to achieve a successful order elsewhere in the world," Nixon's National Security Council concluded in 1971 while considering the paramount importance of destroying Chilean democracy. Historian David Schmitz observes that Allende "threatened American global interests by challenging the whole ideological basis of American Cold War policy. It was the threat of a successful socialist state in Chile that could provide a model for other nations that caused concern and led to American opposition," in fact direct participation in establishing and maintaining the terrorist dictatorship. Henry Kissinger warned that success for democratic socialism in Chile might have reverberations as far as southern Europe - not because Chilean hordes would descend on Madrid and Rome, but because success might inspire popular movements to achieve their goals by means of parliamentary democracy, which is upheld as an abstract value in the West, but with crucial reservations.
Even mainstream scholarship recognizes that Washington has supported democracy if and only if it contributes to strategic and economic interests, a policy that continues without change through all administrations, to the present.
These pervasive concerns are the rational form of the domino theory, sometimes more accurately called "the threat of a good example." For such reasons, even the tiniest departure from strict obedience is regarded as an existential threat that calls for a harsh response: peasant organizing in remote communities of northern Laos, fishing cooperatives in Grenada, and so on throughout the world. It is necessary to ensure that the "virus" of successful independent development does not "spread contagion" elsewhere, in the terminology of the highest level planners.
Such concerns have motivated US military intervention, terrorism, and economic warfare throughout the post-World War II era, in Latin America and throughout much of the world. These are leading features of the Cold War. The superpower confrontation regularly provided pretexts, mostly fraudulent, much as the junior partner in world control appealed to the threat of the West when it crushed popular uprisings in its much narrower Eastern European domains.
But times are changing. In Latin America, the source is primarily in moves towards integration, which has several dimensions. One dimension of integration is regional: moves to strengthen ties among the South American countries of the kind I mentioned. These are now just beginning to reach to Central America, which was so utterly devastated by Reagan's terror wars that it had mostly stayed on the sidelines since, but is now beginning to move. Of particular significance are recent developments in Honduras, the classic "banana republic" and Washington's major base for its terrorist wars in the region in the 1980s. Washington's Ambassador to Honduras, John Negroponte, was one of the leading terrorist commanders of the period, and accordingly was appointed head of counter-terrorist operations by the Bush administration, a choice eliciting no comment. But here too times are changing. President Zelaya declared that US aid does not "make us vassals" or give Washington the right to humiliate the nation, and has improved ties with Venezuela, joining Petrocaribe, and in July, joining the Alba as well.
Regional integration of the kind that has been slowly proceeding for several years is a crucial prerequisite for independence, making it more difficult for the master of the hemisphere to pick off countries one by one. For that reason it is causing considerable distress in Washington, and is either ignored or regularly distorted in the media and other elite commentary.
A second form of integration is global: the establishment of South-South relations, and the diversification of markets and investment, with China a growing and particularly significant participant in hemispheric affairs. Again, these developments undercut Washington's ability to control what Secretary of War Henry Stimson called "our little region over here" at the end of World War II, when he was explaining that other regional systems must be dismantled, while our own must be strengthened.
The third and in many ways most vital form of integration is internal. Latin America is notorious for its extreme concentration of wealth and power, and the lack of responsibility of privileged elites for the welfare of the nation. It is instructive to compare Latin America with East Asia. Half a century ago, South Korea was at the level of a poor African country. Today it is an industrial powerhouse. And much the same is true throughout East Asia. The contrast to Latin America is dramatic, particularly so because Latin America has far superior natural advantages. The reasons for the dramatic contrast are not hard to identify. For 30 years Latin America has rigorously observed the rules of the Washington consensus, while East Asia has largely ignored them. Latin American elites separated themselves from the fate of their countries, while their East Asian counterparts were compelled to assume responsibilities. One measure is capital flight: in Latin America, it is on the scale of the crushing debt, while in South Korea it was so carefully controlled that it could bring the death penalty. More generally, East Asia adopted the modes of development that had enabled the wealthy countries to reach their current state, while Latin America adhered to the market principles that were imposed on the colonies and largely created the third world, blocking development.
Furthermore, needless to say, development of the East Asian style is hardly a model to which Latin America, or any other region, should aspire. The serious problems of developing truly democratic societies, based on popular control of all social, economic, political and cultural institutions, and overturning structures of hierarchy and domination in all aspects of life, are barely even on the horizon, posing formidable and essential tasks for the future.
These are huge problems within Latin America. They are beginning to be addressed, though haltingly, with many internal difficulties. And they are, of course, arousing bitter antagonism on the part of traditional sectors of power and privilege, again backed by the traditional master of "our little region over here." The struggle is particularly intense and significant right now in Bolivia, but in fact is constant in one or another form throughout the hemisphere.
The problems of Latin America and the Caribbean have global roots, and have to be addressed by regional and global solidarity along with internal struggle. The growth of the social forums, first in South America, now elsewhere, has been one of the most encouraging steps forward in recent years. These developments may bear the seeds of the first authentic international, heralding an era of true globalization - international integration in the interests of people, not investors and other concentrations of power. You are right at the heart of these dramatic developments, an exciting opportunity, a difficult challenge, a responsibility of historic proportions.
(Source: http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/18958)
By Noam Chomsky
September 30, 2008
(Caracas 9-24-08) During the past decade, Latin America has become the most exciting region of the world. The dynamic has very largely flowed from right where you are meeting, in Caracas, with the election of a leftist president dedicated to using Venezuela's rich resources for the benefit of the population rather than for wealth and privilege at home and abroad, and to promote the regional integration that is so desperately needed as a prerequisite for independence, for democracy, and for meaningful development. The initiatives taken in Venezuela have had a significant impact throughout the subcontinent, what has now come to be called "the pink tide." The impact is revealed within the individual countries, most recently Paraguay, and in the regional institutions that are in the process of formation. Among these are the Banco del Sur, an initiative that was endorsed here in Caracas a year ago by Nobel laureate in economics Joseph Stiglitz; and the ALBA, the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean, which might prove to be a true dawn if its initial promise can be realized.
The ALBA is often described as an alternative to the US-sponsored "Free Trade Area of the Americas," though the terms are misleading. It should be understood to be an independent development, not an alternative. And, furthermore, the so-called "free trade agreements" have only a limited relation to free trade, or even to trade in any serious sense of that term; and they are certainly not agreements, at least if people are part of their countries. A more accurate term would be "investor-rights arrangements," designed by multinational corporations and banks and the powerful states that cater to their interests, established mostly in secret, without public participation or awareness. That is why the US executive regularly calls for "fast-track authority" for these agreements - essentially, Kremlin-style authority.
Another regional organization that is beginning to take shape is UNASUR, the Union of South American Nations. This continental bloc, modeled on the European Union, aims to establish a South American parliament in Cochabamba, a fitting site for the UNASUR parliament. Cochabamba was not well known internationally before the water wars of 2000. But in that year events in Cochabamba became an inspiration for people throughout the world who are concerned with freedom and justice, as a result of the courageous and successful struggle against privatization of water, which awakened international solidarity and was a fine and encouraging demonstration of what can be achieved by committed activism.
The aftermath has been even more remarkable. Inspired in part by developments in Venezuela, Bolivia has forged an impressive path to true democratization in the hemisphere, with large-scale popular initiatives and meaningful participation of the organized majority of the population in establishing a government and shaping its programs on issues of great importance and popular concern, an ideal that is rarely approached elsewhere, surely not in the Colossus of the North, despite much inflated rhetoric by doctrinal managers.
Much the same had been true 15 years earlier in Haiti, the only country in the hemisphere that surpasses Bolivia in poverty - and like Bolivia, was the source of much of the wealth of Europe, later the United States. In 1990, Haiti's first free election took place. It was taken for granted in the West that the US candidate, a former World Bank official who monopolized resources, would easily win. No one was paying attention to the extensive grass-roots organizing in the slums and hills, which swept into power the populist priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Washington turned at once to undermining the feared and hated democratic government. It took only a few months for a US-backed military coup to reverse this stunning victory for democracy, and to place in power a regime that terrorized the population with the direct support of the US government, first under president Bush I, then Clinton. Washington finally permitted the elected president to return, but only on the condition that he adhere to harsh neoliberal rules that were guaranteed to crush what remained of the economy, as they did. And in 2004, the traditional torturers of Haiti, France and the US, joined to remove the elected president from office once again, launching a new regime of terror, though the people remain unvanquished, and the popular struggle continues despite extreme adversity.
All of this is familiar in Latin America, not least in Bolivia, the scene of today's most intense and dangerous confrontation between popular democracy and traditional US-backed elites. Archaeologists are now discovering that before the European conquest, Bolivia had a wealthy, sophisticated and complex society - to quote their words, "one of the largest, strangest, and most ecologically rich artificial environments on the face of the planet, with causeways and canals, spacious and formal towns and considerable wealth," creating a landscape that was "one of humankind's greatest works of art, a masterpiece." And of course Bolivia's vast mineral wealth enriched Spain and indirectly northern Europe, contributing massively to its economic and cultural development, including the industrial and scientific revolutions. Then followed a bitter history of imperial savagery with the crucial connivance of rapacious domestic elites, factors that are very much alive today.
Sixty years ago, US planners regarded Bolivia and Guatemala as the greatest threats to its domination of the hemisphere. In both cases, Washington succeeded in overthrowing the popular governments, but in different ways. In Guatemala, Washington resorted to the standard technique of violence, installing one of the world's most brutal and vicious regimes, which extended its criminality to virtual genocide in the highlands during Reagan's murderous terrorist wars of the 1980s - and we might bear in mind that these horrendous atrocities were carried out under the guise of a "war on terror," a war that was re-declared by George Bush in September 2001, not declared, a revealing distinction when we recall the implementation of Reagan's "war on terror" and its grim human consequences.
In Guatemala, the Eisenhower administration overcame the threat of democracy and independent development by violence. In Bolivia, it achieved much the same results by exploiting Bolivia's economic dependence on the US, particularly for processing Bolivia's tin exports. Latin America scholar Stephen Zunes points out that "At a critical point in the nation's effort to become more self-sufficient [in the early 1950s], the U.S. government forced Bolivia to use its scarce capital not for its own development, but to compensate the former mine owners and repay its foreign debts."
The economic policies forced on Bolivia in those years were a precursor of the structural adjustment programs imposed on the continent thirty years later, under the terms of the neoliberal "Washington consensus," which has generally had disastrous effects wherever its strictures have been observed. By now, the victims of neoliberal market fundamentalism are coming to include the rich countries, where the curse of financial liberalization is bringing about the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s and leading to massive state intervention in a desperate effort to rescue collapsing financial institutions.
We should note that this is a regular feature of contemporary state capitalism, though the scale today is unprecedented. A study by two well-known international economists 15 years ago found that at least twenty companies in the top Fortune 100 would not have survived if they had not been saved by their respective governments, and that many of the rest gained substantially by demanding that governments "socialise their losses." Such government intervention "has been the rule rather than the exception over the past two centuries," they conclude from a detailed analysis. [Ruigrok and von Tulder]
We might also take note of the striking similarity between the structural adjustment programs imposed on the weak by the International Monetary Fund, and the huge financial bailout that is on the front pages today in the North. The US executive-director of the IMF, adopt ing an image from the Mafia, described the institution as "the credit community's enforcer." Under the rules of the Western-run international economy, investors make loans to third world tyrannies, and since the loans carry considerable risk, make enormous profits. Suppose the borrower defaults. In a capitalist economy, the lenders would incur the loss. But really existing capitalism functions quite differently. If the borrowers cannot pay the debts, then the IMF steps in to guarantee that lenders and investors are protected. The debt is transferred to the poor population of the debtor country, who never borrowed the money in the first place and gained little if anything from it. That is called "structural adjustment." And taxpayers in the rich country, who also gained nothing from the loans, sustain the IMF through their taxes. These doctrines do not derive from economic theory; they merely reflect the distribution of decision-making power.
The designers of the international economy sternly demand that the poor accept market discipline, but they ensure that they themselves are protected from its ravages, a useful arrangement that goes back to the origins of modern industrial capitalism, and played a large role in dividing the world into rich and poor societies, the first and third worlds.
This wonderful anti-market system designed by self-proclaimed market enthusiasts is now being implemented in the United States, to deal with the very ominous crisis of financial markets. In general, markets have well-known inefficiencies. One is that transactions do not take into account the effect on others who are not party to the transaction. These so-called "externalities" can be huge. That is particularly so in the case of financial institutions. Their task is to take risks, and if well-managed, to ensure that potential losses to themselves will be covered. To themselves. Under capitalist rules, it is not their business to consider the cost to others if their practices lead to financial crisis, as they regularly do. In economists' terms, risk is underpriced, because systemic risk is not priced into decisions. That leads to repeated crisis, naturally. At that point, we turn to the IMF solution. The costs are transferred to the public, which had nothing to do with the risky choices but is now compelled to pay the costs - in the US, perhaps mounting to about $1 trillion right now. And of course the public has no voice in determining these outcomes, any more than poor peasants have a voice in being subjected to cruel structural adjustment programs.
A basic principle of modern state capitalism is that cost and risk are socialized, while profit is privatized. That principle extends far beyond financial institutions. Much the same is true for the entire advanced economy, which relies extensively on the dynamic state sector for innovation, for basic research and development, for procurement when purchasers are unavailable, for direct bail-outs, and in numerous other ways. These mechanisms are the domestic counterpart of imperial and neocolonial hegemony, formalized in World Trade Organization rules and the misleadingly named "free trade agreements."
Financial liberalization has effects well beyond the economy. It has long been understood that it is a powerful weapon against democracy Free capital movement creates what some international economists have called a "virtual parliament" of investors and lenders, who can closely monitor government programs and "vote" against them if they are considered irrational: for the benefit of people, rather than concentrated private power. They can "vote" by capital flight, attacks on currencies, and other devices offered by financial liberalization. That is one reason why the Bretton Woods system established by the US and UK after World War II instituted capital controls and regulated currencies. The Great Depression and the war had aroused powerful radical democratic currents, taking many forms, from the anti-fascist resistance to working class organization. These pressures made it necessary to permit social democratic policies. The Bretton Woods system was designed in part to create a space for government action responding to public will - for some measure of democracy, that is. John Maynard Keynes, the British negotiator, considered the most important achievement of Bretton Woods to be establishment of the right of governments to restrict capital movement. In dramatic contrast, in the neoliberal phase after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the US Treasury now regards free capital mobility as a "fundamental right," unlike such alleged "rights" as those guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: health, education, decent employment, security, and other rights that the Reagan and Bush administrations have dismissed as "letters to Santa Claus," "preposterous," mere "myths."
In earlier years the public had not been much of a problem. The reasons are reviewed by Barry Eichengreen in his standard scholarly history of the international monetary system. He explains that in the 19th century, governments had not yet been "politicized by universal male suffrage and the rise of trade unionism and parliamentary labor parties." Therefore the severe costs imposed by the virtual parliament could be transferred to the general population. But with the radicalization of the general public during the Great Depression and the anti-fascist war, that luxury was no longer available to private power and wealth. Hence in the Bretton Woods system, "limits on capital mobility substituted for limits on democracy as a source of insulation from market pressures." It is only necessary to add the obvious corollary: with the dismantling of the system from the 1970s, functioning democracy is restricted. It has therefore become necessary to control and marginalize the public in some fashion, processes that are particularly evident in the more business-run societies like the United States. The management of electoral extravaganzas by the Public Relations industry is one illustration.
The primary victims of military terror and economic strangulation are the poor and weak, within the rich countries themselves and far more brutally in the South. But times are changing. In Venezuela, in Bolivia, and elsewhere there are promising efforts to bring about desperately needed structural and institutional changes. And not surprisingly, these efforts to promote democracy, social justice, and cultural rights are facing harsh challenges from the traditional rulers, at home and internationally.
For the first time in half a millennium, South America is beginning to take its fate into its own hands. There have been attempts before, but they have been crushed by outside force, as in the cases I just mentioned and other hideous ones too numerous and too familiar to review. But there are now significant departures from a long and shameful history. The departures are symbolized by the UNASUR crisis summit in Santiago just a few days ago. At the summit, the presidents of the South American countries issued a strong statement of support for the elected Morales government, which as you know is under attack by the traditional rulers: privileged Europeanized elites who bitterly oppose Bolivian democracy and social justice and, routinely, enjoy the firm backing of the master of the hemisphere. The South American leaders gathering at the UNASUR summit in Santiago declared "their full and firm support for the constitutional government of President Evo Morales, whose mandate was ratified by a big majority" -- referring, of course, to his overwhelming victory in the recent referendum. Morales thanked UNASUR for its support, observing that "For the first time in South America's history, the countries of our region are deciding how to resolve our problems, without the presence of the United States."
A matter of no slight significance.
The significance of the UNASUR support for democracy in Bolivia is underscored by the fact that the leading media in the US refused to report it, though editors and correspondents surely knew all about it. Ample information was available to them on wire services.
That has been a familiar pattern. To cite just one of many examples, the Cochabamba declaration of South American leaders in December 2006, calling for moves towards integration on the model of the European Union, was barred from the Free Press in the traditional ruler of the hemisphere. There are many other cases, all illustrating the same fear among the political class and economic centers in the US that the hemisphere is slipping from their control.
Current developments in South America are of historic significance for the continent and its people. It is well understood in Washington that these developments threaten not only its domination of the hemisphere, but also its global dominance. Control of Latin America was the earliest goal of US foreign policy, tracing back to the earliest days of the Republic. The United States is, I suppose, the only country that was founded as a "nascent empire," in George Washington's words. The most libertarian of the Founding Fathers, Thomas Jefferson, predicted that the newly liberated colonies would drive the indigenous population "with the beasts of the forests into the Stony Mountains," and the country will ultimately be "free of blot or mixture," red or black (with the return of slaves to Africa after eventual ending of slavery). And furthermore, it "will be the nest, from which all America, North and South, is to be peopled," displacing not only the red men but the Latin population of the South.
These aspirations were not achieved, but control of Latin America remains a central policy goal, partly for resources and markets, but also for broader ideological and geostrategic reasons. If the US cannot control Latin America, it cannot expect "to achieve a successful order elsewhere in the world," Nixon's National Security Council concluded in 1971 while considering the paramount importance of destroying Chilean democracy. Historian David Schmitz observes that Allende "threatened American global interests by challenging the whole ideological basis of American Cold War policy. It was the threat of a successful socialist state in Chile that could provide a model for other nations that caused concern and led to American opposition," in fact direct participation in establishing and maintaining the terrorist dictatorship. Henry Kissinger warned that success for democratic socialism in Chile might have reverberations as far as southern Europe - not because Chilean hordes would descend on Madrid and Rome, but because success might inspire popular movements to achieve their goals by means of parliamentary democracy, which is upheld as an abstract value in the West, but with crucial reservations.
Even mainstream scholarship recognizes that Washington has supported democracy if and only if it contributes to strategic and economic interests, a policy that continues without change through all administrations, to the present.
These pervasive concerns are the rational form of the domino theory, sometimes more accurately called "the threat of a good example." For such reasons, even the tiniest departure from strict obedience is regarded as an existential threat that calls for a harsh response: peasant organizing in remote communities of northern Laos, fishing cooperatives in Grenada, and so on throughout the world. It is necessary to ensure that the "virus" of successful independent development does not "spread contagion" elsewhere, in the terminology of the highest level planners.
Such concerns have motivated US military intervention, terrorism, and economic warfare throughout the post-World War II era, in Latin America and throughout much of the world. These are leading features of the Cold War. The superpower confrontation regularly provided pretexts, mostly fraudulent, much as the junior partner in world control appealed to the threat of the West when it crushed popular uprisings in its much narrower Eastern European domains.
But times are changing. In Latin America, the source is primarily in moves towards integration, which has several dimensions. One dimension of integration is regional: moves to strengthen ties among the South American countries of the kind I mentioned. These are now just beginning to reach to Central America, which was so utterly devastated by Reagan's terror wars that it had mostly stayed on the sidelines since, but is now beginning to move. Of particular significance are recent developments in Honduras, the classic "banana republic" and Washington's major base for its terrorist wars in the region in the 1980s. Washington's Ambassador to Honduras, John Negroponte, was one of the leading terrorist commanders of the period, and accordingly was appointed head of counter-terrorist operations by the Bush administration, a choice eliciting no comment. But here too times are changing. President Zelaya declared that US aid does not "make us vassals" or give Washington the right to humiliate the nation, and has improved ties with Venezuela, joining Petrocaribe, and in July, joining the Alba as well.
Regional integration of the kind that has been slowly proceeding for several years is a crucial prerequisite for independence, making it more difficult for the master of the hemisphere to pick off countries one by one. For that reason it is causing considerable distress in Washington, and is either ignored or regularly distorted in the media and other elite commentary.
A second form of integration is global: the establishment of South-South relations, and the diversification of markets and investment, with China a growing and particularly significant participant in hemispheric affairs. Again, these developments undercut Washington's ability to control what Secretary of War Henry Stimson called "our little region over here" at the end of World War II, when he was explaining that other regional systems must be dismantled, while our own must be strengthened.
The third and in many ways most vital form of integration is internal. Latin America is notorious for its extreme concentration of wealth and power, and the lack of responsibility of privileged elites for the welfare of the nation. It is instructive to compare Latin America with East Asia. Half a century ago, South Korea was at the level of a poor African country. Today it is an industrial powerhouse. And much the same is true throughout East Asia. The contrast to Latin America is dramatic, particularly so because Latin America has far superior natural advantages. The reasons for the dramatic contrast are not hard to identify. For 30 years Latin America has rigorously observed the rules of the Washington consensus, while East Asia has largely ignored them. Latin American elites separated themselves from the fate of their countries, while their East Asian counterparts were compelled to assume responsibilities. One measure is capital flight: in Latin America, it is on the scale of the crushing debt, while in South Korea it was so carefully controlled that it could bring the death penalty. More generally, East Asia adopted the modes of development that had enabled the wealthy countries to reach their current state, while Latin America adhered to the market principles that were imposed on the colonies and largely created the third world, blocking development.
Furthermore, needless to say, development of the East Asian style is hardly a model to which Latin America, or any other region, should aspire. The serious problems of developing truly democratic societies, based on popular control of all social, economic, political and cultural institutions, and overturning structures of hierarchy and domination in all aspects of life, are barely even on the horizon, posing formidable and essential tasks for the future.
These are huge problems within Latin America. They are beginning to be addressed, though haltingly, with many internal difficulties. And they are, of course, arousing bitter antagonism on the part of traditional sectors of power and privilege, again backed by the traditional master of "our little region over here." The struggle is particularly intense and significant right now in Bolivia, but in fact is constant in one or another form throughout the hemisphere.
The problems of Latin America and the Caribbean have global roots, and have to be addressed by regional and global solidarity along with internal struggle. The growth of the social forums, first in South America, now elsewhere, has been one of the most encouraging steps forward in recent years. These developments may bear the seeds of the first authentic international, heralding an era of true globalization - international integration in the interests of people, not investors and other concentrations of power. You are right at the heart of these dramatic developments, an exciting opportunity, a difficult challenge, a responsibility of historic proportions.
(Source: http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/18958)
Wednesday, January 21, 2009
DECLARACION DEL II ENCUENTRO NACIONAL AFROVENEZOLANO
DECLARACION DEL II ENCUENTRO NACIONAL AFROVENEZOLANO
DEL 17 AL 20 DE JULIO DE 2008, 19/8/08
CARACAS
Nosotros y nosotras, mujeres y hombres afrodescendientes de la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, nos hemos reunido en la ciudad de Caracas, durante los días 18, 19 y 20 de Julio de 2008 en las instalaciones del Museo de Bellas Artes, bajo la coordinación de la Red de organizaciones Afrovenezolana, Con los auspicios del Despacho del Viceministerio para África (Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Relaciones Exteriores, el Ministerio del Poder Popular Para la Agricultura y Tierra, Comision Presidencial Contra el Racismo y Direccion de Interculturalidad del Ministerio del Poder Popular Para la Educación, Ministerio de Informacion y Comunicación, IAEM, Oficina de Enlace con Comuinandes Afrodescendientes, Museo de Bellas Artes del Ministerio, Subcomisión Afrodescendientes de la Asamblea Nacional), Inapymi, Parlamento Andino, Instituto Nacional de la Mujer convocados por nuestros ancestros y ancestras Rey Miguel, Andresote, Guillermo Rivas, Manucha Algarin, Jose Leonardo Chirino, Argelia Laya, Josefina Brington, Irene Ugueto, Juan Ramón Lugo
CONSIDERANDO
La necesidad de fomentar la participación de las comunidades Afrovenezolanas en el proceso de la Refundación de la República, para contribuir a la ruptura del cerco de la exclusión etnosocial, signada por la discrimación y el racismo por mas de quinientos años.
CONSIDERANDO
Que la Constitución de la República Bolivariana consagra en su artículo 62 que "la participación del pueblo en la formación, ejecución y control de la gestión pública es el medio necesario para lograr el protagonismo que garantice su completo desarrollo, tanto individual como colectivo. Es obligación del Estado y deber de la Sociedad facilitar la generación de las condiciones mas favorables para su práctica".
CONSIDERANDO
La necesidad de desarrollar una política de articulación internacional con organizaciones de las Américas, el Caribe y África, que luchan contra el racismo, la exclusión y los procesos de liberación, aunándose a la construcción de un mundo multipolar y anti- imperialista.
CONSIDERANDO
Que la implementación de la directiva del Retorno, liderizada por la Unión Europea es semejante al proyecto de Higiene Racial, practicada durante el Gobierno de Adolfo Hitler, violando de esta manera las convenciones Internacionales en la esfera de los Derechos Humanos y el Plan de Acción de Durban.
CONSIDERANDO
Que nuestro pais es firmante del III PLAN DE ACCION CONTRA EL RACISMO, dado en la ciudad de Durba (Surafrica) en el año 2001
CONSIDERANDO
Que la comunidad Afrcolombiana sufre los traumas del desplamiento masivo, ejecusiones selectivas de liderez y liderezas como resultado del Plan Colombia y los conflictos armados
CONSIDERANDO
Que dentro del proceso de integración continental a través del proyecto Alternativa Bolivariana de los Pueblos (ALBA), aun no ha ido considerado un grueso de la poblacion afrodescendientes de las Américas que vive en condicioens de pobreza extremas
CONSIDERANDO
Que el valeroso pueblo haitiano esta sufriendo los rigores de la desestabilización, al exclusion y la discriminación
CONSIDERANDO
Que desde su fundación, la Red de Organizaciones Afrovenezolanas ha ido creciendo cualitativamente en la afinación de sus practicas y estrategias discursivas que han enriquecido el proceso Bolivariano, así como la sensibilización de un sector del estado y la sociedad venezolana en general sobre la ausencia de políticas hacia este segmento de la afrovenezonalidad que sigue viviendo en condiciones de pobreza.
CONSIDERANDO
Que en las comunidades Afrovenezolanas el proceso Bolivariano ha recibido un contundente apoyo, evidenciado en el respaldo a las iniciativas planteadas por el imarron Presidente Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías en los nueve años de revolución.
CONSIDERANDO
La urgencia de lograr el reconocimiento de las y los afrodescendientes en las políticas publicas del Estado venezolano.
CONSIDERANDO
La necesidad de establecer proyectos y programas en los distintos ente del estado para el desarrollo sistémico de las comunidades Afrovenezolanas.
CONSIDERANDO
Que las heroinas afrodescendientes jugaron un papel en el campo de la ética en los procesos libertario e independentista, tacando entre ellas la Negra Matea e Hipolita por su rol jugado en la formacion de los valores de solidaridad y sentido humano del libertador Simon Bolívar.
CONSIDERANDO
Que actualmente la Asamblea Nacional adelanta esfuerzo en la discusión de leyes que favorecen el desarrollo de las mujeres venezolanas
La necesidad de que el gobierno Bolivariano y el Estado en general, pasen del dicho al hecho concreto en la implementación de políticas que incluyan concientemente a la población Afrovenezolana:
DECLARAMOS:
1- Exigir al Estado la facilitación de mecanismos jurídicos y ejecutivos que posibiliten la participación conciente de las y los afrodescendientes en el diseño, ejecución control y evaluacion de las políticas públicas
2- Desarrollar acciones conjuntas con organizaciones hermanas del mundo entero para denunciar las prácticas racista que siguen presente en países de América, el Caribe, Europa, África y Asia.
3.- Rechazar categóricamente la legislación racista de la Directiva del Retorno aprobada recientemente por el parlamento europeo. Exigir al Gobierno Venezolano a traves de sus instituciones activar el Plan de Acción de la III Conferencia Internacional Contra el Racismo.
4- Profundizar el trabajo organizativo y formativo de los y las militantes a lo interno de la Red de Organizaciones Afrovenezolanas.
Exigir al gobierno del Presidente Uribe cesar las agresiones contra las comunidades afrocolombianas y condenamos el Plan Colombia por militarista y terrorista.
Exigir al Gobierno Bolivariano profundizar la solidaridad con el pueblo haitiano.
5- Reiterar que nuestra organización acompaña de manera contundente, en el marco del pensamiento critico afrodescendiente, el proceso de transformaciones profundas de la sociedad venezolana que lideriza el Cimarron Presidente Hugo Chávez Frias.
6- Sumarse a la campaña, iniciada por el Viceministro Para Africa, de llevar al Panteon Nacional a la Negra Matea y a la Negra Hipolita.
7- Lograr la incorporación del Cumbe de Mujeres afrovenezolanas, para apoyar el esfuerzo que viene realizando la Asamblea Nacional, a través de las discusiones sobre la ley de protección social para las amas de casa y la ley de igualda y equidad de genero, para garantizar la visibilización de las mujeres afrovenezolanas en las mismas.
8- Exigir al Poder Legislativo, a los Ministerios del Poder Popular para la Educación, Cultura, Comunicación e información, Telecomunicaciones, Ciencia y Tecnología, Ambiente, Agricultura y Tierra, salud y demás entes de los poderes. públicos la instrumentación de políticas que favorezcan la inclusión de las y los afrodescendientes.
9- Solicitar al Poder Ejecutivo la creación del Vice Ministerio para la Atención de la Mujer Afrodescendiente en el seno del Ministerio de Asuntos Para la Mujer.
10- Reiterar la necesidad de introducir una enmienda constitucional que incorpore los derechos de los pueblos afrovenezolanos y la indemnización compensatoria por los siglos de esclavitud, genocidio y discriminación sufridos.
11- Exigir la incorporación de los jóvenes afrodescendientes en la Reforma de la Ley de Juventud a fin de visibilizar este sector de la población juvenil en este instrumento jurídico.
AFRODESCENDIENTES PARA PROFUNDIZAR LA REVOLUCION
Carcas 19 de julio del 2008.....a 154 años de la abolicion de la esclavitud
Conclusión: el II Encuentro Nacional Afrovenezolano - Concluye Hoy en el Museo de Bellas Artes, 19/7/08
"El Estado está en mora con los afrovenezolanos"
Piden a Chávez pasar de la palabra a los hechos Se aprobó crear una Ley contra Discriminación Racial
Caracas. "Al proceso bolivariano le falta dar el salto cualitativo para construir un modelo de sociedad antirracista y discriminatoria", es una de las conclusiones del II Encuentro Nacional Afrovenezolano que, tras tres días de deliberaciones, concluye hoy en el Museo de Bellas Artes.
Así lo dio a conocer Jesús "Chucho" García, miembro de la Red de Organizaciones Afrovenezolanas, quien aclaró que "no tenemos un Estado expresamente racista, pero sí una sociedad donde aún existen focos racistas y discriminatorios que se expresan, por ejemplo, en muchos medios de comunicación, en algunas instituciones del Estado y empresas privadas donde han discriminado personas por su color de piel desechando su capacidad intelectual y técnica. De eso hay denuncias en el Ministerio del Trabajo. También se les impide la entrada en algunas discotecas. Por eso es importante la Ley contra la Discriminación Racial", señaló.
Este encuentro se llevó a cabo con el fin de evaluar las políticas que se han venido impulsando durante ocho años como organización social y, al mismo tiempo, detectar cuáles son los déficit del Estado en 10 años del proceso bolivariano con respecto a las comunidades afrovenezolanas", señaló.
También persigue elaborar el Plan Quinquenal 2008-2013 de las comunidades afrovenezolanas en las áreas tierra y desarrollo agrícola, tecnología y comunicación, mujer, jóvenes, indicadores sociales, educación y legislación, "ejes en que se ha avanzado en estos ocho años en el proceso de sensibilización hacia el afrodescendiente, pero falta que se concreten", indicó.
Destacó que, comparado con países como Brasil, Ecuador, Colombia y Nicaragua, que tienen espacios públicos y legislaciones concretas para la población afro, el Estado venezolano es el más atrasado en el reconocimiento a la población afrovenezolana. "La ausencia del Estado y sus políticas para atender los profundos problemas de nuestras comunidades se sienten en la cotidianidad, sin soluciones concretas ni de calidad", expresó.
Las conclusiones del evento se elevarán al presidente Chávez "porque él tiene una deuda con la población afrovenezolana. Es el único Presidente, después de 154 años de haberse abolido la esclavitud, que se ha asumido afro, pero que ahora debe pasar de la declaración a la concreción, es decir, pasar de la palabra a los hechos".
En el encuentro, se aprobó incluir a la mujer afro en las políticas públicas, propuesta de la ministra María León; ampliar el concepto de interculturalidad para incluir a los afrovenezolanos en el nuevo currículo educativo; crear la Ley contra la Discriminación Racial; y revisar el Código Penal con el fin de penalizar el racismo, una propuesta del diputado Modesto Ruiz, entre otros.
ANTECEDENTES
Nacimiento
La Red de Organizaciones Afrovenezolanas nace el 16 de junio de 2000.
Finalidad
Luchar por el reconocimiento de los aportes morales, políticos, sociales, culturales, económicos y espirituales de las y los africanos y sus descendientes.
Población
Se estima que la población afrovenezolana supera 30% de los habitantes del país.
Actualmente, se está trabajando con el Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE) para que en el Censo de 2010 también se cuenten y, en consecuencia, saber cuántos son, dónde y cómo están.
Afrovenezolanos Exigen Profundizar la Revolucion, 11/7/08, Prensa Afrovenezolana
Durante los dias 17 al 20 de julio se estara realizando el II Encuentro Nacional Afrovenezolano, donde participaran delegados y delagadas de catorce estado del pais para elaborar el plan quinquenal 2008/2013 para el desarrollo integral de las comunidades afrodescendiente en el pais.
La Red de organizaciones Afrovenezolanas, nacio en San Jose de Barlovento, Estado Miranda a mediados del mes de junio del 2000 en el marco de la nueva Constitucion de la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela donde se expresa el principio de participion activa de la comunidad organizada con miras a poner en practica el princio de DEMOCRACIA PROTAGONICA Y PARTICIPATIVA. Mas de veinte organizaciones afrovenezolanas definieron sus lineas estrategicas de accion e insertarse en el proceso bolivariano con una agenda propia que permitiera llenar las ausencias de politicas publicas hacia este componente venezolano marginado por mas de medio siglo y ubicado bajo la linea de la exclusion, el racsimo y la discriminacion. Desde el 2000 hasta nuestro dias esta organizacion ha logrado hacer una ruptura con la vision folclorica y estereotipada que los gobiernos y la sociedad global tenian hacia la poblacion afro y salto, de esa vision reduccionista, a una vision de participacion en lo politico y develar la situacion que se encontraban mas de 5 mil comunidades afro en mas de cincuenta municipio de todo el pais donde la educacion, la salud, el tema de la tierra, la ausencia de servicios basicos, necesiaddes basicas insatisfecha,violencia intrafamiliar, entre otros problemas, dejan mucho que desear a psear d e als buenas intencioens del gobierno bolivariano durante esta deacada. La Red logro colocar el tema afro en la boca del presidente Chavez, de algunas instituciones del gobierno, en los medios de comuicacion tanto privado como publicos, fuimos los primeros en denunciar el paramilitarismo y la actitud racsita del exalcalde Alfredo Pena, que para ese entonces era considerado un revolucionario, pero ademas de ello lla Red Afro avanzo en el tema del curriculum educativo asi como la redimension de la interculturalidad, en los indicadores sociales y estadisticas, en el tema de la mujer, en el reconocimiento del racismo como cancer que afecta a la sociedad venezolana y la elaboracion de propuesta juridicas para combatir esas aberraciones humanas.
PROFUNDIZAR LA REVOLUCION
El 17 de diciembre del 2007, la Red Afrovenezolana asumio su posicion revolucionaria de profundizar el proceso de Democracia participativa sumada a una corriente critica del pensamiento, inspirado en el Rey Miguel, Andresote, Chirino, Guillermo Rivas, ARgelia Laya, Josefina Brington, Amilcar Cabral, Shankara, entre otros, como guias para la accion contra las deformaciones del proceso bolivariano tales como la corrupcion, el monopolio de la democracia participativa pro un sector del proceso convertida en democracia endogena e individualizada, la ineficacia institucional asi como la necesidad de articular con los movimientos afrorevolucionarias con America y el Caribe y Africa para enriquecer con ideas la experiencia democratica venezolana. Los temas a abordar en este segundo Encuentro Afrovenezolano son: Educacion, Mujeres, Jovenes, Indicadores sociales, el problema de la tierra, ciencia/comunicacion y tecnologia,y los aspectos juridicos.La particiapcion para este segundo encuentro sera restringida solo por invitacion pues se trata de elaborar un plan y discutir las estrategias y las acciones acorto y mediano plazo. De todas maneras para cualquier informacion llamar al telefo 212 506 86 71 y escribir al e/mail jesuschuchogarcia_AT_hotmail.com, aldeatapipa_AT_hotmail.com afrojuvenilbarlovento_AT_hotmail.com cnirva03_AT_hotmail.com
A 154 años de la abolición de la esclavitud ....la deuda continua, 23/3/08
Colectivo Red Afrovenezolana
La lucha por la libertad de las esclavitudes en Venezuela, fue una iniciativa de los y las africanas y sus descendientes desde que fueron secuestrado de África al sur del desierto del Sahara, o mejor conocida como África Subsahariana, para ser convertido en esclavizados. Esa luchas libertarias se remontan desde la gesta heroica del Rey Miguel, en las minas de Buría, Estado Yaracuy en 1553, seguida por Andrés López del Rosario en la zona de Veroes, Estado Yaracuy durante los a/nos de 1728 a 1732. Los levantamientos de esclavizados y transformados en Cimarrones en los valles de Barlovento desde 1768 a 1771, liderizados por el cimarrón Guillermo Rivas, y por supuesto,el levantamiento en la siera del Falcon, Jose Leonardo Chirino,, catalogada por la historia oficial como movimiento preindependentista en 1795. La participación en innumerables batallas por la libertad, ya habían entrenado a miles de cimarrones que luego se incorporarían a las Guerras de Independencias por la libertad de Venezuela. Un cuadro de proclamas, decretos e intenciones jurídicas por abolir la esclavitud se iniciaría desde 1810 hasta el Congreso constituyente de la Gran Colombia, donde Bolívar propone la abolición de la esclavitud en Venezuela, el cual no fue escuchado por la élite de los blancos criollos que dirigían la nueva Republica Venezolana. En definitiva fue el 24 de marzo de 1854, cuando el presidente José Gregorio Monagas, procedió a firmar el decreto de la abolición de la esclavitud, en el cual se dejó en libertad 'casi condicional' a miles de hombres mujeres y niños sometidos a la pésima esclavitud que generó a lo largo de más de medio milenio el terrible trauma del racismo, la discriminación y la marginación.
Afrodescendientes hoy...cual es la agenda?
En Venezuela, aun hoy en pleno proceso bolivariano, el movimiento afro venezolano, conciente de su rol histórico, ha insistido en colocar el tema del racismo, la discriminación racial y la exclusión a que siguen siendo sometidos miles afrovenezolanos, en las políticas públicas, a pesar del esfuerzo del gobierno, pero sin embargo a 154 años de la abolicion de la esclavitud, mas de 60 municipio afroveneozlanas asi lo evidencian. Dentro de las lineas de orientacion que tiene el movimiento afrovenezolano destacan:
* Profundizar el tema curricular en el sistema educativo Bolivariano, reconociendo y desarrollando el tema afro;
* Avanzar hacia la consolidacion de un sistema de informacion estadisticos de las comunidades afro;
* Impulsar en las leyes organicas (como cultura y educacion) el reconcomiento del tema afro, asi como la elaboracion de una ley contra el racismo y la discrminacion racial e incorporar la penalizacion del racismo en el Condigo penal venezolano.
* Exigir la demarcion de tierras cimarronas/tierras comuneras.
En el plano internacional la Red de Organziaciones Afrovenezolanas se plantea lo siguiente:
* Avanzar hacia la integracion del movimiento afrodescendientes y transformaciones revolucionarias a nivel de las Americas y el Caribe
* Participar activamente en la concrecion del Plan de Accion de la Tercera Conferencia Mundial Contra el Racismo (conocido como Plan de Accion de Durban)
* Iniciar acciones de solidaridad y con el pueblo afrocolombiana que sufre desplazamineto continuo frente a las confrontaciones militares en sus territorios
* Profundizar la lucha contra el racismo y la solidaridad con la diaspora africana a nivel mundial y promover alianzas con los movimiento sociales progresistas de Africa.
Mayo mes de la afrovenezolanidad
En el 2004, la Red de Organizaciones afrovenezolanas, lanzo el MES DE LA AFROVENEZOLANIDAD, aprobado en una acuerdo por unanimidad de la Asamblea Nacional de Venezuela y tambien fue aprobada la orden Jose Leonardo Chirino, la cual fue entregda a Danny Glover, Argelia Laya, Josefina Brington, Irenes Ugueto y JUan Ramon Lugo. A partir del mes de marzo se estaran realizando actividades sobre este dia de la abolicion de la esclavitud, siendo unas de ella un foro organizado por la Comision Preisdencial Contra el Racismo.
En ese sentido la Red Afro arranca su programacion el dia 26 de abril, en la poblacion de Nirgua, donde se dara inicio a LA RUTA DE LOS CIMARRONES en homenaje al Rey Miguel, despues se realizara el ENCUENTRO NACIONAL AFROVENEZOLANIDAD e INTERCULTURALIDAD, se continuara con el dia del cimarron, 25 de mayo en Palmarejo (Yaracuy), El Ultimo Barco Negrero, 26 de mayo en Puerto Cabello. Visite la pagina web de la red afro www.redafroavenezolana.com
Fechas a recordar
14 de agosto de 1810, eliminación del trafico de esclavizados en Venezuela
Decreto de abolición de la esclavitud el 2 de junio de 1816, dictado por Simón Bolívar en Carúpano.
Decreto de abolición de la esclavitud en Venezuela el 6 de julio de 1816. Decretado pro Simón Bolívar en Ocumare de la Costa.
Discurso de Angostura, hoy Ciudad Bolívar el 15 de febrero de 1819, donde Bolívar implora sea abolida la Esclavitud.
14 de julio de 1821, se pide de nuevo la Abolición de la Esclavitud.
23 de abril DIA DEL REY MIGUEL. NIRGUA. ESTADO YARACUY.
6 de Julio 1816 NI/NOS ESCLAVIZADOS DE CHUAO TOMADO POR BOLIVAR PARA LA GUERRA DE INDEPENDENCIA
25 de mayo DIA DEL CIMARRON
26 DE MAYO fecha que llego el ULTIMO BARCO NEGRERO barco negrero a costas venezolanas. Puerto Cabello. Estado Carabobo
10 de mayo levantamiento de JOSE LEONARDO CHIRINO
23 de septiembre DIA DE LA SANTA AFROCATOLICA SANTA EFIGENIA
10 de noviembre de 1771, asesinato del CIMARRON GUILLERMO RIVAS, mango de Ocoytaup.gif (925 bytes)
THE AFROVENEZUELAN NETWORK AND THE PARAMILITARY MENACE, 3/5/08
by Jesus "Chucho" Garcia
From its foundation in 2000, the Afrovenezuelan Network had systematically denounced first the threat from Plan Colombia and second the so called Plan Patriotic as a threat to the stability of the Andean region -- this plan is based on military aims with the goal of ending drug trafficking in the Region. Under the administration of President Uribe Vélez, the Plan Patriotic was implemented and started to deepen the military and terrorist character implemented against groups like the FARC and the ELN who for many years have been holding anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchical positions and have been recognized as belligerent political actors before governments like Venezuela and Mexico.
The results of the Plan Colombia and Patriotic Plan is expressed in an increase of Colombian troops to almost half a million men, an increase in highly sophisticated weapons, the creation of new military bases with the support of the government of the United States, in different areas of the Colombian territory, towards the border of Ecuador and Venezuela, with the effective cooperation of more than two thousand of American military that strengthen the Colombian Self-defense units, better known as the paramilitary.
All this resulted in almost three million displaced Colombians, of which sixty percent were Afrocolombians, and 31,000 people disappeared, 1771 unionists assassinated, ten thousand victims in common graves. When a process just began to reduce the FARC's belligerent character, a process that could contribute to bring the peace in Colombia, expressed by the humanitarian exchange under the leadership of the Afrocolombian woman Senator Piedad Cordova and President Chávez, the government of Uribe Velez began to sabotage this process. Their most recent move was to violate the Democratic Chart of the Organization of American States, specifically the article 21 about not violating the national territory of another country, and Colombian armed forces trespassed the Ecuadorian border, killing 20 guerrilla FARC members, among them the commander Raul Reyes, who was the leader of the project of humanitarian exchange.
The Afrovenezuelan Network strongly condemns the intrusion of Colombian soldiers along with US forces into the territory of our Ecuatorian brothers. We demand the immediate closing of the Military Base of Manta (in Ecuador). We condemn the policy of Uribe who took away the Afrocolombians' territory, after the constitutional approval of their right over this space more than fifteen years ago established in the “Law Seventy” of Afrocolombians communities, we express our support to Senator Piedad Cordova in her brave efforts to continue in the humanitarian exchange.
Summit of the Network of AfroVenezuelan Organizations
Caracas, March 5, 2008 up.gif (925 bytes)
LA RED AFROVENEZOLANA ANTE LA AMENAZA PARAMILITAR, 5/3/08
por Jesus "Chucho" Garcia
Desde su fundación en el año 2000, la Red de Organizaciones Afrovenezolanas había venido denunciando sistemáticamente la amenaza del Plan Colombia, en primera instancia y luego el Plan Patriota como una amenaza para desestabilización del área andina, con fines estrictamente militaristas bajo el mandato de acabar con el narcotráfico. En la gestión del gobierno del actual presidente Uribe Vélez, se lanza el plan patriota que va a profundizar el carácter militarista y terrorista implementando contra fuerzas militares insurgente como FARC y el ELN, quienes desde hace muchos años han mantenido posición antiimperialista y antioligarquica y habían sido reconocidas como actores políticos beligerantes ante gobiernos como el de Venezuela y México.
Los resultado del Plan Colombia y Plan Patriota, se expresa en un aumento de las fuerzas militares colombianas a un número de casi medio millón de hombres, armamentos súper sofisticados, establecimientos de nuevas bases militares con el apoyo del gobierno de los Estados Unidos, en diferentes espacios del territorio colombiano y hacia la frontera de Ecuador y Venezuela, con participación efectiva de mas de dos mil autodefensas militares estadounidenses súper entrenados y fortaleciendo el aparto de las denominadas Autodefensas colombianas, mejor conocidas como paramilitares.
Todo esto se tradujo en costos por casi de mas de tres millones de desplazados colombianos, siendo en un sesenta por ciento afroclombianos, 31.000 personas desaparecidas, 1771 sindicalistas asesinados, diez mil victimas en fosas comunes. Ahora precisamente que se iniciaba un proceso de devolver a las FARC su carácter beligerante, que pudiera contribuir a la Paz en Colombia, expresado en el canje humanitario, liderizado por la senadora afrocolombiana Piedad Córdoba y el Presidente Chávez, el gobierno de Uribe Velez, comenzó a sabotear dicho proceso y ahora lo mas reciente que fue violar la Carta Democrática de la Organización de Estados Americanos en su articulo 21, sobre la inviolabilidad del ningún territorio al penetrar, una vez, en territorio Ecuatoriano para asesinar a mas de 20 guerrillero de la FARC y entre ellos al comandante Reyes, quien liderizaba el proyecto de Canje humanitario.
La Red de Organizaciones Afrovenezolanas condena enérgicamente la intromisión del ejercito colombiano conjuntamente con el ejercito norteamericano al territorio del hermano pueblo ecuatoriano. Exigimos la salida de inmediato de la Base Militar de Manta (en Ecuador), condenamos la política de Uribe al despojar de sus tierra a los afrocolombianos, después de haber sido aprobada, hace mas de quince años el derecho a sus tierras establecida en al Ley Setenta de comunidades afrocolombianas, apoyamos a la senadora Piedad Córdoba en sus gestiones valientes por proseguir en el canje humanitario.
Cumbe Operativo de la Red de Organizaciones Afrovenezolanas
Caracas 5 de marzo del 2008
(Fuente: http://afrocubaweb.com/News/venezuela/redafrovenezolana.htm)
DEL 17 AL 20 DE JULIO DE 2008, 19/8/08
CARACAS
Nosotros y nosotras, mujeres y hombres afrodescendientes de la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, nos hemos reunido en la ciudad de Caracas, durante los días 18, 19 y 20 de Julio de 2008 en las instalaciones del Museo de Bellas Artes, bajo la coordinación de la Red de organizaciones Afrovenezolana, Con los auspicios del Despacho del Viceministerio para África (Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Relaciones Exteriores, el Ministerio del Poder Popular Para la Agricultura y Tierra, Comision Presidencial Contra el Racismo y Direccion de Interculturalidad del Ministerio del Poder Popular Para la Educación, Ministerio de Informacion y Comunicación, IAEM, Oficina de Enlace con Comuinandes Afrodescendientes, Museo de Bellas Artes del Ministerio, Subcomisión Afrodescendientes de la Asamblea Nacional), Inapymi, Parlamento Andino, Instituto Nacional de la Mujer convocados por nuestros ancestros y ancestras Rey Miguel, Andresote, Guillermo Rivas, Manucha Algarin, Jose Leonardo Chirino, Argelia Laya, Josefina Brington, Irene Ugueto, Juan Ramón Lugo
CONSIDERANDO
La necesidad de fomentar la participación de las comunidades Afrovenezolanas en el proceso de la Refundación de la República, para contribuir a la ruptura del cerco de la exclusión etnosocial, signada por la discrimación y el racismo por mas de quinientos años.
CONSIDERANDO
Que la Constitución de la República Bolivariana consagra en su artículo 62 que "la participación del pueblo en la formación, ejecución y control de la gestión pública es el medio necesario para lograr el protagonismo que garantice su completo desarrollo, tanto individual como colectivo. Es obligación del Estado y deber de la Sociedad facilitar la generación de las condiciones mas favorables para su práctica".
CONSIDERANDO
La necesidad de desarrollar una política de articulación internacional con organizaciones de las Américas, el Caribe y África, que luchan contra el racismo, la exclusión y los procesos de liberación, aunándose a la construcción de un mundo multipolar y anti- imperialista.
CONSIDERANDO
Que la implementación de la directiva del Retorno, liderizada por la Unión Europea es semejante al proyecto de Higiene Racial, practicada durante el Gobierno de Adolfo Hitler, violando de esta manera las convenciones Internacionales en la esfera de los Derechos Humanos y el Plan de Acción de Durban.
CONSIDERANDO
Que nuestro pais es firmante del III PLAN DE ACCION CONTRA EL RACISMO, dado en la ciudad de Durba (Surafrica) en el año 2001
CONSIDERANDO
Que la comunidad Afrcolombiana sufre los traumas del desplamiento masivo, ejecusiones selectivas de liderez y liderezas como resultado del Plan Colombia y los conflictos armados
CONSIDERANDO
Que dentro del proceso de integración continental a través del proyecto Alternativa Bolivariana de los Pueblos (ALBA), aun no ha ido considerado un grueso de la poblacion afrodescendientes de las Américas que vive en condicioens de pobreza extremas
CONSIDERANDO
Que el valeroso pueblo haitiano esta sufriendo los rigores de la desestabilización, al exclusion y la discriminación
CONSIDERANDO
Que desde su fundación, la Red de Organizaciones Afrovenezolanas ha ido creciendo cualitativamente en la afinación de sus practicas y estrategias discursivas que han enriquecido el proceso Bolivariano, así como la sensibilización de un sector del estado y la sociedad venezolana en general sobre la ausencia de políticas hacia este segmento de la afrovenezonalidad que sigue viviendo en condiciones de pobreza.
CONSIDERANDO
Que en las comunidades Afrovenezolanas el proceso Bolivariano ha recibido un contundente apoyo, evidenciado en el respaldo a las iniciativas planteadas por el imarron Presidente Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías en los nueve años de revolución.
CONSIDERANDO
La urgencia de lograr el reconocimiento de las y los afrodescendientes en las políticas publicas del Estado venezolano.
CONSIDERANDO
La necesidad de establecer proyectos y programas en los distintos ente del estado para el desarrollo sistémico de las comunidades Afrovenezolanas.
CONSIDERANDO
Que las heroinas afrodescendientes jugaron un papel en el campo de la ética en los procesos libertario e independentista, tacando entre ellas la Negra Matea e Hipolita por su rol jugado en la formacion de los valores de solidaridad y sentido humano del libertador Simon Bolívar.
CONSIDERANDO
Que actualmente la Asamblea Nacional adelanta esfuerzo en la discusión de leyes que favorecen el desarrollo de las mujeres venezolanas
La necesidad de que el gobierno Bolivariano y el Estado en general, pasen del dicho al hecho concreto en la implementación de políticas que incluyan concientemente a la población Afrovenezolana:
DECLARAMOS:
1- Exigir al Estado la facilitación de mecanismos jurídicos y ejecutivos que posibiliten la participación conciente de las y los afrodescendientes en el diseño, ejecución control y evaluacion de las políticas públicas
2- Desarrollar acciones conjuntas con organizaciones hermanas del mundo entero para denunciar las prácticas racista que siguen presente en países de América, el Caribe, Europa, África y Asia.
3.- Rechazar categóricamente la legislación racista de la Directiva del Retorno aprobada recientemente por el parlamento europeo. Exigir al Gobierno Venezolano a traves de sus instituciones activar el Plan de Acción de la III Conferencia Internacional Contra el Racismo.
4- Profundizar el trabajo organizativo y formativo de los y las militantes a lo interno de la Red de Organizaciones Afrovenezolanas.
Exigir al gobierno del Presidente Uribe cesar las agresiones contra las comunidades afrocolombianas y condenamos el Plan Colombia por militarista y terrorista.
Exigir al Gobierno Bolivariano profundizar la solidaridad con el pueblo haitiano.
5- Reiterar que nuestra organización acompaña de manera contundente, en el marco del pensamiento critico afrodescendiente, el proceso de transformaciones profundas de la sociedad venezolana que lideriza el Cimarron Presidente Hugo Chávez Frias.
6- Sumarse a la campaña, iniciada por el Viceministro Para Africa, de llevar al Panteon Nacional a la Negra Matea y a la Negra Hipolita.
7- Lograr la incorporación del Cumbe de Mujeres afrovenezolanas, para apoyar el esfuerzo que viene realizando la Asamblea Nacional, a través de las discusiones sobre la ley de protección social para las amas de casa y la ley de igualda y equidad de genero, para garantizar la visibilización de las mujeres afrovenezolanas en las mismas.
8- Exigir al Poder Legislativo, a los Ministerios del Poder Popular para la Educación, Cultura, Comunicación e información, Telecomunicaciones, Ciencia y Tecnología, Ambiente, Agricultura y Tierra, salud y demás entes de los poderes. públicos la instrumentación de políticas que favorezcan la inclusión de las y los afrodescendientes.
9- Solicitar al Poder Ejecutivo la creación del Vice Ministerio para la Atención de la Mujer Afrodescendiente en el seno del Ministerio de Asuntos Para la Mujer.
10- Reiterar la necesidad de introducir una enmienda constitucional que incorpore los derechos de los pueblos afrovenezolanos y la indemnización compensatoria por los siglos de esclavitud, genocidio y discriminación sufridos.
11- Exigir la incorporación de los jóvenes afrodescendientes en la Reforma de la Ley de Juventud a fin de visibilizar este sector de la población juvenil en este instrumento jurídico.
AFRODESCENDIENTES PARA PROFUNDIZAR LA REVOLUCION
Carcas 19 de julio del 2008.....a 154 años de la abolicion de la esclavitud
Conclusión: el II Encuentro Nacional Afrovenezolano - Concluye Hoy en el Museo de Bellas Artes, 19/7/08
"El Estado está en mora con los afrovenezolanos"
Piden a Chávez pasar de la palabra a los hechos Se aprobó crear una Ley contra Discriminación Racial
Caracas. "Al proceso bolivariano le falta dar el salto cualitativo para construir un modelo de sociedad antirracista y discriminatoria", es una de las conclusiones del II Encuentro Nacional Afrovenezolano que, tras tres días de deliberaciones, concluye hoy en el Museo de Bellas Artes.
Así lo dio a conocer Jesús "Chucho" García, miembro de la Red de Organizaciones Afrovenezolanas, quien aclaró que "no tenemos un Estado expresamente racista, pero sí una sociedad donde aún existen focos racistas y discriminatorios que se expresan, por ejemplo, en muchos medios de comunicación, en algunas instituciones del Estado y empresas privadas donde han discriminado personas por su color de piel desechando su capacidad intelectual y técnica. De eso hay denuncias en el Ministerio del Trabajo. También se les impide la entrada en algunas discotecas. Por eso es importante la Ley contra la Discriminación Racial", señaló.
Este encuentro se llevó a cabo con el fin de evaluar las políticas que se han venido impulsando durante ocho años como organización social y, al mismo tiempo, detectar cuáles son los déficit del Estado en 10 años del proceso bolivariano con respecto a las comunidades afrovenezolanas", señaló.
También persigue elaborar el Plan Quinquenal 2008-2013 de las comunidades afrovenezolanas en las áreas tierra y desarrollo agrícola, tecnología y comunicación, mujer, jóvenes, indicadores sociales, educación y legislación, "ejes en que se ha avanzado en estos ocho años en el proceso de sensibilización hacia el afrodescendiente, pero falta que se concreten", indicó.
Destacó que, comparado con países como Brasil, Ecuador, Colombia y Nicaragua, que tienen espacios públicos y legislaciones concretas para la población afro, el Estado venezolano es el más atrasado en el reconocimiento a la población afrovenezolana. "La ausencia del Estado y sus políticas para atender los profundos problemas de nuestras comunidades se sienten en la cotidianidad, sin soluciones concretas ni de calidad", expresó.
Las conclusiones del evento se elevarán al presidente Chávez "porque él tiene una deuda con la población afrovenezolana. Es el único Presidente, después de 154 años de haberse abolido la esclavitud, que se ha asumido afro, pero que ahora debe pasar de la declaración a la concreción, es decir, pasar de la palabra a los hechos".
En el encuentro, se aprobó incluir a la mujer afro en las políticas públicas, propuesta de la ministra María León; ampliar el concepto de interculturalidad para incluir a los afrovenezolanos en el nuevo currículo educativo; crear la Ley contra la Discriminación Racial; y revisar el Código Penal con el fin de penalizar el racismo, una propuesta del diputado Modesto Ruiz, entre otros.
ANTECEDENTES
Nacimiento
La Red de Organizaciones Afrovenezolanas nace el 16 de junio de 2000.
Finalidad
Luchar por el reconocimiento de los aportes morales, políticos, sociales, culturales, económicos y espirituales de las y los africanos y sus descendientes.
Población
Se estima que la población afrovenezolana supera 30% de los habitantes del país.
Actualmente, se está trabajando con el Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE) para que en el Censo de 2010 también se cuenten y, en consecuencia, saber cuántos son, dónde y cómo están.
Afrovenezolanos Exigen Profundizar la Revolucion, 11/7/08, Prensa Afrovenezolana
Durante los dias 17 al 20 de julio se estara realizando el II Encuentro Nacional Afrovenezolano, donde participaran delegados y delagadas de catorce estado del pais para elaborar el plan quinquenal 2008/2013 para el desarrollo integral de las comunidades afrodescendiente en el pais.
La Red de organizaciones Afrovenezolanas, nacio en San Jose de Barlovento, Estado Miranda a mediados del mes de junio del 2000 en el marco de la nueva Constitucion de la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela donde se expresa el principio de participion activa de la comunidad organizada con miras a poner en practica el princio de DEMOCRACIA PROTAGONICA Y PARTICIPATIVA. Mas de veinte organizaciones afrovenezolanas definieron sus lineas estrategicas de accion e insertarse en el proceso bolivariano con una agenda propia que permitiera llenar las ausencias de politicas publicas hacia este componente venezolano marginado por mas de medio siglo y ubicado bajo la linea de la exclusion, el racsimo y la discriminacion. Desde el 2000 hasta nuestro dias esta organizacion ha logrado hacer una ruptura con la vision folclorica y estereotipada que los gobiernos y la sociedad global tenian hacia la poblacion afro y salto, de esa vision reduccionista, a una vision de participacion en lo politico y develar la situacion que se encontraban mas de 5 mil comunidades afro en mas de cincuenta municipio de todo el pais donde la educacion, la salud, el tema de la tierra, la ausencia de servicios basicos, necesiaddes basicas insatisfecha,violencia intrafamiliar, entre otros problemas, dejan mucho que desear a psear d e als buenas intencioens del gobierno bolivariano durante esta deacada. La Red logro colocar el tema afro en la boca del presidente Chavez, de algunas instituciones del gobierno, en los medios de comuicacion tanto privado como publicos, fuimos los primeros en denunciar el paramilitarismo y la actitud racsita del exalcalde Alfredo Pena, que para ese entonces era considerado un revolucionario, pero ademas de ello lla Red Afro avanzo en el tema del curriculum educativo asi como la redimension de la interculturalidad, en los indicadores sociales y estadisticas, en el tema de la mujer, en el reconocimiento del racismo como cancer que afecta a la sociedad venezolana y la elaboracion de propuesta juridicas para combatir esas aberraciones humanas.
PROFUNDIZAR LA REVOLUCION
El 17 de diciembre del 2007, la Red Afrovenezolana asumio su posicion revolucionaria de profundizar el proceso de Democracia participativa sumada a una corriente critica del pensamiento, inspirado en el Rey Miguel, Andresote, Chirino, Guillermo Rivas, ARgelia Laya, Josefina Brington, Amilcar Cabral, Shankara, entre otros, como guias para la accion contra las deformaciones del proceso bolivariano tales como la corrupcion, el monopolio de la democracia participativa pro un sector del proceso convertida en democracia endogena e individualizada, la ineficacia institucional asi como la necesidad de articular con los movimientos afrorevolucionarias con America y el Caribe y Africa para enriquecer con ideas la experiencia democratica venezolana. Los temas a abordar en este segundo Encuentro Afrovenezolano son: Educacion, Mujeres, Jovenes, Indicadores sociales, el problema de la tierra, ciencia/comunicacion y tecnologia,y los aspectos juridicos.La particiapcion para este segundo encuentro sera restringida solo por invitacion pues se trata de elaborar un plan y discutir las estrategias y las acciones acorto y mediano plazo. De todas maneras para cualquier informacion llamar al telefo 212 506 86 71 y escribir al e/mail jesuschuchogarcia_AT_hotmail.com, aldeatapipa_AT_hotmail.com afrojuvenilbarlovento_AT_hotmail.com cnirva03_AT_hotmail.com
A 154 años de la abolición de la esclavitud ....la deuda continua, 23/3/08
Colectivo Red Afrovenezolana
La lucha por la libertad de las esclavitudes en Venezuela, fue una iniciativa de los y las africanas y sus descendientes desde que fueron secuestrado de África al sur del desierto del Sahara, o mejor conocida como África Subsahariana, para ser convertido en esclavizados. Esa luchas libertarias se remontan desde la gesta heroica del Rey Miguel, en las minas de Buría, Estado Yaracuy en 1553, seguida por Andrés López del Rosario en la zona de Veroes, Estado Yaracuy durante los a/nos de 1728 a 1732. Los levantamientos de esclavizados y transformados en Cimarrones en los valles de Barlovento desde 1768 a 1771, liderizados por el cimarrón Guillermo Rivas, y por supuesto,el levantamiento en la siera del Falcon, Jose Leonardo Chirino,, catalogada por la historia oficial como movimiento preindependentista en 1795. La participación en innumerables batallas por la libertad, ya habían entrenado a miles de cimarrones que luego se incorporarían a las Guerras de Independencias por la libertad de Venezuela. Un cuadro de proclamas, decretos e intenciones jurídicas por abolir la esclavitud se iniciaría desde 1810 hasta el Congreso constituyente de la Gran Colombia, donde Bolívar propone la abolición de la esclavitud en Venezuela, el cual no fue escuchado por la élite de los blancos criollos que dirigían la nueva Republica Venezolana. En definitiva fue el 24 de marzo de 1854, cuando el presidente José Gregorio Monagas, procedió a firmar el decreto de la abolición de la esclavitud, en el cual se dejó en libertad 'casi condicional' a miles de hombres mujeres y niños sometidos a la pésima esclavitud que generó a lo largo de más de medio milenio el terrible trauma del racismo, la discriminación y la marginación.
Afrodescendientes hoy...cual es la agenda?
En Venezuela, aun hoy en pleno proceso bolivariano, el movimiento afro venezolano, conciente de su rol histórico, ha insistido en colocar el tema del racismo, la discriminación racial y la exclusión a que siguen siendo sometidos miles afrovenezolanos, en las políticas públicas, a pesar del esfuerzo del gobierno, pero sin embargo a 154 años de la abolicion de la esclavitud, mas de 60 municipio afroveneozlanas asi lo evidencian. Dentro de las lineas de orientacion que tiene el movimiento afrovenezolano destacan:
* Profundizar el tema curricular en el sistema educativo Bolivariano, reconociendo y desarrollando el tema afro;
* Avanzar hacia la consolidacion de un sistema de informacion estadisticos de las comunidades afro;
* Impulsar en las leyes organicas (como cultura y educacion) el reconcomiento del tema afro, asi como la elaboracion de una ley contra el racismo y la discrminacion racial e incorporar la penalizacion del racismo en el Condigo penal venezolano.
* Exigir la demarcion de tierras cimarronas/tierras comuneras.
En el plano internacional la Red de Organziaciones Afrovenezolanas se plantea lo siguiente:
* Avanzar hacia la integracion del movimiento afrodescendientes y transformaciones revolucionarias a nivel de las Americas y el Caribe
* Participar activamente en la concrecion del Plan de Accion de la Tercera Conferencia Mundial Contra el Racismo (conocido como Plan de Accion de Durban)
* Iniciar acciones de solidaridad y con el pueblo afrocolombiana que sufre desplazamineto continuo frente a las confrontaciones militares en sus territorios
* Profundizar la lucha contra el racismo y la solidaridad con la diaspora africana a nivel mundial y promover alianzas con los movimiento sociales progresistas de Africa.
Mayo mes de la afrovenezolanidad
En el 2004, la Red de Organizaciones afrovenezolanas, lanzo el MES DE LA AFROVENEZOLANIDAD, aprobado en una acuerdo por unanimidad de la Asamblea Nacional de Venezuela y tambien fue aprobada la orden Jose Leonardo Chirino, la cual fue entregda a Danny Glover, Argelia Laya, Josefina Brington, Irenes Ugueto y JUan Ramon Lugo. A partir del mes de marzo se estaran realizando actividades sobre este dia de la abolicion de la esclavitud, siendo unas de ella un foro organizado por la Comision Preisdencial Contra el Racismo.
En ese sentido la Red Afro arranca su programacion el dia 26 de abril, en la poblacion de Nirgua, donde se dara inicio a LA RUTA DE LOS CIMARRONES en homenaje al Rey Miguel, despues se realizara el ENCUENTRO NACIONAL AFROVENEZOLANIDAD e INTERCULTURALIDAD, se continuara con el dia del cimarron, 25 de mayo en Palmarejo (Yaracuy), El Ultimo Barco Negrero, 26 de mayo en Puerto Cabello. Visite la pagina web de la red afro www.redafroavenezolana.com
Fechas a recordar
14 de agosto de 1810, eliminación del trafico de esclavizados en Venezuela
Decreto de abolición de la esclavitud el 2 de junio de 1816, dictado por Simón Bolívar en Carúpano.
Decreto de abolición de la esclavitud en Venezuela el 6 de julio de 1816. Decretado pro Simón Bolívar en Ocumare de la Costa.
Discurso de Angostura, hoy Ciudad Bolívar el 15 de febrero de 1819, donde Bolívar implora sea abolida la Esclavitud.
14 de julio de 1821, se pide de nuevo la Abolición de la Esclavitud.
23 de abril DIA DEL REY MIGUEL. NIRGUA. ESTADO YARACUY.
6 de Julio 1816 NI/NOS ESCLAVIZADOS DE CHUAO TOMADO POR BOLIVAR PARA LA GUERRA DE INDEPENDENCIA
25 de mayo DIA DEL CIMARRON
26 DE MAYO fecha que llego el ULTIMO BARCO NEGRERO barco negrero a costas venezolanas. Puerto Cabello. Estado Carabobo
10 de mayo levantamiento de JOSE LEONARDO CHIRINO
23 de septiembre DIA DE LA SANTA AFROCATOLICA SANTA EFIGENIA
10 de noviembre de 1771, asesinato del CIMARRON GUILLERMO RIVAS, mango de Ocoytaup.gif (925 bytes)
THE AFROVENEZUELAN NETWORK AND THE PARAMILITARY MENACE, 3/5/08
by Jesus "Chucho" Garcia
From its foundation in 2000, the Afrovenezuelan Network had systematically denounced first the threat from Plan Colombia and second the so called Plan Patriotic as a threat to the stability of the Andean region -- this plan is based on military aims with the goal of ending drug trafficking in the Region. Under the administration of President Uribe Vélez, the Plan Patriotic was implemented and started to deepen the military and terrorist character implemented against groups like the FARC and the ELN who for many years have been holding anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchical positions and have been recognized as belligerent political actors before governments like Venezuela and Mexico.
The results of the Plan Colombia and Patriotic Plan is expressed in an increase of Colombian troops to almost half a million men, an increase in highly sophisticated weapons, the creation of new military bases with the support of the government of the United States, in different areas of the Colombian territory, towards the border of Ecuador and Venezuela, with the effective cooperation of more than two thousand of American military that strengthen the Colombian Self-defense units, better known as the paramilitary.
All this resulted in almost three million displaced Colombians, of which sixty percent were Afrocolombians, and 31,000 people disappeared, 1771 unionists assassinated, ten thousand victims in common graves. When a process just began to reduce the FARC's belligerent character, a process that could contribute to bring the peace in Colombia, expressed by the humanitarian exchange under the leadership of the Afrocolombian woman Senator Piedad Cordova and President Chávez, the government of Uribe Velez began to sabotage this process. Their most recent move was to violate the Democratic Chart of the Organization of American States, specifically the article 21 about not violating the national territory of another country, and Colombian armed forces trespassed the Ecuadorian border, killing 20 guerrilla FARC members, among them the commander Raul Reyes, who was the leader of the project of humanitarian exchange.
The Afrovenezuelan Network strongly condemns the intrusion of Colombian soldiers along with US forces into the territory of our Ecuatorian brothers. We demand the immediate closing of the Military Base of Manta (in Ecuador). We condemn the policy of Uribe who took away the Afrocolombians' territory, after the constitutional approval of their right over this space more than fifteen years ago established in the “Law Seventy” of Afrocolombians communities, we express our support to Senator Piedad Cordova in her brave efforts to continue in the humanitarian exchange.
Summit of the Network of AfroVenezuelan Organizations
Caracas, March 5, 2008 up.gif (925 bytes)
LA RED AFROVENEZOLANA ANTE LA AMENAZA PARAMILITAR, 5/3/08
por Jesus "Chucho" Garcia
Desde su fundación en el año 2000, la Red de Organizaciones Afrovenezolanas había venido denunciando sistemáticamente la amenaza del Plan Colombia, en primera instancia y luego el Plan Patriota como una amenaza para desestabilización del área andina, con fines estrictamente militaristas bajo el mandato de acabar con el narcotráfico. En la gestión del gobierno del actual presidente Uribe Vélez, se lanza el plan patriota que va a profundizar el carácter militarista y terrorista implementando contra fuerzas militares insurgente como FARC y el ELN, quienes desde hace muchos años han mantenido posición antiimperialista y antioligarquica y habían sido reconocidas como actores políticos beligerantes ante gobiernos como el de Venezuela y México.
Los resultado del Plan Colombia y Plan Patriota, se expresa en un aumento de las fuerzas militares colombianas a un número de casi medio millón de hombres, armamentos súper sofisticados, establecimientos de nuevas bases militares con el apoyo del gobierno de los Estados Unidos, en diferentes espacios del territorio colombiano y hacia la frontera de Ecuador y Venezuela, con participación efectiva de mas de dos mil autodefensas militares estadounidenses súper entrenados y fortaleciendo el aparto de las denominadas Autodefensas colombianas, mejor conocidas como paramilitares.
Todo esto se tradujo en costos por casi de mas de tres millones de desplazados colombianos, siendo en un sesenta por ciento afroclombianos, 31.000 personas desaparecidas, 1771 sindicalistas asesinados, diez mil victimas en fosas comunes. Ahora precisamente que se iniciaba un proceso de devolver a las FARC su carácter beligerante, que pudiera contribuir a la Paz en Colombia, expresado en el canje humanitario, liderizado por la senadora afrocolombiana Piedad Córdoba y el Presidente Chávez, el gobierno de Uribe Velez, comenzó a sabotear dicho proceso y ahora lo mas reciente que fue violar la Carta Democrática de la Organización de Estados Americanos en su articulo 21, sobre la inviolabilidad del ningún territorio al penetrar, una vez, en territorio Ecuatoriano para asesinar a mas de 20 guerrillero de la FARC y entre ellos al comandante Reyes, quien liderizaba el proyecto de Canje humanitario.
La Red de Organizaciones Afrovenezolanas condena enérgicamente la intromisión del ejercito colombiano conjuntamente con el ejercito norteamericano al territorio del hermano pueblo ecuatoriano. Exigimos la salida de inmediato de la Base Militar de Manta (en Ecuador), condenamos la política de Uribe al despojar de sus tierra a los afrocolombianos, después de haber sido aprobada, hace mas de quince años el derecho a sus tierras establecida en al Ley Setenta de comunidades afrocolombianas, apoyamos a la senadora Piedad Córdoba en sus gestiones valientes por proseguir en el canje humanitario.
Cumbe Operativo de la Red de Organizaciones Afrovenezolanas
Caracas 5 de marzo del 2008
(Fuente: http://afrocubaweb.com/News/venezuela/redafrovenezolana.htm)
Real rights and recognition replace racism in Venezuela
Real rights and recognition replace racism in Venezuela
Lauren Carroll Harris
13 July 2007
(Source: http://www.greenleft.org.au/2007/717/37209)
Like the rest of Latin America, Venezuela’s history is scarred by colonialism’s racist legacy — Venezuela’s people were dispossessed in 1520 following Spanish settlement. In the following centuries, they were systematically killed and their land exploited. Slavery, which allowed the colonisers to plunder Venezuela, existed until 1854, and at the time of the 1830 constitution neither indigenous people nor those descended from Africa were recognised as Venezuelans.
Racism was a necessary part of the justification of colonialist conquests. Only now, with the gains being made by the government of socialist President Hugo Chavez and the growing mass revolutionary movement, is Venezuela beginning to grapple in earnest with how to confront this racist legacy.
Chavez’s election in 1998 re-sparked old expectations of land control and the defence of indigenous ways of life, and brought the plight of Venezuela’s indigenous peoples into the public eye.
Venezuela’s 2001 census found 35 different indigenous tribes, 34 different indigenous languages and 535,000 indigenous people (2.1% of the population). Further, many Venezuelans identify as mestizo — or mixed race — and are of a broad racial background.
The rights of Venezuela’s indigenous people were first entrenched in the 1999 Bolivarian constitution, which was ratified by 71% of voters (with 60% voter participation). For the first time, indigenous land rights were identified as being collective, inalienable and non-transferable, with the recognition of the “rights of the indigenous peoples over the land they traditionally and ancestrally occupied. They must demarcate that land and guarantee the right to its collective ownership.”
Article 9 stipulates that while Spanish is Venezuela’s primary language, “indigenous languages are also for official use for indigenous peoples and must be respected throughout the Republic’s territory for being part of the nation’s and humanity’s patrimonial culture”. The 1999 constitution also affirms that “exploitation by the state of natural resources will be subject to prior consultation with the native communities”, that “indigenous peoples have the right to an education system of an intercultural and bilingual nature”, that indigenous people have the right to control ancestral knowledge over “native genetic resources” and biodiversity, and that three indigenous representatives are ensured seats in the country’s National Assembly (these were elected by delegates of the National Council of Venezuelan Indians in July 1999).
In October 2004, Dalia Herminia Yanez, a member of the Environmental Network of Indigenous Warao women of Delta Amacuro state, said: “Under previous governments we had only two lines in the constitution. We have advanced. We also have the law of the demarcation of land that will be approved, the rights of children, and now we are writing laws of the rights of indigenous women.”
Since then, the confidence of the indigenous rights movement has exploded. The multitude of social problems that persist as a hangover of previous, capitalist policies has led to a culture of Chavista activists who support the revolution and lobby the Chavez government to demand attention to their particular issue.
In April 2005, indigenous activists from the Wayuu, Bari and Yukpa tribes converged in Caracas to denounce coalmining operations in Zulia state, which had resulted in the deforestation of thousands of acres of land and the onset of respiratory diseases in members of the local and indigenous communities due to coal dust. A leader of the Yukpa tribe, Cesareo Panapaera, declared: “We want the government to hear us: we don’t want coal. Here are our bows and arrows, and we will use them against the miners if they come to our lands. And if we have to die fighting for our lands, we will die.”
Their campaign was successful. On April 4 this year, Chavez announced a ban on the expansion of coalmining in the Zulia region. The mining, which was carried out by a consortium of the state-owned oil company PDVSA and privately owned transnational corporations, was found to be in violation of the constitution’s affirmation of the indigenous right to control over indigenous land. A statement released by the coalition of environment and indigenous activists announced, “we know that the powerful multinational mining interests in Zulia will keep trying to keep their mega-coal project alive, whatever the cost” and pledged to continue struggling until coalmining was banned entirely in the region.
This campaign demonstrates the gap between what the constitution promises and what exists in Venezuela. Mission Guaicaipuro was established in October 2003 to implement the indigenous rights that are contained within the constitution. Organised by the environment and natural resources ministry, its chief concern is to restore communal and indigenous land titles and defend indigenous rights and resources against corporate exploitation.
At the forefront of the anti-racist movement is the Afro-Venezuelan Network, headed by Jesus “Chucho” Garcia, which is lobbying for recognition of Afro-Venezuelans in the next round of amendments to the Bolivarian constitution, and for the census to ask questions about race and ethnic background, to give a more accurate picture of Venezuela’s racial demographics. Many Venezuelans believe in the common misconception that Venezuela’s broad racial composition and the high number of mestizos means equality prevails and racism is dead, without a deeper understanding of the racial lines that divide the country’s classes and the ongoing, institutional impact of Venezuela’s colonial history.
The Afro-Venezuelan Network has also successfully campaigned for the creation of a presidential commission against racism in 2005, the inclusion of Afro-Venezuelan history in the school curriculum, the establishment of a number of cocoa-processing plants and farming cooperatives run by black Venezuelans in the Barlovento area (which has one of the largest concentrations of Afro-Venezuelans and most active black rights movements in Venezuela) and for Afro-Venezuelan Day on May 10 each year.
The ambitious land and agrarian reforms embedded in the 1999 constitution have been especially beneficial to indigenous and Afro-Venezuelan communities. The constitution declares that idle, uncultivated private land over a certain size can be transformed into productive units of land for common social benefit. By prioritising socially productive land use over monopolistic private land ownership and redistributing idle land to the landless, Chavez has promoted independence, food sovereignty and local agricultural development.
Amidst these local changes, Chavez has been building alliances with other marginalised communities in the Americas, such as providing food, water and medical care to 45,000 Hurricane Katrina victims in areas surrounding New Orleans and supplying discounted heating and diesel oil to schools, nursing homes and hospitals in poor communities in the US.
Despite the limitations that result from the current co-existence of both old and new forces of political and economic power, the Chavez government has doubtless taken the side of the dispossessed, the landless, the black and the indigenous. While in other, capitalist countries, the quality of life for indigenous people is stagnating, and neoliberal governments are consciously rolling back the gains of prior black rights movements (including Australian Prime Minister John Howard’s recent, cynical indigenous action plan), in Venezuela the space for frank discussion about how to move forward in the context of a mass movement has been opened up by the ongoing revolutionary process, and genuine gains have been made by indigenous and Afro-Venezuelan movements to eliminate the systemic nature of racism from Venezuelan life.
Venezuela’s explicitly socialist revolution is creating a model of respect for the indigenous rights of land sovereignty, preservation of culture and language, and meaningful representation and participation in political life.
Lauren Carroll Harris
13 July 2007
(Source: http://www.greenleft.org.au/2007/717/37209)
Like the rest of Latin America, Venezuela’s history is scarred by colonialism’s racist legacy — Venezuela’s people were dispossessed in 1520 following Spanish settlement. In the following centuries, they were systematically killed and their land exploited. Slavery, which allowed the colonisers to plunder Venezuela, existed until 1854, and at the time of the 1830 constitution neither indigenous people nor those descended from Africa were recognised as Venezuelans.
Racism was a necessary part of the justification of colonialist conquests. Only now, with the gains being made by the government of socialist President Hugo Chavez and the growing mass revolutionary movement, is Venezuela beginning to grapple in earnest with how to confront this racist legacy.
Chavez’s election in 1998 re-sparked old expectations of land control and the defence of indigenous ways of life, and brought the plight of Venezuela’s indigenous peoples into the public eye.
Venezuela’s 2001 census found 35 different indigenous tribes, 34 different indigenous languages and 535,000 indigenous people (2.1% of the population). Further, many Venezuelans identify as mestizo — or mixed race — and are of a broad racial background.
The rights of Venezuela’s indigenous people were first entrenched in the 1999 Bolivarian constitution, which was ratified by 71% of voters (with 60% voter participation). For the first time, indigenous land rights were identified as being collective, inalienable and non-transferable, with the recognition of the “rights of the indigenous peoples over the land they traditionally and ancestrally occupied. They must demarcate that land and guarantee the right to its collective ownership.”
Article 9 stipulates that while Spanish is Venezuela’s primary language, “indigenous languages are also for official use for indigenous peoples and must be respected throughout the Republic’s territory for being part of the nation’s and humanity’s patrimonial culture”. The 1999 constitution also affirms that “exploitation by the state of natural resources will be subject to prior consultation with the native communities”, that “indigenous peoples have the right to an education system of an intercultural and bilingual nature”, that indigenous people have the right to control ancestral knowledge over “native genetic resources” and biodiversity, and that three indigenous representatives are ensured seats in the country’s National Assembly (these were elected by delegates of the National Council of Venezuelan Indians in July 1999).
In October 2004, Dalia Herminia Yanez, a member of the Environmental Network of Indigenous Warao women of Delta Amacuro state, said: “Under previous governments we had only two lines in the constitution. We have advanced. We also have the law of the demarcation of land that will be approved, the rights of children, and now we are writing laws of the rights of indigenous women.”
Since then, the confidence of the indigenous rights movement has exploded. The multitude of social problems that persist as a hangover of previous, capitalist policies has led to a culture of Chavista activists who support the revolution and lobby the Chavez government to demand attention to their particular issue.
In April 2005, indigenous activists from the Wayuu, Bari and Yukpa tribes converged in Caracas to denounce coalmining operations in Zulia state, which had resulted in the deforestation of thousands of acres of land and the onset of respiratory diseases in members of the local and indigenous communities due to coal dust. A leader of the Yukpa tribe, Cesareo Panapaera, declared: “We want the government to hear us: we don’t want coal. Here are our bows and arrows, and we will use them against the miners if they come to our lands. And if we have to die fighting for our lands, we will die.”
Their campaign was successful. On April 4 this year, Chavez announced a ban on the expansion of coalmining in the Zulia region. The mining, which was carried out by a consortium of the state-owned oil company PDVSA and privately owned transnational corporations, was found to be in violation of the constitution’s affirmation of the indigenous right to control over indigenous land. A statement released by the coalition of environment and indigenous activists announced, “we know that the powerful multinational mining interests in Zulia will keep trying to keep their mega-coal project alive, whatever the cost” and pledged to continue struggling until coalmining was banned entirely in the region.
This campaign demonstrates the gap between what the constitution promises and what exists in Venezuela. Mission Guaicaipuro was established in October 2003 to implement the indigenous rights that are contained within the constitution. Organised by the environment and natural resources ministry, its chief concern is to restore communal and indigenous land titles and defend indigenous rights and resources against corporate exploitation.
At the forefront of the anti-racist movement is the Afro-Venezuelan Network, headed by Jesus “Chucho” Garcia, which is lobbying for recognition of Afro-Venezuelans in the next round of amendments to the Bolivarian constitution, and for the census to ask questions about race and ethnic background, to give a more accurate picture of Venezuela’s racial demographics. Many Venezuelans believe in the common misconception that Venezuela’s broad racial composition and the high number of mestizos means equality prevails and racism is dead, without a deeper understanding of the racial lines that divide the country’s classes and the ongoing, institutional impact of Venezuela’s colonial history.
The Afro-Venezuelan Network has also successfully campaigned for the creation of a presidential commission against racism in 2005, the inclusion of Afro-Venezuelan history in the school curriculum, the establishment of a number of cocoa-processing plants and farming cooperatives run by black Venezuelans in the Barlovento area (which has one of the largest concentrations of Afro-Venezuelans and most active black rights movements in Venezuela) and for Afro-Venezuelan Day on May 10 each year.
The ambitious land and agrarian reforms embedded in the 1999 constitution have been especially beneficial to indigenous and Afro-Venezuelan communities. The constitution declares that idle, uncultivated private land over a certain size can be transformed into productive units of land for common social benefit. By prioritising socially productive land use over monopolistic private land ownership and redistributing idle land to the landless, Chavez has promoted independence, food sovereignty and local agricultural development.
Amidst these local changes, Chavez has been building alliances with other marginalised communities in the Americas, such as providing food, water and medical care to 45,000 Hurricane Katrina victims in areas surrounding New Orleans and supplying discounted heating and diesel oil to schools, nursing homes and hospitals in poor communities in the US.
Despite the limitations that result from the current co-existence of both old and new forces of political and economic power, the Chavez government has doubtless taken the side of the dispossessed, the landless, the black and the indigenous. While in other, capitalist countries, the quality of life for indigenous people is stagnating, and neoliberal governments are consciously rolling back the gains of prior black rights movements (including Australian Prime Minister John Howard’s recent, cynical indigenous action plan), in Venezuela the space for frank discussion about how to move forward in the context of a mass movement has been opened up by the ongoing revolutionary process, and genuine gains have been made by indigenous and Afro-Venezuelan movements to eliminate the systemic nature of racism from Venezuelan life.
Venezuela’s explicitly socialist revolution is creating a model of respect for the indigenous rights of land sovereignty, preservation of culture and language, and meaningful representation and participation in political life.
AFRO-VENEZUELANS AND THE STRUGGLE TO END RACISM
AFRO-VENEZUELANS AND THE STRUGGLE TO END RACISM
Venezuela is making unprecedented progress in combating the historical legacy of racism and recognizing the national importance of its African heritage. New government initiatives including reforms addressing poverty and inequality have afforded Afro-Venezuelans greater social, economic, and political rights.[i] Now, despite centuries of institutionalized racism and systematic political and social exclusion, Afro-Venezuelan citizens are experiencing gains that are the result of new action being taken by government and society.
SLAVERY AND THE MYTH OF RACIAL DEMOCRACY
An estimated 100,000 enslaved Africans were brought to Venezuela between the 16th and 19th centuries.[ii] Most were sold to the central coastal states, which drove an agricultural economy based in coffee and cacao. Abolition occurred in 1854, but freedom did not bring equality. Racism continued to flourish in Venezuela throughout most of the 20th century, and African heritage was denied through an emphasis on racial mixing. The mestizo, born of European, Indigenous, and African blood, became a cornerstone of national identity. In this scheme, Blackness was devalued to such an extent that state policies sought to "whiten" the population through European immigration.[iii] Venezuela, like many other Latin American countries, used the idea of the mestizo to uphold a myth of racial democracy that denied rampant discrimination on the basis of skin color.[iv]
AFRO-VENEZUELANS AND THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION
Hugo Chavez is the first president in Venezuela's history to claim and honor his Indigenous and African ancestry. Since his first election in 1998, reforms have been instituted to address the problems faced by the Afro-Venezuelan community and to extend to them important social, political, and economic rights. Historically, poor and rural citizens have lacked access to health care and education. Because cities and states with the largest Afro-Venezuelan populations face the highest levels of poverty, the recent social missions instituted by the Chavez administration have had a huge impact.
EDUCATION: Massive literacy campaigns and new educational institutions have allowed more than 1.5 million adults to learn to read and write, or to return to school. Due to subsidized education programs for elementary, high school, and college-aged students, Afro-Venezuelans are partaking in education at unprecedented rates. Once a privilege enjoyed by only a few, education is now considered a human right.
HEALTH CARE: In 1999, Venezuela became the first Latin American country to guarantee all citizens the right to basic health care. To meet this goal, a partnership was initiated with the government of Cuba, which has provided 20,000 medical professionals to treat previously underserved Venezuelans. In the past 5 years, thousands of community health clinics have been established throughout the country. Today, more than 60% of the Venezuelan population receives some form of government-sponsored health care. The results have been dramatic; between 1996 and 2002, infant mortality rates decreased by 38%.
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: Since 2003, millions of Afro-Venezuelans have been issued national ID cards guaranteeing them the citizenship rights they previously lacked. Article 56 of the 1999 Constitution guaranteed all persons the right to free registration with the Civil Registry Office, a measure which has allowed electoral participation among Afro-Venezuelans to grow tremendously. In unprecedented numbers, Afro-Venezuelans are exercising their right to vote as well as to run for political office. Afro-Venezuelans occupy important posts in the Chavez administration as legislators, ambassadors, and assemblymen. It is the first administration in Venezuelan history to include a Black Venezuelan in the President’s Cabinet.
VENEZUELA'S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Venezuela has prioritized its relations with Africa by opening 18 new embassies in countries including Mali, Morocco, Congo, Angola, Burkina Faso, and many more. The diplomatic initiative has been accompanied by cooperative energy agreements as well as programs in health and education.[v] In the Caribbean, Venezuela is helping ease the energy burden in many countries through a plan called PETROCARIBE, which provides countries with oil at market prices made affordable through beneficial financing terms. This aid provides member countries with energy and stimulates national and regional economic and social development. Currently, all but 3 countries in the Caribbean belong to PETROCARIBE.
THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE STRUGGLE
Venezuela's Boliviarian Revolution has made great strides in addressing the racism that has been the legacy of slavery and its continued manifestations in high rates of poverty, hunger, disease, and illiteracy among Afro-descendants. Because obstacles still exist, the struggle against discrimination is moving forward. Afro-Venezuelans still lack constitutional recognition, though many are confident that future reforms will include legislation guaranteeing the political, economic, and social rights of the community. Though Afro-Venezuelans currently comprise up to 40% of the Venezuelan population, reliable census data is still lacking. Civil society groups such as the Network of Afro-Venezuelan Organizations are working to end the statistical invisibility that has been the handmaiden of marginalization. Plans are being made to improve the 2010 census, which many hope will bring self-awareness.[vi]
A new consciousness is being forged by Afro-Venezuelans who today recognize and value their African heritage within the larger society. Anti-racist groups in Venezuela have entered into powerful alliances with the government through initiatives such as the Presidential Commission to End Racial Discrimination, which was started in 2005. New awareness campaigns designed in cooperation with the social missions emphasize the national historical contribution of Afro-Venezuelans. Taking stock of the struggle against racism, the renowned Afro-Venezuelan activist and scholar Jesús "Chucho" García (pictured at right) has said: "There is a great opening now; it's the moment for our recognition. That's what we are going to fight for."[vii]
Endnotes:
[i] "The Political Status of Afro-Venezuelans in the Bolivarian Revolution: A Democratic Measure for Venezuela and a Hemispheric Imperative," by James Early and Jesus "Chucho" Garcia, Olivia Burlingame Goumbri, ed., The Venezuela Reader: The Building of a People's Democracy (EPICA, 2005).
[ii] Jesús María Herrera Salas, "Ethnicity and Revolution: The Political Economy of Racism in Venezuela," Latin American Perspectives 32:2, March 2005.
[iii] "Chucho Garcia Interview: Race and Racial Divides in Venezuela," By Gregory Wilpert, Venezuelanalysis, Jan. 21, 2004. http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1091
[iv] Café con Leche: Race, Class, and the National Image in Venezuela, Winthrop R. Wright (University of Texas Press, 1993).
[v] "Africa-Venezuela: Weaving New Alliances With Cultural Threads," By Humberto Márquez, Inter Press Service, Oct. 28, 2005. http://ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=30807
[vi] "Venezuela: Afro-descendants Seek Visibility in Numbers," By Humberto Marquez, Inter Press Service, June 22, 2007. http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=38278
[vii] "Chucho Garcia Interview: Race and Racial Divides in Venezuela," By Gregory Wilpert, Venezuelanalysis, Jan. 21, 2004.
Note: The Venezuela Information Office is dedicated to informing the American public about contemporary Venezuela, and receives its funding from the government of Venezuela. Further information is available from the FARA office of the Department of Justice in Washington, DC.
Venezuela is making unprecedented progress in combating the historical legacy of racism and recognizing the national importance of its African heritage. New government initiatives including reforms addressing poverty and inequality have afforded Afro-Venezuelans greater social, economic, and political rights.[i] Now, despite centuries of institutionalized racism and systematic political and social exclusion, Afro-Venezuelan citizens are experiencing gains that are the result of new action being taken by government and society.
SLAVERY AND THE MYTH OF RACIAL DEMOCRACY
An estimated 100,000 enslaved Africans were brought to Venezuela between the 16th and 19th centuries.[ii] Most were sold to the central coastal states, which drove an agricultural economy based in coffee and cacao. Abolition occurred in 1854, but freedom did not bring equality. Racism continued to flourish in Venezuela throughout most of the 20th century, and African heritage was denied through an emphasis on racial mixing. The mestizo, born of European, Indigenous, and African blood, became a cornerstone of national identity. In this scheme, Blackness was devalued to such an extent that state policies sought to "whiten" the population through European immigration.[iii] Venezuela, like many other Latin American countries, used the idea of the mestizo to uphold a myth of racial democracy that denied rampant discrimination on the basis of skin color.[iv]
AFRO-VENEZUELANS AND THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION
Hugo Chavez is the first president in Venezuela's history to claim and honor his Indigenous and African ancestry. Since his first election in 1998, reforms have been instituted to address the problems faced by the Afro-Venezuelan community and to extend to them important social, political, and economic rights. Historically, poor and rural citizens have lacked access to health care and education. Because cities and states with the largest Afro-Venezuelan populations face the highest levels of poverty, the recent social missions instituted by the Chavez administration have had a huge impact.
EDUCATION: Massive literacy campaigns and new educational institutions have allowed more than 1.5 million adults to learn to read and write, or to return to school. Due to subsidized education programs for elementary, high school, and college-aged students, Afro-Venezuelans are partaking in education at unprecedented rates. Once a privilege enjoyed by only a few, education is now considered a human right.
HEALTH CARE: In 1999, Venezuela became the first Latin American country to guarantee all citizens the right to basic health care. To meet this goal, a partnership was initiated with the government of Cuba, which has provided 20,000 medical professionals to treat previously underserved Venezuelans. In the past 5 years, thousands of community health clinics have been established throughout the country. Today, more than 60% of the Venezuelan population receives some form of government-sponsored health care. The results have been dramatic; between 1996 and 2002, infant mortality rates decreased by 38%.
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: Since 2003, millions of Afro-Venezuelans have been issued national ID cards guaranteeing them the citizenship rights they previously lacked. Article 56 of the 1999 Constitution guaranteed all persons the right to free registration with the Civil Registry Office, a measure which has allowed electoral participation among Afro-Venezuelans to grow tremendously. In unprecedented numbers, Afro-Venezuelans are exercising their right to vote as well as to run for political office. Afro-Venezuelans occupy important posts in the Chavez administration as legislators, ambassadors, and assemblymen. It is the first administration in Venezuelan history to include a Black Venezuelan in the President’s Cabinet.
VENEZUELA'S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Venezuela has prioritized its relations with Africa by opening 18 new embassies in countries including Mali, Morocco, Congo, Angola, Burkina Faso, and many more. The diplomatic initiative has been accompanied by cooperative energy agreements as well as programs in health and education.[v] In the Caribbean, Venezuela is helping ease the energy burden in many countries through a plan called PETROCARIBE, which provides countries with oil at market prices made affordable through beneficial financing terms. This aid provides member countries with energy and stimulates national and regional economic and social development. Currently, all but 3 countries in the Caribbean belong to PETROCARIBE.
THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE STRUGGLE
Venezuela's Boliviarian Revolution has made great strides in addressing the racism that has been the legacy of slavery and its continued manifestations in high rates of poverty, hunger, disease, and illiteracy among Afro-descendants. Because obstacles still exist, the struggle against discrimination is moving forward. Afro-Venezuelans still lack constitutional recognition, though many are confident that future reforms will include legislation guaranteeing the political, economic, and social rights of the community. Though Afro-Venezuelans currently comprise up to 40% of the Venezuelan population, reliable census data is still lacking. Civil society groups such as the Network of Afro-Venezuelan Organizations are working to end the statistical invisibility that has been the handmaiden of marginalization. Plans are being made to improve the 2010 census, which many hope will bring self-awareness.[vi]
A new consciousness is being forged by Afro-Venezuelans who today recognize and value their African heritage within the larger society. Anti-racist groups in Venezuela have entered into powerful alliances with the government through initiatives such as the Presidential Commission to End Racial Discrimination, which was started in 2005. New awareness campaigns designed in cooperation with the social missions emphasize the national historical contribution of Afro-Venezuelans. Taking stock of the struggle against racism, the renowned Afro-Venezuelan activist and scholar Jesús "Chucho" García (pictured at right) has said: "There is a great opening now; it's the moment for our recognition. That's what we are going to fight for."[vii]
Endnotes:
[i] "The Political Status of Afro-Venezuelans in the Bolivarian Revolution: A Democratic Measure for Venezuela and a Hemispheric Imperative," by James Early and Jesus "Chucho" Garcia, Olivia Burlingame Goumbri, ed., The Venezuela Reader: The Building of a People's Democracy (EPICA, 2005).
[ii] Jesús María Herrera Salas, "Ethnicity and Revolution: The Political Economy of Racism in Venezuela," Latin American Perspectives 32:2, March 2005.
[iii] "Chucho Garcia Interview: Race and Racial Divides in Venezuela," By Gregory Wilpert, Venezuelanalysis, Jan. 21, 2004. http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1091
[iv] Café con Leche: Race, Class, and the National Image in Venezuela, Winthrop R. Wright (University of Texas Press, 1993).
[v] "Africa-Venezuela: Weaving New Alliances With Cultural Threads," By Humberto Márquez, Inter Press Service, Oct. 28, 2005. http://ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=30807
[vi] "Venezuela: Afro-descendants Seek Visibility in Numbers," By Humberto Marquez, Inter Press Service, June 22, 2007. http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=38278
[vii] "Chucho Garcia Interview: Race and Racial Divides in Venezuela," By Gregory Wilpert, Venezuelanalysis, Jan. 21, 2004.
Note: The Venezuela Information Office is dedicated to informing the American public about contemporary Venezuela, and receives its funding from the government of Venezuela. Further information is available from the FARA office of the Department of Justice in Washington, DC.
Tuesday, January 20, 2009
President Barack Obama 2009 Inauguration and Address
Wow... regardless of how radical some of us we may be, this moment can not be understimated. This video speaks to the tears and screams spread all along the streets and backwoods of a nation founded on racism and intolerance. This video is one that is for those who fought, fell, and yet were never heard until it was too late for their generation to be witness of today's historic event.
As a radical I quiestion the degree to which it really changes the culture that persists in the United States... but if this is to be recognized as a minimal gesture of liberal democracy at its finest, then it itself should also be recognized as a foundation for a greater vision of political participation and expresionism... that is hardly symbolic.
Today was a fascinating day for all... lets just hope that the following days and years offer many more fascinating moments.
The U.S.A. must change.
As a radical I quiestion the degree to which it really changes the culture that persists in the United States... but if this is to be recognized as a minimal gesture of liberal democracy at its finest, then it itself should also be recognized as a foundation for a greater vision of political participation and expresionism... that is hardly symbolic.
Today was a fascinating day for all... lets just hope that the following days and years offer many more fascinating moments.
The U.S.A. must change.
Enjambre: Las reglas han cambiado
(Note to English readers: I will post the video and its abstract once it becomes available, but for now here it is in Spanish).
Documental de Guarataro Films y Venezolana de Televisión que analiza la doctrina de Guerra en Red o Guerra de Cuarta Generación y su aplicación en Venezuela, el cual será subido a este canal en 6 partes. El documental se encuentra disponible paar libre descarga en Internet.
Se incluyen entrevistas a: Miguel Henrique Otero. Director y editor del periódico El Nacional. Portavoz del Movimiento 2D que promueve la desobediencia civil contra el gobierno venezolano. Mario Iván Carratú. Vice Almirante (retirado). Ex-jefe de Casa Militar con Carlos Andrés Pérez durante el 4F de 1992. Antiguo agregado militar venezolano en Washington. Gene Sharp. Fundador del Albert Einstein Institution de Estados Unidos. Inspirador de Otpor y protagonista de una polémica con el presidente Chávez, el cual lo acuso de entrenar el movimiento estudiantil opositor. Eleazar Diaz Rangel. Director del periódico venezolano con mayor difusión: Últimas Noticias. Melvin López Hidalgo. General (retirado). Ex Secretario General del Consejo de Defensa. Héctor Herrera. Teniente Coronel (retirado). Fundador del Frente Cívico-Militar Bolivariano. Editor de la revista Ámbito Cívico-Militar. Miguel Ángel Contreras. Sociólogo y Profesor de la Universidad Central de Venezuela. Carlos Lanz. Profesor y Sociólogo. Ex guerrillero y ex comisario de la DISIP. / Se incluyen grabaciones de: Tomás Moncanut. General venezolano fallecido en accidente en 2005. Salvador Allende. Presidente de Chile muerto durante el Golpe de Estado en 1973.
La Doctrina de Cuarta Generación, afirma que la guerra ya no es entre naciones con fronteras nítidas, embajadas, frentes de ejércitos uniformados, comunicados oficiales, banderas e himnos nacionales. Se atacarán sociedades mediante la combinación de ideas, tecnología, acciones de guerra armada y el absoluto control de los medios de comunicación.
La guerra eterna declarada el 11/S por Bush, ha significado que el enfrentamiento amigo-enemigo trasciende todos los niveles de identificación del pasado. Incluso el de combatiente y no combatiente. La Guerra en Red (Netwar en la terminología de la RAND Corporation), es una cara más en la guerra de baja intensidad global, una nueva vuelta de tuerca en el conflicto basado en formas de organización, estrategia y tecnología en red. Los EEUU prueban cotidianamente las capacidades de defensa de naciones soberanas para comprobar su potencial y sus defensas en una eventual ciberguerra. Por tanto, debemos adaptarnos a las transformaciones que exigen nuestros tiempos para conducir el conflicto; necesitamos reorganizarnos en el mundo tal como somos, como una enredadera y no como un árbol.
GUERRA MULTIDIMENSIONAL
La Swarm Warfare, guerra del enjambre o de la horda, es la modalidad de conducción de operaciones bélicas que John Arquilla y David Ronfeldt han desenterrado después del imbatible uso que de ella hiciera Gengis Khan. En términos modernos, esa estrategia pone en práctica la guerra en todas sus dimensiones —terrestre, naval, aérea, mediante misiles, espacial, virtual y en el plano de la información—, en múltiples teatros y niveles. Para ello es necesario que el «enjambre» de diversos componentes y de acciones que se desarrollan concentrándose en un lugar y una dimensión dadas para trasladarse enseguida a otros lugares y otras dimensiones pueda, en cualquier caso, impedir cualquier tipo de reacción. Las hordas encargadas de la destrucción física de los blancos deben integrarse y concentrarse sobre los objetivos a la par de las hordas virtuales encargadas de las acciones diplomáticas, de la guerra sicológica, al igual que las encargadas de la manipulación de la información.
OPERACIÓN ENJAMBRE (SWARMING)
Ante enemigos con apoyo social, los norteamericanos utilizarán probablemente las nuevas tácticas conocidas genéricamente como swarming (enjambres), basadas en el despliegue de pequeñas unidades de comando con alto poder de fuego, autonomía propia, coordinación electrónica entre las mismas y acceso constante a información por satélite y a apoyo aéreo instantáneo con armas de precisión), con el uso de formas de organización y doctrinas más relacionadas con el empleo de tecnología de punta, al tiempo que sugiere una conformación de pequeños grupos dispersos que se comunican y coordinan sin un orden central que signifique la supeditación a estructuras jerárquicas específicas. El término fue establecido por el científico político estadounidense David Ronfeldt y su equipo de colaboradores.
Documental de Guarataro Films y Venezolana de Televisión que analiza la doctrina de Guerra en Red o Guerra de Cuarta Generación y su aplicación en Venezuela, el cual será subido a este canal en 6 partes. El documental se encuentra disponible paar libre descarga en Internet.
Se incluyen entrevistas a: Miguel Henrique Otero. Director y editor del periódico El Nacional. Portavoz del Movimiento 2D que promueve la desobediencia civil contra el gobierno venezolano. Mario Iván Carratú. Vice Almirante (retirado). Ex-jefe de Casa Militar con Carlos Andrés Pérez durante el 4F de 1992. Antiguo agregado militar venezolano en Washington. Gene Sharp. Fundador del Albert Einstein Institution de Estados Unidos. Inspirador de Otpor y protagonista de una polémica con el presidente Chávez, el cual lo acuso de entrenar el movimiento estudiantil opositor. Eleazar Diaz Rangel. Director del periódico venezolano con mayor difusión: Últimas Noticias. Melvin López Hidalgo. General (retirado). Ex Secretario General del Consejo de Defensa. Héctor Herrera. Teniente Coronel (retirado). Fundador del Frente Cívico-Militar Bolivariano. Editor de la revista Ámbito Cívico-Militar. Miguel Ángel Contreras. Sociólogo y Profesor de la Universidad Central de Venezuela. Carlos Lanz. Profesor y Sociólogo. Ex guerrillero y ex comisario de la DISIP. / Se incluyen grabaciones de: Tomás Moncanut. General venezolano fallecido en accidente en 2005. Salvador Allende. Presidente de Chile muerto durante el Golpe de Estado en 1973.
La Doctrina de Cuarta Generación, afirma que la guerra ya no es entre naciones con fronteras nítidas, embajadas, frentes de ejércitos uniformados, comunicados oficiales, banderas e himnos nacionales. Se atacarán sociedades mediante la combinación de ideas, tecnología, acciones de guerra armada y el absoluto control de los medios de comunicación.
La guerra eterna declarada el 11/S por Bush, ha significado que el enfrentamiento amigo-enemigo trasciende todos los niveles de identificación del pasado. Incluso el de combatiente y no combatiente. La Guerra en Red (Netwar en la terminología de la RAND Corporation), es una cara más en la guerra de baja intensidad global, una nueva vuelta de tuerca en el conflicto basado en formas de organización, estrategia y tecnología en red. Los EEUU prueban cotidianamente las capacidades de defensa de naciones soberanas para comprobar su potencial y sus defensas en una eventual ciberguerra. Por tanto, debemos adaptarnos a las transformaciones que exigen nuestros tiempos para conducir el conflicto; necesitamos reorganizarnos en el mundo tal como somos, como una enredadera y no como un árbol.
GUERRA MULTIDIMENSIONAL
La Swarm Warfare, guerra del enjambre o de la horda, es la modalidad de conducción de operaciones bélicas que John Arquilla y David Ronfeldt han desenterrado después del imbatible uso que de ella hiciera Gengis Khan. En términos modernos, esa estrategia pone en práctica la guerra en todas sus dimensiones —terrestre, naval, aérea, mediante misiles, espacial, virtual y en el plano de la información—, en múltiples teatros y niveles. Para ello es necesario que el «enjambre» de diversos componentes y de acciones que se desarrollan concentrándose en un lugar y una dimensión dadas para trasladarse enseguida a otros lugares y otras dimensiones pueda, en cualquier caso, impedir cualquier tipo de reacción. Las hordas encargadas de la destrucción física de los blancos deben integrarse y concentrarse sobre los objetivos a la par de las hordas virtuales encargadas de las acciones diplomáticas, de la guerra sicológica, al igual que las encargadas de la manipulación de la información.
OPERACIÓN ENJAMBRE (SWARMING)
Ante enemigos con apoyo social, los norteamericanos utilizarán probablemente las nuevas tácticas conocidas genéricamente como swarming (enjambres), basadas en el despliegue de pequeñas unidades de comando con alto poder de fuego, autonomía propia, coordinación electrónica entre las mismas y acceso constante a información por satélite y a apoyo aéreo instantáneo con armas de precisión), con el uso de formas de organización y doctrinas más relacionadas con el empleo de tecnología de punta, al tiempo que sugiere una conformación de pequeños grupos dispersos que se comunican y coordinan sin un orden central que signifique la supeditación a estructuras jerárquicas específicas. El término fue establecido por el científico político estadounidense David Ronfeldt y su equipo de colaboradores.
Monday, January 19, 2009
Homage to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
Barack Obama Speaks at Dr. King's Church
Martin Luther King - I have a dream
Tuesday, January 13, 2009
An Analysis of Human Rights Watch's Report on Venezuela
Smoke and Mirrors: An Analysis of Human Rights Watch's Report on Venezuela
October 19, 2008 By Gregory Wilpert
Source: Venezuelanalysis.com
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President Chavez managed to hand Human Rights Watch a major public relations victory with his recent expulsion of its America's Director José Miguel Vivanco and its Deputy Director Daniel Wilkinson. With the expulsion, which Chavez ordered because Vivanco and Wilkinson are foreigners and did not have a visa that allowed them to engage in political or professional activity in Venezuela, Venezuela seemed to prove Human Rights Watch's point, that the Chavez government does not tolerate dissent. Whether the expulsion was justified is a distraction from the larger issue, though, which is whether the report, "A Decade Under Chávez,"[i] which Human Rights Watch (HRW) presented in Venezuela on September 18, is justified.
Another distraction, this time put forward by defenders of the Chavez government, is whether HRW is an agent of the U.S. government and of imperialism. Apparently false arguments about Vivanco's past are brought up, among other things.[ii] This, however, also serves to distract from a serious and accurate analysis of whether what HRW writes about Venezuela is valid and worth paying attention to.
Writing an analysis of the HRW report is a challenge, though, because it is tempting to respond to each and every point, which would make the response almost as long as the 236-page report itself. I will thus try to refrain from responding to each and every accusation and will discuss only the most important ones.
In short, the report raises a few problems with regard to the protection of political rights in Venezuela, but the few places where it is on target are almost completely drowned in a sea of de-contextualization, trumped-up accusations, and a clear and obvious bias in favor of the opposition and against the government. I will examine each of HRW's criticisms in the same order as the report itself, which deals with political discrimination, the judicial system, mass media, labor unions, and civil society organizations.
The Report in Context - Meta-Criticism
Before we begin the analysis of the report itself, though, it makes sense to take a brief look at some of the over-arching problems with the report.
First, the report gives the impression of being about human rights violations in general in Venezuela (the subtitle is: "Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela"), but actually narrowly focuses on some political rights (not even all political rights, leaving out electoral rights, for example), to the complete exclusion of social and economic rights. The report itself justifies this narrow focus by saying that the report "does not address all the pressing human rights issues facing [Venezuela] today, many of which pre-date the Chávez presidency. Rather, it focuses on the impact that the Chávez government's policies have had on institutions that play key roles in ensuring that human rights are respected: the courts, the media, organized labor, and civil society."[iii] Not only does this statement imply that there are far more human rights violations in Venezuela than the ones cited in this report, but it also implies that the violations it does discuss are the most important ones to focus on because they "ensure that human rights are respected."
Such a one-sided focus completely leaves out any consideration of the well-established human rights norm that human rights are "indivisible." That is, all of the human rights listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)—whether political, economic, or social—are equally important.[iv] In other words, had HRW taken economic and social rights also into consideration, it would have to conclude that the progress made in these areas has been tremendous during the Chavez presidency. Also, if one were to take economic rights seriously, it would be almost silly to claim that attention to courts, media, labor unions, and civil society are more important, since people who do not have their basic economic rights guaranteed, and are thus too busy finding food and shelter, are generally incapable of taking advantage of these institutions. HRW's emphasis on political rights thus reflects its bias towards the better off, who are already able to enjoy their economic and social rights without restriction.
Second, throughout the report HRW fails to present incidents or policies in their proper context, which makes it more difficult to understand how and why certain things happen in Venezuela. As a result, by excluding this context, readers interpret the issues that the report discusses through the lens of their own prejudices or the false media impressions of Venezuela, such as the widespread images of Chavez the "caudillo" or "dictator" of Venezuela.
Third, as almost all critics of the report have noted, the report was launched for maximum effectiveness (with an embargoed press release) just two month before Venezuela's November 23rd regional elections. This is the third time that HRW releases a major report shortly before an electoral contest (the first being in June 2004, just before the presidential recall referendum and the second in late 2007, just before the constitutional reform referendum).[v] Vivanco should thus not be surprised if HRW is suspected of timing its reports to influence Venezuelan electoral contests.
Finally, this is one of the longest (other than its annual reports) special reports that HRW has done on any one topic or country.[vi] Vivanco says that the reason for this is that, "Everyone in the world has an opinion about Venezuela. There are very many and very strong opinions, but it is difficult to find concrete facts. We wanted to make the most faithful picture of what is happening here so that the world would know it."[vii] In other words, it would seem that the seriousness of human rights violations in Venezuela is not the real motivation for this book-length report, but rather it is the controversy surrounding Venezuela that motivated HRW to conduct this two-year investigation.
For a human rights group to make such a massive investment into a project (just how much did it cost and who paid for it?) not because of the seriousness of human rights violations, but because of the lack of consensus seems odd. This circumstance adds credence to one blogger's sarcastic remark (BoRev.net) that apparently Human Rights Watch believes that it's original mission has been accomplished, of rooting out torture, forced disappearances, and political imprisonments and that now it can afford the luxury of focusing on weak judiciaries and political discrimination in the hiring processes for civil service jobs.
We have yet to see a comparably long report on human rights violations in Colombia, Mexico, or the U.S. war on terror. More than that, there seems to be a political motivation for the report, based on Vivanco's statement, "We did the report because we wanted to demonstrate to the world that Venezuela is not a model for anyone..."[viii] Certainly, if the Venezuelan government were a systematic violator of human rights, no one would say that such practices should be a model. Rather, the model that Chavez and his supporters defend (and Chavez himself has always said that every country should find its own path) are the policies that go against free market capitalism and in favor of redistribution of wealth and of political power.
These meta-criticisms of the report aside, it is nonetheless worthwhile to examine the issues it raises with respect to Venezuela's human rights situation. One just needs to keep in mind that in practically all of the areas it does not examine there have been tremendous advances, whether, for example, in education, in reducing poverty, or in including the previously excluded (such as women and indigenous and afro-Venezuelan populations). One specific measure of this progress is the fact that Venezuela is one of the few countries in Latin America to be on track for reaching the Millennium Development Goals.[ix]
Political Discrimination - Decontextualizing Problems
All of five sections of the HRW report exhibit three consistent problems that fundamentally distort the final result. First, they each display a lack of contextualization of the problems they discuss. Second, they represent what some have called trumped-up accusations in that they accuse the government of definite wrongdoing in areas where the facts of the matter are not that clear or where relatively minor problems are turned into major issues. Third, and closely related to the second, each section brings up issues where the interpretation of events relies almost exclusively on that of the opposition. Finally, because there is so much overlap in the issues the report discusses, there is a tremendous amount of repetition, thus giving the impression that there are far more human rights problems than is actually the case.
Beginning with the section on political discrimination, this section is perhaps the most decontextualized. The main issue that HRW raises here is the use of the so-called "Tascón list," which National Assembly member Luis Tascón created when he posted the names of the signers of the petition for a presidential recall referendum on his personal website. The stated purpose of the list was to give individuals who did not sign the petition, but who were placed on the list against their will, an opportunity to have their name removed from it. The list, however, ended up being used by government officials to screen job applicants, to make sure they weren't hiring opposition sympathizers.
The HRW report does make a token effort to provide historical context by pointing out that in the pre-Chavez era, governments regularly discriminated against political opponents in the hiring process for the public administration.[x]Also, it does state Tascón's intention for publicly posting the list (although it expresses doubt that this was the real reason, saying this was the "ostensible" reason). However, the report completely skips over the extent to which opposition supporters in the public administration were involved in sabotage. Such information might be difficult to come by, but if one were to speak to any departmental director in the public administration, they could tell many stories of such occurrences. Certainly, ideally a minister or vice-minister or departmental director ought to fire those engaged in sabotage, following the formal procedures for such a case. This, however, is almost impossible because of restrictive labor laws in the public sector and because it can be extremely difficult to prove an on-the-job slow-down.
In other words, while the use of such lists is to be condemned (and HRW admits that Chavez and Tascón have condemned it) and prohibited, it is at least understandable why many government officials have used it nonetheless. If a department director faces the choice between having an apolitical hiring process, but an unmanageable department because some opposition supporters are subtly sabotaging, versus illegally politicizing the hiring process and thereby having a better functioning department, most managers will opt for the latter option.
In addition to this de-contextualization of the circumstances in which the Tascón list (and later the Maisanta program) was applied, HRW fails to show how systematic their application actually is in Venezuela. While they list a few cases,[xi] these pale in comparison to the total number of employees in the public administration.[xii]
The most prominent case to which HRW refers, though, is without any merit whatsoever, which is the case of the state owned oil company PDVSA. Here HRW cites two incidents, the oil industry shutdown of December 2002, where 19,000 PDVSA employees (about half the workforce) were fired for their participation in the shutdown, and an incident in which PDVSA president Rafael Ramirez told a gathering of PDVSA managers in November 2006 that he would not tolerate any opposition supporters in the management.
By calling the two-month oil industry shutdown, which started in December 2002, "legitimate strike activity," HRW shows quite clearly that its sympathies lie with the opposition. For everyone who was present in Venezuela during that extremely stressful period and who saw the daily "strike reports," it was more than clear that the one and only demand of the strikers was Chavez's resignation. They clearly hoped that Chavez would resign if they could bring Venezuela's oil dependent economy to its knees. Indeed, the strike cost the country anywhere between $10 and $20 billion, drove unemployment to an unheard of high of 22%, and caused the economy to shrink by 29%.
The only reason HRW refers to this oil industry shutdown[xiii] as a legitimate strike is because it relies on a ruling of the ILO's Freedom of Association Committee, which claimed to have found that the PDVSA "strike" also involved labor-related demands. Apparently opposition labor leaders managed to convince the ILO committee of this. However, even if there were some labor-related demands (they were not even stated in the ILO decision), they were not known by most Venezuelans, not one of PDVSA's three main labor unions supported the "strike" (even though the leadership was otherwise sympathetic to the opposition) and the only message anyone ever got during the "strike" was that it was to force Chavez's resignation.[xiv]
With the fig leaf of the ILO's hopelessly misguided ruling, HRW can now claim that the Chavez government engaged in illegal political discrimination and firing against PDVSA employees. It bolsters its case with another fig leaf, which is PDVSA President Ramirez's 2006 demand that all PDVSA managers should be supporters of the Chavez government. However, HRW claims that this demand was made of all PDVSA employees, when in fact it was made only to the managers.[xv] By failing to make this crucial distinction HRW can again claim that political discrimination is a government policy. It should not come as a surprise that a company president demands that all of his managers are government supporters when the company is still recovering from a debilitating political strike. By interpreting Venezuelan events from the perspective of the more right-wing elements in Venezuelan politics, HRW clearly demonstrates that its sympathies lie with the particularly anti-democratic and ruthlessly anti-Chávez sectors of the Venezuelan opposition.
HRW then goes on to list several concrete cases where PDVSA workers were fired apparently due to their political beliefs. While such actions, if true, are definitely wrong, these few instances again do not prove that PDVSA is engaged in systematic political discrimination. For every politically motivated firing, PDVSA employees can point to an opposition supporter working at the company.[xvi] As HRW correctly points out, the official position against political discrimination was reaffirmed in a July 2007 memo (p.33).
Judicial Independence - A Contradictory Analysis
The analysis of the next area that HRW examines, Venezuela's judicial system, is riddled with contradictions, which undermine the overall claim that Venezuela's judiciary is not independent of the executive. The main critique here is that by passing a new Supreme Court law in 2004 the Chavez government managed to "pack and purge" the court and with that to politicize all the courts, since these are subordinated to the Supreme Court. However, not only does HRW again give no credence to the official reasons for which the "court-packing law" (as they call the law in the language of the opposition) was passed, throughout the report HRW cites cases where the supposedly executive-dependent court system made decisions against the Chavez government or its supporters.
Again, HRW provides some badly needed historical context by briefly describing the judiciary prior to the Chavez presidency, which it calls "bankrupt" due to the rampant corruption in the system. Also, it cites a 1998 UN Development Program survey, which found that only 0.8% of Venezuelans had confidence in the judiciary. Oddly, a brief review of HRW reports on Venezuela during the pre-Chavez era finds not a single report was on the judiciary of the time.
Also, HRW fails to make any meaningful comparison between this "bankrupt" pre-Chavez judiciary and the current Chavez-era judiciary. An examination of survey data, though, finds that Venezuelans evaluate their judiciary quite favorably compared to the rest of Latin America. According to Latinobarometro, only 38% of Latin Americans evaluate in their country's respective judiciary systems as doing "good" or "very good" work, while Venezuelans respond positively 52% of the time.[xvii]
Despite this positive evaluation compared to other countries, the HRW report is unrelenting in its criticism of the Chavez-era judiciary. HRW notes that the 2004 Supreme Court law that allowed the addition of 12 new judges (hence the "packing" of the court) was preceded by the court's momentous decision to exonerate four of the main coup organizers with the claim that there was no coup in April 2002, only a "vacuum of power." The report, though, dismisses the importance of this decision when it refers to the supposedly far greater danger the new pro-Chavez balance of power represents in the Supreme Court. That is, it ought to be a valid consideration, which is a graver threat to democracy, a Supreme Court that condones a coup attempt (which dissolved the Supreme Court too, among other institutions) or a new court, dominated by Chavez sympathizers. Clearly, HRW endorses the former.
HRW does raise one valid point, though, in this discussion, which is the danger that the new Supreme Court Law makes removing sitting judges too easy. That is, while previously an impeachment procedure required a two-thirds majority on the National Assembly to vote for such an impeachment, the new law effectively lowers this requirement to a simple 50% majority in special circumstances. This could undermine the court's independence sometime in the future when a party has a simple majority, but no two-thirds majority in the National Assembly (AN) (currently Chavez supporters control almost 90% the seats in the AN).
However, HRW manages to bury this important point in more decontextualization when it argues that the so-called packing of the Supreme Court led to some sort of "altered" composition of the entire judiciary because the new majority on the court used its power to presumably pack all of the other courts (p.49). What HRW fails to mention is that with the ten to ten vote split between opposition and Chavez supporters on the Supreme Court, the court was completely paralyzed in its effort to reform the judiciary.
The judicial reform process had begun in 2000 and was interrupted in late 2001 when Luis Miquilena, Chavez's minister of the interior and justice, who had helped appoint most of the judges, switched over to the opposition. Many of the judges he had appointed also switched sides, which is why ten voted against the indictment of four of the coup organizers. It was only once the court's deadlock was removed that the judicial reform process could proceed.
The HRW report is actually hypocritical when it complains that the new court proceeded to appoint new permanent judges, replacing a large number of temporary judges. In its 2004 report on the new Supreme Court law HRW specifically criticized the judiciary for not making more progress on the court reform.[xviii] Then, with this new report, it criticizes the judiciary for proceeding with the reform, a crucial step of which was the replacement of temporary judges.
HRW then cites a few cases where the Supreme Court failed to rule against the Chavez administration, such as its failure to rule on whether the 2004 Supreme Court law is constitutional, whether the Constitutional Reform Proposal of 2007 was constitutional, whether the rights of the TV station RCTV were infringed when it didn't have its broadcast license renewed, and whether the National Electoral Council is required to supervise union elections. Rather than actually ruling in favor of the Chavez government, the court has in each case merely failed to definitively rule one way or the other. However, if one considers these rulings together with the different rulings in favor of the opposition, which the HRW report itself cites, these arguments lose their effectiveness.
The Media - Making a Mountain out of a Molehill
In the section on the Chavez government's relationship with the media, the HRW report exemplifies its success at trumping up charges against the government. It lists a wide variety of prominent cases against prominent journalists, most of which have been resolved in favor of the journalist or were dismissed. Also, it cites supposedly repressive regulation of the broadcast media that falls well within the standard practices of most other Latin American and Western countries. Finally, it claims that the Venezuelan government is restricting pluralism in the media while at the same time contradicting itself when it concedes that more people than ever have access to the media.
Unlike the previous sections, where there was at least a token attempt to provide some historical context from the pre-Chavez era, this time there is no such information. If the report had provided such historical background, HRW would have been forced to admit that freedom of speech in Venezuela is in a better situation today than it ever was before Chavez, when there was far less pluralism of opinion in the mass media. Also, for example, under earlier presidents, such as Carlos Andrés Perez (1989-1993), there was an actual censorship board that reviewed newspapers before they were published and forced papers to publish blank space whenever an article was deemed too sensitive for the government.[xix]
The report then gives the impression that it is president Chavez's fault that the media have become so polarized in Venezuela, by falsely claiming that "under Chavez" the state television channel VTV "has been as partisan and biased as its private counterparts" (p. 69). However, VTV has always been an explicitly pro-government TV channel, long before Chavez became president. In other words, the report gives the implicit impression that VTV became politicized only with Chavez, when in actuality it has always been an explicitly pro-government channel. The same goes for the report's false suggestion that the simultaneous broadcast of government messages on all radio and TV stations is an invention of the Chavez government, when in actuality Venezuelan presidents long before Chavez also made use of this power.[xx]
The report further criticizes Chavez's "demonizing" (p.72) of his opposition with harsh language, completely leaving out that the opposition just as much demonizes Chavez and that Chavez was responding in kind to his critics. HRW then suggests that it was Chavez's harsh language that was to blame for the incidents of physical aggression against members of the private media, completely leaving out that the incidents the report cites occurred during a time of intense political polarization (2003), in which violence between sympathizers from both sides had been escalating. This is no excuse for such violence, but it is important to understand the context in which these incidents took place.
Also, HRW correctly points out that the Chavez government has launched several new state TV stations (for the National Assembly - ANTV, community programming - Vive, continental programming - Telesur, and cultural programming - Tves), as if this represented some sort of threat to free speech. It then goes on to admit (in a footnote, though) (p.73), that despite this proliferation of a diversity of state TV channels, the audience share of these remains far below that of private channels. In the interest of objectivity, it would have behooved HRW to also state that despite the increase of state channels, the vast majority of TV channels in Venezuela are privately controlled.
Presumably HRW did not mention the large number of private channels because it believes that such private control has become irrelevant in light of recent legislation to regulate radio and television broadcasters. According to HRW, these have been driven to self-censorship due to the stiffening of penalties for the existing prohibition against disrespecting high government officials (in existence for over 50 years) and the new law for social responsibility in radio and television.[xxi]
As evidence for this supposed intimidation HRW cites how two of the major private television stations, Televen and Venevision moderated their editorial line and became less confrontational towards the Chavez government. Instead of interpreting this as an effort to become more responsible and to keep from losing the 60+% of the population that supports Chavez, HRW is convinced that the only reason for this switch are the defamation laws that have always been on the books and have practically never been applied and the social responsibility law that also has so far not resulted in a single closure or even fine. By interpreting these stations' reactions in this way and in no other, HRW implies that the stations want to be polarizing and irresponsible. More than that, the HRW position implies that it would be better if Televen and Venevision had not changed their editorial lines towards more balance and moderation.
Court Cases Against Journalists
Of the ten exemplary court cases against journalists that HRW examines, six are for libel or related issues. By raising these as free speech issues HRW implies that charging a journalist with libel is somehow illegitimate, even though HRW also says it is not opposed to libel laws in principle. Only four of the ten cases, though, resulted in a guilty verdict, whereby only one had to pay a fine[xxii] and two received suspended sentences, one had to apologize, and only one had to serve a prison sentence.[xxiii] Three of the cases were dismissed or never went to trial and three remain open as of the writing of the HRW report.
With such a mixed record of results, it takes an almost paranoid imagination to believe that the government is systematically and successfully persecuting critics with the collusion of a supposedly executive-dependent judiciary—especially if you consider that Venezuela's newspapers and airwaves feature hundreds of journalists every day that attack Chavez, his ministers, and his programs. Rather, the more sensible interpretation is that occasionally some journalists overstep the bounds of journalistic ethics and are prosecuted and found guilty and then there are some isolated cases where prosecutors go too far and go after journalists who have done nothing wrong, in which cases the courts manage to find in favor of the defendants. And in some cases (only one it seems, though; the case of Francisco Usón), a court reaches a bad verdict. This is the record of a normal country that does what it can to balance the interests of the public and of private individuals, not of a country that is stifling freedom of speech, as HRW is intent to imply.
Social Responsibility Law
Next, the HRW report discusses the social responsibility law, where it once again completely omits any relevant context to make sense of why this law was passed. That is, prior to the law's passage in late 2004 there was a near regulatory vacuum with regard to broadcasting regulations. The vehemently oppositional private TV media took great advantage of this vacuum in 2001 to 2003 when it broadcast a constant stream of programming intended to incite an uprising against the president. Twice this incitement had some effect, such as during the April 2002 coup attempt and during the December 2002 oil industry shutdown.
It was in the aftermath of these harrowing events[xxiv] that the media law was passed. Still, it is not unreasonable of HRW to argue that this law is flawed for two main reasons. First, some of the activity that it prohibits (such as incitement) is poorly defined, thus leaving the door open to abuse. Second, it does not provide for a truly independent regulatory body that could impartially rule on infractions against the law.
Having said that, though, the HRW goes completely overboard trying to make these points and in suggesting that Venezuelan law gives the Venezuelan government "unlimited" (p.93) power to restrict freedom of speech. First of all, the powers that the Media law gives the government are protected against abuse by the constitution and by the Supreme Court (which, indeed, HRW seems to believe is worthless). Second, the law itself does not give such unlimited powers at all, as a close reading of the law shows.
HRW goes on to claim that just because Chavez and several other government officials considered some opposition demonstrations and an electoral boycott to be part of preparations for a new coup, these actions could be classified as incitement and thus banned from television. Even if some government officials followed that line of thinking, it is clear that no one in a position where it could have been applied thought so. Here HRW is trying to impute a variety of dangers into situations that are completely removed from Venezuelan reality.
RCTV Case
Finally, with regard to the case of RCTV, HRW's main criticism here is that RCTV's right to due process was violated when its broadcast license was not renewed and another private station's license, Venevision's, which expired at the same time, was renewed. In an abstract sense it is correct that two similar stations were treated differently, which makes it plausible that the difference in treatment is rooted in the different politics of the two stations.[xxv]
However, first, nothing in Venezuelan law (which pre-dates the Chavez presidency) states that a public hearing process is required for the renewal of broadcast licenses. Rather, it is entirely up to the (democratically elected) executive to decide who is to have broadcast licenses. Such a process might be flawed from the perspective of maintaining minority groups' access to the airwaves, but it does not mean that in an ideal legal situation, which would protect minority group access to the airwaves, RCTV would have kept its license. As a matter of fact, in such an ideal situation any station that helped organize a coup would have lost its license a long time ago.
Second, HRW simply dismisses all of the government's arguments for why Venevisión and RCTV were treated differently. The two main reasons were that RCTV had violated the Social Responsibility Law far more often than Venevisión and that it occupied a wavelength that was ideally suited for a new public television channel. While it is true that the argument for a new public television channel came in the last minute and thus was somewhat ad hoc, it is legitimate to ask which type of station is more important, no matter when the question is raised. If faced with a choice between broadcasting a private channel that pursues only the interests of its private owners versus broadcasting a public channel that broadcasts in the public interest because it is publicly owned and controlled by a democratically elected executive (such as TVES, which replaced RCTV), then it is not too far-fetched to argue that the latter is more important.
In an interesting footnote the HRW report cites how balanced the Venezuelan media actually are, which undermines the overall gist of the entire section that the government has supposedly "tilted" media coverage in its favor. That is, according to a study conducted by the Jesuit-run institute Centro Gumilla (which tends to be anti-Chavez), media coverage of the constitutional reform referendum "the coverage of RCTV International and Globovisión was equally biased in favor of the NO vote. The three stations with the most balanced coverage were Venevisión, Televen, and Channel 1." (fn. 324, p.117) TVES and VTV, the two state channels, were biased in favor of the YES vote. If one adds together the audience share of each of the three different types of broadcasters, the YES and NO channels each have about the same audience share (around 15-20% each) and the largest segment of viewers tends to watch the stations with balanced coverage (around 50-60%).
In other words, if balance and pluralism are the main goals for a country's broadcasting landscape, then Venezuela comes closer to this goal than most countries do. This is even more so the case if one also takes the HRW report's very positive analysis of the expansion of community media in Venezuela into consideration. (p.121-125)
Organized Labor - Siding with Corrupt Union Bosses
In the name of freedom of association, HRW ends up blatantly defending one of Latin America's most corrupt union movements. The HRW report briefly concedes that prior to Chavez the freedom for labor to associate was quite restricted due to the nearly total control governing parties had over the union movement, fraudulent elections, corruption, and legal restrictions on strike activity. However, once again HRW jumps directly from this extremely bad state of affairs to implying that the situation of organized labor is worse now under Chavez than it has ever been.
HRW claims, for example, "The government has systematically flouted its obligations under the conventions of the International Labour Organization." (p.134) While the report repeatedly refers to ILO resolutions about the impermissibility of state interference in labor organizing and about how the PDVSA strike was supposedly a legitimate strike, it completely ignores the ILO's recent finding of June, 2008, that Venezuela does not violate labor union freedom, thus displaying its highly selective usage of sources.[xxvi]
In other words, nothing could be further from the truth that Venezuela "systematically flouted its obligation" with regard to union freedom. It only looks that way if one is convinced, as HRW seems to be, that the old labor movement is the legitimate labor movement of Venezuela and that any effort to clean up this miserable state of organized labor represents an attack on the freedom to organize. HRW raises four criticisms to make this point - let's take a look at each one in turn.
State supervision of union elections
HRW repeatedly makes the claim that the "Venezuelan government" "intervenes" and "interferes" in union elections because the "the government" says it has to certify such elections. HRW also claims that the Chavez government is "routinely violating workers' rights, openly rejecting the notion that unions should be free from state interference..." (p.135)
Leaving aside for the moment this highly tendentious description of labor freedom in Venezuela, it is extremely misleading to characterize the union certification process in this way. First of all, it isn't "the government" that supervises and certifies union elections, but the National Electoral Council (CNE), which is a completely independent branch of the executive branch in Venezuela. No "packing" or "purging" of the CNE is possible (if it were even remotely possible, HRW would no doubt have written a report on it by now) without modifying the constitution.[xxvii] Of course, since the opposition stupidly enough boycotted the 2005 National Assembly elections, it could not participate in the nomination process, which, unlike the Supreme Court, requires a two-thirds majority for appointing members to the CNE.
Second, to call supervision and certification an "intervention" in the union election process is a stretch. As long as the elections are free and fair, the CNE has to approve them. It has yet to be shown that the CNE has not certified a fair election.
Here too, HRW completely ignores the relevant background, of Venezuela's history of undemocratic or fraudulently elected labor union leadership. It is precisely due to this history that labor union dissidents, several years before Chavez's election (HRW mentions this in a footnote, fn. 441, p.151) proposed that the electoral council supervise union elections. It is nothing unusual for governments to require and supervise union elections.
HRW claims to have evidence, though, that the CNE simply did not respond to requests for supervising union election processes, thus making it impossible for the union to be certified. However, apparently HRW never even tried to contact the CNE, to get its side of the story. According to María Padrón, the CNE's Director of Union and Professional Association Affairs, "Absolutely no representative of Human Rights Watch established contact with this electoral body [the CNE]."[xxviii] If HRW had, it would have been able to formulate a far more accurate account of how the CNE handles union elections, rather than implying that this independent body is somehow intentionally sabotaging opposition-oriented unions.
For example, HRW claims that, "the required intervention of the CNE denies workers one of the most basic safeguards of union autonomy: the right to elect their representatives in full freedom." (p.144) According to the CNE, though, this is not an "intervention" but a supervision because it does not actually carry out any of the electoral procedures.[xxix] Rather, an electoral commission of the union itself organizes the election. The CNE sets out some basic principles for the process, but the logistics are left up to the union.
Not only that, according to Padrón, supervision is only required when the union requests it. "The CNE does not call upon unions to present their request, rather, it is those interested themselves who approach this institution to request the constitutionally guaranteed support," says Padrón. If a union does not wish CNE supervision, it is free to hold the election on its own. "If the employer and the other administrative labor institutions recognize these [union] authorities as legitimate, this would be sufficient for all involved," adds Padrón.[xxx] In other words, it is possible that some employers, such as the government, say that they will recognize the union leadership only if it was elected under CNE supervision - but this is not a legal requirement.
HRW then goes on to enumerate a few union election cases (out of about 5,000 unions registered with the CNE) in which it claims that the CNE did not certify union elections within a reasonable amount of time.
· CTV (CTV refused to be supervised, government refused to recognize result)
· SUNEP-SAS (health workers - CNE supposedly delayed certification)
· SUNEP-INN (nutrition workers - CNE supposedly delayed certification)
· FMV (doctors - initially refused supervision, now delayed)
In each of these few cases the CNE says irregularities in the electoral process delayed the certification. That HRW presumes to know who is right in this without even interviewing a CNE representative shows, once again, that its sympathies lie with the opposition-oriented leadership of these organizations.[xxxi]
Denial of collective bargaining to unrecognized unions
The second charge with regard to the supposed lack of labor freedom in Venezuela is that the government refuses to engage in collective bargaining processes with unions that are affiliated with the opposition or with the opposition-controlled labor federation, the CTV (Confederation of Venezuelan Labor). HRW lists only two cases in this connection, that of the public sector workers union FEDEUNEP and the airport workers union SUNEP. In both cases the government took advantage of Venezuelan labor law ambiguity, which does not provide for clear regulations about how employers are to decide with which union to bargain collectively when there is more than one union to represent the workers.
Throughout this report, HRW suggests that the government is setting up company unions in order to avoid negotiating with unions affiliated with the opposition-oriented CTV. However, HRW hardly seems to consider the possibility that most Venezuelan workers feel betrayed by the CTV and its unions because of its role in driving up the unemployment rate to over 22% during the 2002/2003 oil industry shutdown. The fact that Venezuelan workers have massively joined the new union federation, the UNT (National Union of Venezuelan Workers) and have abandoned the CTV is not mostly the result of government favoritism towards UNT affiliated unions, as HRW wants its readers to believe. Rather, it is because of the fact that the Chavez government has been far more pro-worker (and anti-business) than the CTV, which has been working hand-in-hand with the country's largest chamber of commerce, Fedecamaras.
That the Chavez government is taking advantage of an age-old imprecision in the existing labor law by choosing which unions to bargain with is not an ideal situation. However, when evaluating the Chavez government's record with regard to labor organizing rights, one should also consider the government's wider record in this regard, compared to previous governments. The comparison would, no doubt, be favorable, measured by the tremendous increase in collective bargaining agreements and the relative lack of strikes, even though the old union movement was largely controlled by one of the former governing parties, Acción Democrática.[xxxii]
Undermining right to strike
To make the case that the Chavez government has generally "undermined the right to strike" HRW relies on just one incident, which is the already mentioned oil industry shutdown, where it keeps repeating, against any real evidence (other than an ILO committee report that was heavily influenced by CTV lobbying), that the shutdown represented a legitimate strike action.
In this section HRW's opposition bias comes out again when it re-hashes some of the details of the oil industry shutdown from an exclusively opposition point-of-view. For example, HRW makes it look like the oil industry management's unrest was exclusively Chavez's fault because he "had fired the PDVSA president and appointed a new board of directors with ties to his administration." (p. 175) In reality, though, PDVSA board members have always been appointed on the basis of their ties to the president. It is just that this time the President of Venezuela and the new PDVSA board did not belong to the country's old elites, to which PDVSA's managers belong.
Also, HRW falsely claims that, following the April 2002 coup attempt, "the struggle between the Chávez administration and PDVSA employees continued through the year." (p.175) In reality, Chavez's appointed board of directors resigned, the old board returned, and the fired managers returned to their posts, even though they had been involved in an illegal lockout during the coup attempt. The PDVSA president, Ali Rodriguez, took a decidedly soft-line with the management and no disturbances took place within the oil industry until the opposition decided to launch its second attempt to unseat Chavez in late 2002 when it saw his mellower approach as a new opportunity to get rid of him.[xxxiii]
Finally, this section of the HRW report concludes with some warnings about how cooperatives and workers councils (which the government plans to introduce in the near future) could be abused and directed against labor.
It is odd, though, to see HRW express so much concern about labor's right to organize when it pays practically no attention to many of the decidedly pro-labor positions of the Chavez government. For example, HRW says nothing about Venezuela having the highest minimum wage in Latin America, which has been steadily increased over the years, President Chavez's direct support for striking steel workers at Sidor, which was nationalized in accordance with worker demands after a prolonged labor conflict, and the tremendous increase in the number of workers who have been incorporated into Venezuela's social security system since Chavez came into office.[xxxiv] These omissions, when combined with the report's relatively weak criticisms (about CNE supervision of union elections, the lack of collective bargaining contracts with opposition-affiliated unions, and the possible abuse of cooperatives and workers councils), gives the distinct impression that HRW is merely siding with Venezuela's formerly dominant and still corrupt unions that are affiliated with the CTV, instead of presenting an objective and pro-labor report.
Civil Society - Weak to Non-Existing Arguments
For HRW's last broadside against the Chavez government, that Chavez and his supporters are "harassing" civil society groups, HRW comes up with its perhaps weakest arguments yet. HRW offers three main arguments to back up its claim: (1) the government subjects rights advocates to unsubstantiated criminal investigations, (2) the government seeks to exclude NGOs that receive money from foreign sources from representing Venezuela in international forums, and (3) the government is pursuing legislation that would allow it to arbitrarily interfere in NGO functioning. While it is possible to say that there might have been some verbal excesses towards oppositional NGOs, it is a complete falsification of reality to imply, as HRW does, that under Chavez civil society is more hemmed in than elsewhere in the world or than previously in Venezuelan history. Just the opposite tends to be the case, as polls about the high degree of politicization and the large amount of political activity in Venezuela attest.[xxxv]
Unsubstantiated Accusations and Other Harassment
The first case HRW takes up to defend is that of Venezuelan Prison Watch (Observatorio Venezolano de Prisiones, OVP), an organization that it presents as being a politically neutral group that works towards prison reform. The goals of this group are certainly laudable, considering that the situation in Venezuela's prisons can be considered nothing less than hellish. Indeed, Chavez has admitted so much and is quoted as saying so in the HRW report. However, to present OVP as a politically neutral organization, which HRW does by presenting government claims of its politicization as having no foundation, is absurd. It is very well known in Venezuela that the group and especially its leader, Humberto Prado, are very active within the opposition. This fact alone, of course, does not justify legal harassment. Actually, HRW does not say that OVP is being harassed legally, just that it is being questioned verbally, by government officials who state what everyone knows, that this group's expressly partisan positioning undermines its stated and commendable objectives of helping reform the prison system. If HRW considers this kind of questioning to be "harassment" (p.208), then it is in effect denying government officials their right to exercise their freedom of speech and say what they think about what a group such as OVP is doing.
HRW then highlights a truly unusual case (not one similar case can be found in the entire report) of Carlos Nieto, the director of Window to Freedom (Una Ventana a la Libertad), who was directly threatened by "government agents" (p.208). Even though it is not at all clear what the details of this case are (the report mentions it almost in passing), it is sandwiched within the story of the supposed "harassment" of OVP, making it look like the two cases are in some way related or part of a larger pattern.
While it is indeed a shame that the Chavez government dismisses OVP's criticisms of prisoner abuse and poor prison conditions because of OVP's highly politicized approach to dealing with the issues, one should keep in mind that the group does its cause no justice by taking the such a confrontational approach (which is indeed quite similar to the confrontational approach that HRW takes). For HRW, though, OVP bears no responsibility for its failure to get through to the government.
Even when complimenting the government, such as in its police reform effort, where the government invited NGOs associated with the opposition, HRW manages to turn it into a backhanded compliment. According to HRW, "the inclusion of representatives from NGOs [on the police reform] was a rare recognition of their work." (p.213) Such a claim, though, is false on the face of it, if one considers how extensively the government has previously worked with civil society groups in the constitutional assembly process (which HRW acknowledges elsewhere), in its urban land reform program, in the creation and modification of the communal council law, and a great variety of other projects.
Nonetheless, HRW keeps stressing that the police reform process was an exception ("that proves the rule" of NGO harassment) and hammers the point of official harassment home with the Attorney General's investigation into the role that Carlos Ayala, a Human Rights lawyer, might have had in the April 2002 coup attempt. Even though there are almost a dozen human rights groups in Venezuela, each working with many lawyers, HRW seems to believe that this one case, which is admittedly based on thin evidence, is proof of the persecution of human rights advocates in Venezuela. Not only that, no formal charges were ever filed against Ayala, which makes it even more difficult to say that the investigation represents some sort of effort to silence him, especially when the investigation actually had the opposite effect, of giving him far more visibility than he ever had before the investigation was launched.
Next is the case of the NGO Súmate, another supposedly non-partisan NGO that received funding from the U.S. government-funded National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The Attorney General filed a suit for conspiracy to subvert the government against Súmate because it received funding from a U.S government-funded group for engaging in partisan electoral activity. According to HRW, this represents another case of NGO intimidation because even if Súmate used the NED funds for the recall referendum, this is "not an act of subversion." On the face of it, this argument is plausible, but if the Attorney General believes he (or she now) can make a case that Súmate used it to influence one side over another in the referendum, then they have the right to take the case to court. In the end, the case was dismissed on technical grounds, though, which just indicates that the court system is independent and not subservient to Chavez or the Attorney General.
Finally, to further support their argument that the Chavez government is "harassing" human rights NGOs, HRW complains about the sometimes strong language Chavez uses to criticize some of their work. As everyone knows, Chavez's rhetoric can often be over the top, but that this point should receive so much space in a report on human rights problems gives further credence to the notion that HRW believes its mission of combating serious human rights violations in the Americas has been accomplished and now the most pressing human rights issue it can find is the strong language of the president of Venezuela.
Legislation to Interfere in NGO Functioning
With regard to the HRW claim that the Chavez government is trying to undermine critical NGOs by passing legislation that would restrict their ability to raise funds from foreign sources, HRW is openly questioning the Venezuelan people's right to determine the extent to which foreign powers should be allowed to shape Venezuelan civil society. Still, once again HRW is chasing a non-issue because, as its report admits, Venezuelan legislators shelved the proposed law at the urging of the EU. This is hardly the action of a government intent on undermining the free functioning of civil society groups.
HRW then proceeds to criticize a Supreme Court ruling that states that groups that receive foreign funding cannot be considered part of Venezuelan civil society for purposes of constitutional requirements to include such groups in certain constitutional processes, such as the nominating process for the Electoral Council directors or the Supreme Court judges. Such a critique is laughable, though, because it implies that for such sensitive processes Venezuelans ought to accept the shaping of their institutions by powerful and wealthy foreign funders who could easily turn typically underfunded third world civil society groups into their puppets. In contrast, the United States, for example, currently has extensive regulations to prevent just that kind of thing from happening, known as FARA (Foreign Agent Registration Act). Venezuela still has nothing of the kind in its laws.
Conclusion
After taking apart each section, we can see that the report actually contains only a handful of valid concerns. These include the potential weakening of Supreme Court autonomy because of the National Assembly's ability to remove judges with a simple majority vote, the lack of an independent regulatory body for the broadcast media (CONATEL), and the lack of clear guidelines for which union has the right to bargain collectively when there is more than one union. However, these outstanding issues in the effort to create a better Venezuela pale in comparison with what has already been achieved if one considers the atrocious shape institutions were in before Chavez, when Supreme Court rulings went to the highest bidder, when the media was free to operate in the interest of its private owners and not the public, and when unions were completely dependent upon the government and a hopelessly corrupt leadership.
Human Rights Watch's special report on Venezuela—probably the most extensive study HRW has ever conducted on Venezuela—bears absolutely no relation to the actual situation of human rights in that country. Anyone unfamiliar with Venezuela will almost automatically conclude that the report's length and depth of reporting must mean that the human rights situation in Venezuela is very serious. But a close reading of the report itself shows that most of the points it makes are extremely weak.
Political discrimination in Venezuela, while a persistent problem throughout its history must be seen in the context of the massive sabotage of state institutions. The supposed lack of Supreme Court independence is not credible if one considers that the court regularly makes decisions against Chavez and his supporters. The private mass media's supposed restrictions bear no relationship to constant stream of invective this media hurls at the government on a regular basis. The accusation that unions lack of collective bargaining freedom appears as little more than the defense of the "right" of a corrupt union leadership to maintain its power. Finally, the government's supposed "aggressively adversarial approach" to civil society becomes a non-issue if one considers the weaknesses of HRW's arguments in this area.
In other words, upon closer examination, practically all of HRW's accusations dissolve into nothing more than smoke and mirrors. Just as Vivanco's comments about the report seem to indicate, the real purpose of this report was to discredit the Chavez government, to show that it is "no model for anyone." It is this reaction, though, which suggests that it is precisely because Venezuela is serving as a radical alternative model that has shaken Venezuela's and the world's elites to the core, that elite-sponsored institutions such as Human Rights Watch see a need to discredit it.
[i] A Decade Under Chávez: Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela, by Human Rights Watch, September 18, 2008 (http://hrw.org/reports/2008/venezuela0908/)
[ii] See: "José Miguel Vivanco's Background," letter to the editor, Venezuelanalysis.com, October 10, 2008 (http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/letter/3868)
[iii] "A Decade Under Chávez", Human Rights Watch, p.2
[iv] "All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis," article 5 of the 1993 Vienna Declaration, signed by all 171 participating nations.
[v] Also, the report claims to be published on the ten-year anniversary since Chavez was first elected as president. However, that anniversary won't be until December 6, 2008. It is thus almost three months early.
[vi] Only in 2005 did HRW release a longer special report on a Latin American country, on "Hidden Abuses Against Detained Youths in Rio de Janeiro" (June, 2005) 392 pages.
[vii] "Venezuela no es modelo para nadie," September 21, 2008, El Universal
[viii] ibid.
[ix] See Venezuela's MDG page on the UNDP website: http://www.mdgmonitor.org/factsheets_00.cfm?c=VEN&cd=862 and the planning ministry's data: http://www.sisov.mpd.gob.ve/metas_milenio/
[x] "Political allegiance was the passport to jobs in the public sector [before Chavez], as well as government contracts and services." p.14, HRW report
[xi] The HRW report cites the case of FOGADE, in which 80 persons lost their job, but where a labor court determined that their dismissals were illegal (p.21-23); one employee of the National Council of Frontiers (p.24); the National Electoral Council where some volunteers lost their positions as poll workers (p.25-26); a cooperative that did not get a government contract (p.27-28); and the opposition controlled public employees union FEDEUNEP, which documents "200 dismissals, 400 employees subjected to pressure tactics, and 180 transfers." (p.16)
[xii] There are at least two million public employees according to Venezuela's National Statistics Institute (INE - www.ine.gov.ve).
[xiii] I do not call it a "strike" because it was also a lockout by the upper-management and it involved a clear effort to sabotage the industry (such as by blocking the harbors, denying access to crucial passwords, and even destroying equipment).
[xiv] Just a cursory glance at any of the newspapers or TV news programs of the time (which were almost all opposition) would prove this point beyond any doubt.
[xv] "Venezuelan Opposition Accuses Oil Company President of Illegal Campaigning," by Gregory Wilpert, Venezuelanalysis.com, November 3, 2006. HRW also cites Chavez, who said around the same time, "PDVSA workers are part of this revolution, and whoever is not should go somewhere else, go to Miami." (p. 31) However, suggesting that people who don't like the government should leave and firing them are two completely different things.
[xvi] This based on my conversations with PDVSA employees.
[xvii] Latinobarometro, Informe Anual 2006, p.80 (www.latinobarometro.com). In Colombia and Brazil 53% responded that their judiciaries did "good" or "very good work", while in the Dominican Republic it was 58% and in Uruguay 59%. Unfortunately, the time series of how Venezuelans evaluate their judiciary going back to 1998 is not available online.
[xviii] See, "Venezuela: Judicial Independence Under Siege," where HRW spends most of its report analyzing the slow progress in the reform of the judicial system. Also, see my critique of this report, "Has Human Rights Watch Joined Venezuela's Opposition?"
[xix] The editor of Últimas Noticias, Eleazar Díaz Rangel, one of Venezuela's most respected journalists, says about the supposed lack of freedom of speech in Venezuela during the Chavez era, "No one can present examples of news that was censored as a result of governmental action." What directors of the major Venezuelan private media are "actually complaining about is having lost the privilege of being the owners of freedom of expression [in Venezuela]," adds Rangel. (http://www.aporrea.org/medios/n122013.html, Oct. 10, 2008)
[xx] "Chávez also made up his media deficit by using presidential authority to order all stations—including private television and radio stations—to interrupt programming without prior warning and broadcast his speeches and other government events live, often for hours on end, at peak viewing hours." (p.70)
[xxi] Unlike the "court-packing law," HRW calls the social responsibility law by its actual name, instead of the nickname the opposition gave it: the "muzzle" law.
[xxii] The fine was against Teodoro Petkoff's newspaper Tal Cual, where HRW tries to argue that the case was unfair and the fine of $50,000 too high. The newspaper hardly had any problems paying the fine, though, because it did some fundraising to do so and because Petkoff is married into one of Venezuela's richest families.
[xxiii] The only case that resulted in a three-year prison sentence was the one against General Francisco Usón, which indeed seems like a draconian sentence that was handed down by a military court martial. The rules under which this verdict was reached, though, pre-date the Chavez government and seem to be normal in the region for this type of military proceeding. Latin America's militaries are extremely sensitive to public criticism from within the ranks. This does not excuse it, but it does call into question whether this case is representative of a supposed effort to muzzle the press.
[xxiv] HRW dismisses all too facilely the impact these events had on Chavez and his supporters when it says that the coup provides "a pretext for a wide range of government policies that have undercut the human rights protections established in the 1999 Constitution." (p. 1)
[xxv] For a more detailed discussion of the RCTV case, see: "RCTV and Freedom of Speech in Venezuela," by Gregory Wilpert, Venezuelanalysis.com, June 2, 2007.
[xxvi] HRW ignores this even though it cites an article about this finding in footnote 421 (p.147): Kiraz Janicke, "Venezuela Removed from ILO List of Labor Union Freedom Violators," Venezuelanalysis.com, June 20, 2008, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/3574
[xxvii] Of course, HRW does try to cast aspersions on the CNE too by falsely claiming, "In 2003 the government disregarded the nominating procedures established in the constitution and allowed the Supreme Court to designate the directors of the CNE, raising additional doubts about the CNE's autonomy." (p.147) First, it is the National Assembly that nominates the CNE. Second, the AN did not "disregard" the procedure, but could not reach a two-thirds majority for appointing the CNE members. The Supreme Court stepped in (while it was still evenly divided between opposition and Chavez supporters) to appoint the board because of the constitutional crisis the lack of a CNE represented. The resulting CNE membership reflected the balance of power in the National Assembly at the time, so that Chavez sympathizers had a one-vote majority on the CNE.
[xxviii] E-mail from María Padrón, of October 9, 2008.
[xxix] The constitution uses the word "organize" (art. 293, no. 6) when referring to elections of unions, professional associations, and political organizations. However, in practice this has always been interpreted as optional and as a supervision, as can be seen by the fact that political parties have often held elections without CNE organization or supervision. Also, contrary to HRW's claim (p.144, fn. 406), article 95 of the constitution does not mandate that union officials be elected once every three years and that they cannot be reelected. This is part of the Organic Labor Law (art. 434), which, again contrary to another HRW claim, does not specify that union leaders cannot be reelected.
[xxx] Email from María Padrón, Oct. 9, 2008. HRW says that new rules that have not yet been made public would make supervision optional, but according to the CNE the existing rules already make them optional. Rather, the new rules, which Padrón says are currently receiving finishing touches, merely clarify this optional status of supervision and make the supervision itself more "flexible." Also, the new rules will reduce the time-span between request and the CNE's certification, from 90 days to 50 days.
[xxxi] Apparently HRW interviewed a former CNE director of union affairs, but this is not the same as speaking to someone who actually represents the CNE.
[xxxii] More unions have been registered and have reached collective bargaining agreements in Venezuela during the Chavez era than was the case before Chavez, according to Labor Ministry statistics. (http://www.mintra.gov.ve/)
[xxxiii] In addition to treating the management relatively well, PDVSA President Rodriguez signed a generous collective bargaining agreement with the three main unions shortly before the shutdown.
[xxxiv] The percentage of the economically active population incorporated into Venezuela's social security system has increased from 23.9% in 1998 to 31.2% in 2007. Those over 60 years old who receive a pension increased even more dramatically, from 16% in 1998 to 40% in 2007. (Source: Ministry of Planning and Development: http://www.sisov.mpd.gob.ve/indicadores/)
[xxxv] See the Latinobarometro reports, which regularly show that Venezuelans are more politically active and engaged than almost any other people in Latin America or than in any time prior to Chavez. (www.latinobarometro.com) One could perhaps argue that this high level of politicization is due to the polarization that supposed restrictions on political activity has caused. However, when asked how highly satisfied Venezuelans are with their democracy, 59% report that they are satisfied, compared to 37% for all of Latin America. Only Uruguay has a higher percentage, at 66%. (Latinobarometro 2007, informe anual, p.80)
(Source: http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/19165)
October 19, 2008 By Gregory Wilpert
Source: Venezuelanalysis.com
Gregory Wilpert's ZSpace Page
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President Chavez managed to hand Human Rights Watch a major public relations victory with his recent expulsion of its America's Director José Miguel Vivanco and its Deputy Director Daniel Wilkinson. With the expulsion, which Chavez ordered because Vivanco and Wilkinson are foreigners and did not have a visa that allowed them to engage in political or professional activity in Venezuela, Venezuela seemed to prove Human Rights Watch's point, that the Chavez government does not tolerate dissent. Whether the expulsion was justified is a distraction from the larger issue, though, which is whether the report, "A Decade Under Chávez,"[i] which Human Rights Watch (HRW) presented in Venezuela on September 18, is justified.
Another distraction, this time put forward by defenders of the Chavez government, is whether HRW is an agent of the U.S. government and of imperialism. Apparently false arguments about Vivanco's past are brought up, among other things.[ii] This, however, also serves to distract from a serious and accurate analysis of whether what HRW writes about Venezuela is valid and worth paying attention to.
Writing an analysis of the HRW report is a challenge, though, because it is tempting to respond to each and every point, which would make the response almost as long as the 236-page report itself. I will thus try to refrain from responding to each and every accusation and will discuss only the most important ones.
In short, the report raises a few problems with regard to the protection of political rights in Venezuela, but the few places where it is on target are almost completely drowned in a sea of de-contextualization, trumped-up accusations, and a clear and obvious bias in favor of the opposition and against the government. I will examine each of HRW's criticisms in the same order as the report itself, which deals with political discrimination, the judicial system, mass media, labor unions, and civil society organizations.
The Report in Context - Meta-Criticism
Before we begin the analysis of the report itself, though, it makes sense to take a brief look at some of the over-arching problems with the report.
First, the report gives the impression of being about human rights violations in general in Venezuela (the subtitle is: "Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela"), but actually narrowly focuses on some political rights (not even all political rights, leaving out electoral rights, for example), to the complete exclusion of social and economic rights. The report itself justifies this narrow focus by saying that the report "does not address all the pressing human rights issues facing [Venezuela] today, many of which pre-date the Chávez presidency. Rather, it focuses on the impact that the Chávez government's policies have had on institutions that play key roles in ensuring that human rights are respected: the courts, the media, organized labor, and civil society."[iii] Not only does this statement imply that there are far more human rights violations in Venezuela than the ones cited in this report, but it also implies that the violations it does discuss are the most important ones to focus on because they "ensure that human rights are respected."
Such a one-sided focus completely leaves out any consideration of the well-established human rights norm that human rights are "indivisible." That is, all of the human rights listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)—whether political, economic, or social—are equally important.[iv] In other words, had HRW taken economic and social rights also into consideration, it would have to conclude that the progress made in these areas has been tremendous during the Chavez presidency. Also, if one were to take economic rights seriously, it would be almost silly to claim that attention to courts, media, labor unions, and civil society are more important, since people who do not have their basic economic rights guaranteed, and are thus too busy finding food and shelter, are generally incapable of taking advantage of these institutions. HRW's emphasis on political rights thus reflects its bias towards the better off, who are already able to enjoy their economic and social rights without restriction.
Second, throughout the report HRW fails to present incidents or policies in their proper context, which makes it more difficult to understand how and why certain things happen in Venezuela. As a result, by excluding this context, readers interpret the issues that the report discusses through the lens of their own prejudices or the false media impressions of Venezuela, such as the widespread images of Chavez the "caudillo" or "dictator" of Venezuela.
Third, as almost all critics of the report have noted, the report was launched for maximum effectiveness (with an embargoed press release) just two month before Venezuela's November 23rd regional elections. This is the third time that HRW releases a major report shortly before an electoral contest (the first being in June 2004, just before the presidential recall referendum and the second in late 2007, just before the constitutional reform referendum).[v] Vivanco should thus not be surprised if HRW is suspected of timing its reports to influence Venezuelan electoral contests.
Finally, this is one of the longest (other than its annual reports) special reports that HRW has done on any one topic or country.[vi] Vivanco says that the reason for this is that, "Everyone in the world has an opinion about Venezuela. There are very many and very strong opinions, but it is difficult to find concrete facts. We wanted to make the most faithful picture of what is happening here so that the world would know it."[vii] In other words, it would seem that the seriousness of human rights violations in Venezuela is not the real motivation for this book-length report, but rather it is the controversy surrounding Venezuela that motivated HRW to conduct this two-year investigation.
For a human rights group to make such a massive investment into a project (just how much did it cost and who paid for it?) not because of the seriousness of human rights violations, but because of the lack of consensus seems odd. This circumstance adds credence to one blogger's sarcastic remark (BoRev.net) that apparently Human Rights Watch believes that it's original mission has been accomplished, of rooting out torture, forced disappearances, and political imprisonments and that now it can afford the luxury of focusing on weak judiciaries and political discrimination in the hiring processes for civil service jobs.
We have yet to see a comparably long report on human rights violations in Colombia, Mexico, or the U.S. war on terror. More than that, there seems to be a political motivation for the report, based on Vivanco's statement, "We did the report because we wanted to demonstrate to the world that Venezuela is not a model for anyone..."[viii] Certainly, if the Venezuelan government were a systematic violator of human rights, no one would say that such practices should be a model. Rather, the model that Chavez and his supporters defend (and Chavez himself has always said that every country should find its own path) are the policies that go against free market capitalism and in favor of redistribution of wealth and of political power.
These meta-criticisms of the report aside, it is nonetheless worthwhile to examine the issues it raises with respect to Venezuela's human rights situation. One just needs to keep in mind that in practically all of the areas it does not examine there have been tremendous advances, whether, for example, in education, in reducing poverty, or in including the previously excluded (such as women and indigenous and afro-Venezuelan populations). One specific measure of this progress is the fact that Venezuela is one of the few countries in Latin America to be on track for reaching the Millennium Development Goals.[ix]
Political Discrimination - Decontextualizing Problems
All of five sections of the HRW report exhibit three consistent problems that fundamentally distort the final result. First, they each display a lack of contextualization of the problems they discuss. Second, they represent what some have called trumped-up accusations in that they accuse the government of definite wrongdoing in areas where the facts of the matter are not that clear or where relatively minor problems are turned into major issues. Third, and closely related to the second, each section brings up issues where the interpretation of events relies almost exclusively on that of the opposition. Finally, because there is so much overlap in the issues the report discusses, there is a tremendous amount of repetition, thus giving the impression that there are far more human rights problems than is actually the case.
Beginning with the section on political discrimination, this section is perhaps the most decontextualized. The main issue that HRW raises here is the use of the so-called "Tascón list," which National Assembly member Luis Tascón created when he posted the names of the signers of the petition for a presidential recall referendum on his personal website. The stated purpose of the list was to give individuals who did not sign the petition, but who were placed on the list against their will, an opportunity to have their name removed from it. The list, however, ended up being used by government officials to screen job applicants, to make sure they weren't hiring opposition sympathizers.
The HRW report does make a token effort to provide historical context by pointing out that in the pre-Chavez era, governments regularly discriminated against political opponents in the hiring process for the public administration.[x]Also, it does state Tascón's intention for publicly posting the list (although it expresses doubt that this was the real reason, saying this was the "ostensible" reason). However, the report completely skips over the extent to which opposition supporters in the public administration were involved in sabotage. Such information might be difficult to come by, but if one were to speak to any departmental director in the public administration, they could tell many stories of such occurrences. Certainly, ideally a minister or vice-minister or departmental director ought to fire those engaged in sabotage, following the formal procedures for such a case. This, however, is almost impossible because of restrictive labor laws in the public sector and because it can be extremely difficult to prove an on-the-job slow-down.
In other words, while the use of such lists is to be condemned (and HRW admits that Chavez and Tascón have condemned it) and prohibited, it is at least understandable why many government officials have used it nonetheless. If a department director faces the choice between having an apolitical hiring process, but an unmanageable department because some opposition supporters are subtly sabotaging, versus illegally politicizing the hiring process and thereby having a better functioning department, most managers will opt for the latter option.
In addition to this de-contextualization of the circumstances in which the Tascón list (and later the Maisanta program) was applied, HRW fails to show how systematic their application actually is in Venezuela. While they list a few cases,[xi] these pale in comparison to the total number of employees in the public administration.[xii]
The most prominent case to which HRW refers, though, is without any merit whatsoever, which is the case of the state owned oil company PDVSA. Here HRW cites two incidents, the oil industry shutdown of December 2002, where 19,000 PDVSA employees (about half the workforce) were fired for their participation in the shutdown, and an incident in which PDVSA president Rafael Ramirez told a gathering of PDVSA managers in November 2006 that he would not tolerate any opposition supporters in the management.
By calling the two-month oil industry shutdown, which started in December 2002, "legitimate strike activity," HRW shows quite clearly that its sympathies lie with the opposition. For everyone who was present in Venezuela during that extremely stressful period and who saw the daily "strike reports," it was more than clear that the one and only demand of the strikers was Chavez's resignation. They clearly hoped that Chavez would resign if they could bring Venezuela's oil dependent economy to its knees. Indeed, the strike cost the country anywhere between $10 and $20 billion, drove unemployment to an unheard of high of 22%, and caused the economy to shrink by 29%.
The only reason HRW refers to this oil industry shutdown[xiii] as a legitimate strike is because it relies on a ruling of the ILO's Freedom of Association Committee, which claimed to have found that the PDVSA "strike" also involved labor-related demands. Apparently opposition labor leaders managed to convince the ILO committee of this. However, even if there were some labor-related demands (they were not even stated in the ILO decision), they were not known by most Venezuelans, not one of PDVSA's three main labor unions supported the "strike" (even though the leadership was otherwise sympathetic to the opposition) and the only message anyone ever got during the "strike" was that it was to force Chavez's resignation.[xiv]
With the fig leaf of the ILO's hopelessly misguided ruling, HRW can now claim that the Chavez government engaged in illegal political discrimination and firing against PDVSA employees. It bolsters its case with another fig leaf, which is PDVSA President Ramirez's 2006 demand that all PDVSA managers should be supporters of the Chavez government. However, HRW claims that this demand was made of all PDVSA employees, when in fact it was made only to the managers.[xv] By failing to make this crucial distinction HRW can again claim that political discrimination is a government policy. It should not come as a surprise that a company president demands that all of his managers are government supporters when the company is still recovering from a debilitating political strike. By interpreting Venezuelan events from the perspective of the more right-wing elements in Venezuelan politics, HRW clearly demonstrates that its sympathies lie with the particularly anti-democratic and ruthlessly anti-Chávez sectors of the Venezuelan opposition.
HRW then goes on to list several concrete cases where PDVSA workers were fired apparently due to their political beliefs. While such actions, if true, are definitely wrong, these few instances again do not prove that PDVSA is engaged in systematic political discrimination. For every politically motivated firing, PDVSA employees can point to an opposition supporter working at the company.[xvi] As HRW correctly points out, the official position against political discrimination was reaffirmed in a July 2007 memo (p.33).
Judicial Independence - A Contradictory Analysis
The analysis of the next area that HRW examines, Venezuela's judicial system, is riddled with contradictions, which undermine the overall claim that Venezuela's judiciary is not independent of the executive. The main critique here is that by passing a new Supreme Court law in 2004 the Chavez government managed to "pack and purge" the court and with that to politicize all the courts, since these are subordinated to the Supreme Court. However, not only does HRW again give no credence to the official reasons for which the "court-packing law" (as they call the law in the language of the opposition) was passed, throughout the report HRW cites cases where the supposedly executive-dependent court system made decisions against the Chavez government or its supporters.
Again, HRW provides some badly needed historical context by briefly describing the judiciary prior to the Chavez presidency, which it calls "bankrupt" due to the rampant corruption in the system. Also, it cites a 1998 UN Development Program survey, which found that only 0.8% of Venezuelans had confidence in the judiciary. Oddly, a brief review of HRW reports on Venezuela during the pre-Chavez era finds not a single report was on the judiciary of the time.
Also, HRW fails to make any meaningful comparison between this "bankrupt" pre-Chavez judiciary and the current Chavez-era judiciary. An examination of survey data, though, finds that Venezuelans evaluate their judiciary quite favorably compared to the rest of Latin America. According to Latinobarometro, only 38% of Latin Americans evaluate in their country's respective judiciary systems as doing "good" or "very good" work, while Venezuelans respond positively 52% of the time.[xvii]
Despite this positive evaluation compared to other countries, the HRW report is unrelenting in its criticism of the Chavez-era judiciary. HRW notes that the 2004 Supreme Court law that allowed the addition of 12 new judges (hence the "packing" of the court) was preceded by the court's momentous decision to exonerate four of the main coup organizers with the claim that there was no coup in April 2002, only a "vacuum of power." The report, though, dismisses the importance of this decision when it refers to the supposedly far greater danger the new pro-Chavez balance of power represents in the Supreme Court. That is, it ought to be a valid consideration, which is a graver threat to democracy, a Supreme Court that condones a coup attempt (which dissolved the Supreme Court too, among other institutions) or a new court, dominated by Chavez sympathizers. Clearly, HRW endorses the former.
HRW does raise one valid point, though, in this discussion, which is the danger that the new Supreme Court Law makes removing sitting judges too easy. That is, while previously an impeachment procedure required a two-thirds majority on the National Assembly to vote for such an impeachment, the new law effectively lowers this requirement to a simple 50% majority in special circumstances. This could undermine the court's independence sometime in the future when a party has a simple majority, but no two-thirds majority in the National Assembly (AN) (currently Chavez supporters control almost 90% the seats in the AN).
However, HRW manages to bury this important point in more decontextualization when it argues that the so-called packing of the Supreme Court led to some sort of "altered" composition of the entire judiciary because the new majority on the court used its power to presumably pack all of the other courts (p.49). What HRW fails to mention is that with the ten to ten vote split between opposition and Chavez supporters on the Supreme Court, the court was completely paralyzed in its effort to reform the judiciary.
The judicial reform process had begun in 2000 and was interrupted in late 2001 when Luis Miquilena, Chavez's minister of the interior and justice, who had helped appoint most of the judges, switched over to the opposition. Many of the judges he had appointed also switched sides, which is why ten voted against the indictment of four of the coup organizers. It was only once the court's deadlock was removed that the judicial reform process could proceed.
The HRW report is actually hypocritical when it complains that the new court proceeded to appoint new permanent judges, replacing a large number of temporary judges. In its 2004 report on the new Supreme Court law HRW specifically criticized the judiciary for not making more progress on the court reform.[xviii] Then, with this new report, it criticizes the judiciary for proceeding with the reform, a crucial step of which was the replacement of temporary judges.
HRW then cites a few cases where the Supreme Court failed to rule against the Chavez administration, such as its failure to rule on whether the 2004 Supreme Court law is constitutional, whether the Constitutional Reform Proposal of 2007 was constitutional, whether the rights of the TV station RCTV were infringed when it didn't have its broadcast license renewed, and whether the National Electoral Council is required to supervise union elections. Rather than actually ruling in favor of the Chavez government, the court has in each case merely failed to definitively rule one way or the other. However, if one considers these rulings together with the different rulings in favor of the opposition, which the HRW report itself cites, these arguments lose their effectiveness.
The Media - Making a Mountain out of a Molehill
In the section on the Chavez government's relationship with the media, the HRW report exemplifies its success at trumping up charges against the government. It lists a wide variety of prominent cases against prominent journalists, most of which have been resolved in favor of the journalist or were dismissed. Also, it cites supposedly repressive regulation of the broadcast media that falls well within the standard practices of most other Latin American and Western countries. Finally, it claims that the Venezuelan government is restricting pluralism in the media while at the same time contradicting itself when it concedes that more people than ever have access to the media.
Unlike the previous sections, where there was at least a token attempt to provide some historical context from the pre-Chavez era, this time there is no such information. If the report had provided such historical background, HRW would have been forced to admit that freedom of speech in Venezuela is in a better situation today than it ever was before Chavez, when there was far less pluralism of opinion in the mass media. Also, for example, under earlier presidents, such as Carlos Andrés Perez (1989-1993), there was an actual censorship board that reviewed newspapers before they were published and forced papers to publish blank space whenever an article was deemed too sensitive for the government.[xix]
The report then gives the impression that it is president Chavez's fault that the media have become so polarized in Venezuela, by falsely claiming that "under Chavez" the state television channel VTV "has been as partisan and biased as its private counterparts" (p. 69). However, VTV has always been an explicitly pro-government TV channel, long before Chavez became president. In other words, the report gives the implicit impression that VTV became politicized only with Chavez, when in actuality it has always been an explicitly pro-government channel. The same goes for the report's false suggestion that the simultaneous broadcast of government messages on all radio and TV stations is an invention of the Chavez government, when in actuality Venezuelan presidents long before Chavez also made use of this power.[xx]
The report further criticizes Chavez's "demonizing" (p.72) of his opposition with harsh language, completely leaving out that the opposition just as much demonizes Chavez and that Chavez was responding in kind to his critics. HRW then suggests that it was Chavez's harsh language that was to blame for the incidents of physical aggression against members of the private media, completely leaving out that the incidents the report cites occurred during a time of intense political polarization (2003), in which violence between sympathizers from both sides had been escalating. This is no excuse for such violence, but it is important to understand the context in which these incidents took place.
Also, HRW correctly points out that the Chavez government has launched several new state TV stations (for the National Assembly - ANTV, community programming - Vive, continental programming - Telesur, and cultural programming - Tves), as if this represented some sort of threat to free speech. It then goes on to admit (in a footnote, though) (p.73), that despite this proliferation of a diversity of state TV channels, the audience share of these remains far below that of private channels. In the interest of objectivity, it would have behooved HRW to also state that despite the increase of state channels, the vast majority of TV channels in Venezuela are privately controlled.
Presumably HRW did not mention the large number of private channels because it believes that such private control has become irrelevant in light of recent legislation to regulate radio and television broadcasters. According to HRW, these have been driven to self-censorship due to the stiffening of penalties for the existing prohibition against disrespecting high government officials (in existence for over 50 years) and the new law for social responsibility in radio and television.[xxi]
As evidence for this supposed intimidation HRW cites how two of the major private television stations, Televen and Venevision moderated their editorial line and became less confrontational towards the Chavez government. Instead of interpreting this as an effort to become more responsible and to keep from losing the 60+% of the population that supports Chavez, HRW is convinced that the only reason for this switch are the defamation laws that have always been on the books and have practically never been applied and the social responsibility law that also has so far not resulted in a single closure or even fine. By interpreting these stations' reactions in this way and in no other, HRW implies that the stations want to be polarizing and irresponsible. More than that, the HRW position implies that it would be better if Televen and Venevision had not changed their editorial lines towards more balance and moderation.
Court Cases Against Journalists
Of the ten exemplary court cases against journalists that HRW examines, six are for libel or related issues. By raising these as free speech issues HRW implies that charging a journalist with libel is somehow illegitimate, even though HRW also says it is not opposed to libel laws in principle. Only four of the ten cases, though, resulted in a guilty verdict, whereby only one had to pay a fine[xxii] and two received suspended sentences, one had to apologize, and only one had to serve a prison sentence.[xxiii] Three of the cases were dismissed or never went to trial and three remain open as of the writing of the HRW report.
With such a mixed record of results, it takes an almost paranoid imagination to believe that the government is systematically and successfully persecuting critics with the collusion of a supposedly executive-dependent judiciary—especially if you consider that Venezuela's newspapers and airwaves feature hundreds of journalists every day that attack Chavez, his ministers, and his programs. Rather, the more sensible interpretation is that occasionally some journalists overstep the bounds of journalistic ethics and are prosecuted and found guilty and then there are some isolated cases where prosecutors go too far and go after journalists who have done nothing wrong, in which cases the courts manage to find in favor of the defendants. And in some cases (only one it seems, though; the case of Francisco Usón), a court reaches a bad verdict. This is the record of a normal country that does what it can to balance the interests of the public and of private individuals, not of a country that is stifling freedom of speech, as HRW is intent to imply.
Social Responsibility Law
Next, the HRW report discusses the social responsibility law, where it once again completely omits any relevant context to make sense of why this law was passed. That is, prior to the law's passage in late 2004 there was a near regulatory vacuum with regard to broadcasting regulations. The vehemently oppositional private TV media took great advantage of this vacuum in 2001 to 2003 when it broadcast a constant stream of programming intended to incite an uprising against the president. Twice this incitement had some effect, such as during the April 2002 coup attempt and during the December 2002 oil industry shutdown.
It was in the aftermath of these harrowing events[xxiv] that the media law was passed. Still, it is not unreasonable of HRW to argue that this law is flawed for two main reasons. First, some of the activity that it prohibits (such as incitement) is poorly defined, thus leaving the door open to abuse. Second, it does not provide for a truly independent regulatory body that could impartially rule on infractions against the law.
Having said that, though, the HRW goes completely overboard trying to make these points and in suggesting that Venezuelan law gives the Venezuelan government "unlimited" (p.93) power to restrict freedom of speech. First of all, the powers that the Media law gives the government are protected against abuse by the constitution and by the Supreme Court (which, indeed, HRW seems to believe is worthless). Second, the law itself does not give such unlimited powers at all, as a close reading of the law shows.
HRW goes on to claim that just because Chavez and several other government officials considered some opposition demonstrations and an electoral boycott to be part of preparations for a new coup, these actions could be classified as incitement and thus banned from television. Even if some government officials followed that line of thinking, it is clear that no one in a position where it could have been applied thought so. Here HRW is trying to impute a variety of dangers into situations that are completely removed from Venezuelan reality.
RCTV Case
Finally, with regard to the case of RCTV, HRW's main criticism here is that RCTV's right to due process was violated when its broadcast license was not renewed and another private station's license, Venevision's, which expired at the same time, was renewed. In an abstract sense it is correct that two similar stations were treated differently, which makes it plausible that the difference in treatment is rooted in the different politics of the two stations.[xxv]
However, first, nothing in Venezuelan law (which pre-dates the Chavez presidency) states that a public hearing process is required for the renewal of broadcast licenses. Rather, it is entirely up to the (democratically elected) executive to decide who is to have broadcast licenses. Such a process might be flawed from the perspective of maintaining minority groups' access to the airwaves, but it does not mean that in an ideal legal situation, which would protect minority group access to the airwaves, RCTV would have kept its license. As a matter of fact, in such an ideal situation any station that helped organize a coup would have lost its license a long time ago.
Second, HRW simply dismisses all of the government's arguments for why Venevisión and RCTV were treated differently. The two main reasons were that RCTV had violated the Social Responsibility Law far more often than Venevisión and that it occupied a wavelength that was ideally suited for a new public television channel. While it is true that the argument for a new public television channel came in the last minute and thus was somewhat ad hoc, it is legitimate to ask which type of station is more important, no matter when the question is raised. If faced with a choice between broadcasting a private channel that pursues only the interests of its private owners versus broadcasting a public channel that broadcasts in the public interest because it is publicly owned and controlled by a democratically elected executive (such as TVES, which replaced RCTV), then it is not too far-fetched to argue that the latter is more important.
In an interesting footnote the HRW report cites how balanced the Venezuelan media actually are, which undermines the overall gist of the entire section that the government has supposedly "tilted" media coverage in its favor. That is, according to a study conducted by the Jesuit-run institute Centro Gumilla (which tends to be anti-Chavez), media coverage of the constitutional reform referendum "the coverage of RCTV International and Globovisión was equally biased in favor of the NO vote. The three stations with the most balanced coverage were Venevisión, Televen, and Channel 1." (fn. 324, p.117) TVES and VTV, the two state channels, were biased in favor of the YES vote. If one adds together the audience share of each of the three different types of broadcasters, the YES and NO channels each have about the same audience share (around 15-20% each) and the largest segment of viewers tends to watch the stations with balanced coverage (around 50-60%).
In other words, if balance and pluralism are the main goals for a country's broadcasting landscape, then Venezuela comes closer to this goal than most countries do. This is even more so the case if one also takes the HRW report's very positive analysis of the expansion of community media in Venezuela into consideration. (p.121-125)
Organized Labor - Siding with Corrupt Union Bosses
In the name of freedom of association, HRW ends up blatantly defending one of Latin America's most corrupt union movements. The HRW report briefly concedes that prior to Chavez the freedom for labor to associate was quite restricted due to the nearly total control governing parties had over the union movement, fraudulent elections, corruption, and legal restrictions on strike activity. However, once again HRW jumps directly from this extremely bad state of affairs to implying that the situation of organized labor is worse now under Chavez than it has ever been.
HRW claims, for example, "The government has systematically flouted its obligations under the conventions of the International Labour Organization." (p.134) While the report repeatedly refers to ILO resolutions about the impermissibility of state interference in labor organizing and about how the PDVSA strike was supposedly a legitimate strike, it completely ignores the ILO's recent finding of June, 2008, that Venezuela does not violate labor union freedom, thus displaying its highly selective usage of sources.[xxvi]
In other words, nothing could be further from the truth that Venezuela "systematically flouted its obligation" with regard to union freedom. It only looks that way if one is convinced, as HRW seems to be, that the old labor movement is the legitimate labor movement of Venezuela and that any effort to clean up this miserable state of organized labor represents an attack on the freedom to organize. HRW raises four criticisms to make this point - let's take a look at each one in turn.
State supervision of union elections
HRW repeatedly makes the claim that the "Venezuelan government" "intervenes" and "interferes" in union elections because the "the government" says it has to certify such elections. HRW also claims that the Chavez government is "routinely violating workers' rights, openly rejecting the notion that unions should be free from state interference..." (p.135)
Leaving aside for the moment this highly tendentious description of labor freedom in Venezuela, it is extremely misleading to characterize the union certification process in this way. First of all, it isn't "the government" that supervises and certifies union elections, but the National Electoral Council (CNE), which is a completely independent branch of the executive branch in Venezuela. No "packing" or "purging" of the CNE is possible (if it were even remotely possible, HRW would no doubt have written a report on it by now) without modifying the constitution.[xxvii] Of course, since the opposition stupidly enough boycotted the 2005 National Assembly elections, it could not participate in the nomination process, which, unlike the Supreme Court, requires a two-thirds majority for appointing members to the CNE.
Second, to call supervision and certification an "intervention" in the union election process is a stretch. As long as the elections are free and fair, the CNE has to approve them. It has yet to be shown that the CNE has not certified a fair election.
Here too, HRW completely ignores the relevant background, of Venezuela's history of undemocratic or fraudulently elected labor union leadership. It is precisely due to this history that labor union dissidents, several years before Chavez's election (HRW mentions this in a footnote, fn. 441, p.151) proposed that the electoral council supervise union elections. It is nothing unusual for governments to require and supervise union elections.
HRW claims to have evidence, though, that the CNE simply did not respond to requests for supervising union election processes, thus making it impossible for the union to be certified. However, apparently HRW never even tried to contact the CNE, to get its side of the story. According to María Padrón, the CNE's Director of Union and Professional Association Affairs, "Absolutely no representative of Human Rights Watch established contact with this electoral body [the CNE]."[xxviii] If HRW had, it would have been able to formulate a far more accurate account of how the CNE handles union elections, rather than implying that this independent body is somehow intentionally sabotaging opposition-oriented unions.
For example, HRW claims that, "the required intervention of the CNE denies workers one of the most basic safeguards of union autonomy: the right to elect their representatives in full freedom." (p.144) According to the CNE, though, this is not an "intervention" but a supervision because it does not actually carry out any of the electoral procedures.[xxix] Rather, an electoral commission of the union itself organizes the election. The CNE sets out some basic principles for the process, but the logistics are left up to the union.
Not only that, according to Padrón, supervision is only required when the union requests it. "The CNE does not call upon unions to present their request, rather, it is those interested themselves who approach this institution to request the constitutionally guaranteed support," says Padrón. If a union does not wish CNE supervision, it is free to hold the election on its own. "If the employer and the other administrative labor institutions recognize these [union] authorities as legitimate, this would be sufficient for all involved," adds Padrón.[xxx] In other words, it is possible that some employers, such as the government, say that they will recognize the union leadership only if it was elected under CNE supervision - but this is not a legal requirement.
HRW then goes on to enumerate a few union election cases (out of about 5,000 unions registered with the CNE) in which it claims that the CNE did not certify union elections within a reasonable amount of time.
· CTV (CTV refused to be supervised, government refused to recognize result)
· SUNEP-SAS (health workers - CNE supposedly delayed certification)
· SUNEP-INN (nutrition workers - CNE supposedly delayed certification)
· FMV (doctors - initially refused supervision, now delayed)
In each of these few cases the CNE says irregularities in the electoral process delayed the certification. That HRW presumes to know who is right in this without even interviewing a CNE representative shows, once again, that its sympathies lie with the opposition-oriented leadership of these organizations.[xxxi]
Denial of collective bargaining to unrecognized unions
The second charge with regard to the supposed lack of labor freedom in Venezuela is that the government refuses to engage in collective bargaining processes with unions that are affiliated with the opposition or with the opposition-controlled labor federation, the CTV (Confederation of Venezuelan Labor). HRW lists only two cases in this connection, that of the public sector workers union FEDEUNEP and the airport workers union SUNEP. In both cases the government took advantage of Venezuelan labor law ambiguity, which does not provide for clear regulations about how employers are to decide with which union to bargain collectively when there is more than one union to represent the workers.
Throughout this report, HRW suggests that the government is setting up company unions in order to avoid negotiating with unions affiliated with the opposition-oriented CTV. However, HRW hardly seems to consider the possibility that most Venezuelan workers feel betrayed by the CTV and its unions because of its role in driving up the unemployment rate to over 22% during the 2002/2003 oil industry shutdown. The fact that Venezuelan workers have massively joined the new union federation, the UNT (National Union of Venezuelan Workers) and have abandoned the CTV is not mostly the result of government favoritism towards UNT affiliated unions, as HRW wants its readers to believe. Rather, it is because of the fact that the Chavez government has been far more pro-worker (and anti-business) than the CTV, which has been working hand-in-hand with the country's largest chamber of commerce, Fedecamaras.
That the Chavez government is taking advantage of an age-old imprecision in the existing labor law by choosing which unions to bargain with is not an ideal situation. However, when evaluating the Chavez government's record with regard to labor organizing rights, one should also consider the government's wider record in this regard, compared to previous governments. The comparison would, no doubt, be favorable, measured by the tremendous increase in collective bargaining agreements and the relative lack of strikes, even though the old union movement was largely controlled by one of the former governing parties, Acción Democrática.[xxxii]
Undermining right to strike
To make the case that the Chavez government has generally "undermined the right to strike" HRW relies on just one incident, which is the already mentioned oil industry shutdown, where it keeps repeating, against any real evidence (other than an ILO committee report that was heavily influenced by CTV lobbying), that the shutdown represented a legitimate strike action.
In this section HRW's opposition bias comes out again when it re-hashes some of the details of the oil industry shutdown from an exclusively opposition point-of-view. For example, HRW makes it look like the oil industry management's unrest was exclusively Chavez's fault because he "had fired the PDVSA president and appointed a new board of directors with ties to his administration." (p. 175) In reality, though, PDVSA board members have always been appointed on the basis of their ties to the president. It is just that this time the President of Venezuela and the new PDVSA board did not belong to the country's old elites, to which PDVSA's managers belong.
Also, HRW falsely claims that, following the April 2002 coup attempt, "the struggle between the Chávez administration and PDVSA employees continued through the year." (p.175) In reality, Chavez's appointed board of directors resigned, the old board returned, and the fired managers returned to their posts, even though they had been involved in an illegal lockout during the coup attempt. The PDVSA president, Ali Rodriguez, took a decidedly soft-line with the management and no disturbances took place within the oil industry until the opposition decided to launch its second attempt to unseat Chavez in late 2002 when it saw his mellower approach as a new opportunity to get rid of him.[xxxiii]
Finally, this section of the HRW report concludes with some warnings about how cooperatives and workers councils (which the government plans to introduce in the near future) could be abused and directed against labor.
It is odd, though, to see HRW express so much concern about labor's right to organize when it pays practically no attention to many of the decidedly pro-labor positions of the Chavez government. For example, HRW says nothing about Venezuela having the highest minimum wage in Latin America, which has been steadily increased over the years, President Chavez's direct support for striking steel workers at Sidor, which was nationalized in accordance with worker demands after a prolonged labor conflict, and the tremendous increase in the number of workers who have been incorporated into Venezuela's social security system since Chavez came into office.[xxxiv] These omissions, when combined with the report's relatively weak criticisms (about CNE supervision of union elections, the lack of collective bargaining contracts with opposition-affiliated unions, and the possible abuse of cooperatives and workers councils), gives the distinct impression that HRW is merely siding with Venezuela's formerly dominant and still corrupt unions that are affiliated with the CTV, instead of presenting an objective and pro-labor report.
Civil Society - Weak to Non-Existing Arguments
For HRW's last broadside against the Chavez government, that Chavez and his supporters are "harassing" civil society groups, HRW comes up with its perhaps weakest arguments yet. HRW offers three main arguments to back up its claim: (1) the government subjects rights advocates to unsubstantiated criminal investigations, (2) the government seeks to exclude NGOs that receive money from foreign sources from representing Venezuela in international forums, and (3) the government is pursuing legislation that would allow it to arbitrarily interfere in NGO functioning. While it is possible to say that there might have been some verbal excesses towards oppositional NGOs, it is a complete falsification of reality to imply, as HRW does, that under Chavez civil society is more hemmed in than elsewhere in the world or than previously in Venezuelan history. Just the opposite tends to be the case, as polls about the high degree of politicization and the large amount of political activity in Venezuela attest.[xxxv]
Unsubstantiated Accusations and Other Harassment
The first case HRW takes up to defend is that of Venezuelan Prison Watch (Observatorio Venezolano de Prisiones, OVP), an organization that it presents as being a politically neutral group that works towards prison reform. The goals of this group are certainly laudable, considering that the situation in Venezuela's prisons can be considered nothing less than hellish. Indeed, Chavez has admitted so much and is quoted as saying so in the HRW report. However, to present OVP as a politically neutral organization, which HRW does by presenting government claims of its politicization as having no foundation, is absurd. It is very well known in Venezuela that the group and especially its leader, Humberto Prado, are very active within the opposition. This fact alone, of course, does not justify legal harassment. Actually, HRW does not say that OVP is being harassed legally, just that it is being questioned verbally, by government officials who state what everyone knows, that this group's expressly partisan positioning undermines its stated and commendable objectives of helping reform the prison system. If HRW considers this kind of questioning to be "harassment" (p.208), then it is in effect denying government officials their right to exercise their freedom of speech and say what they think about what a group such as OVP is doing.
HRW then highlights a truly unusual case (not one similar case can be found in the entire report) of Carlos Nieto, the director of Window to Freedom (Una Ventana a la Libertad), who was directly threatened by "government agents" (p.208). Even though it is not at all clear what the details of this case are (the report mentions it almost in passing), it is sandwiched within the story of the supposed "harassment" of OVP, making it look like the two cases are in some way related or part of a larger pattern.
While it is indeed a shame that the Chavez government dismisses OVP's criticisms of prisoner abuse and poor prison conditions because of OVP's highly politicized approach to dealing with the issues, one should keep in mind that the group does its cause no justice by taking the such a confrontational approach (which is indeed quite similar to the confrontational approach that HRW takes). For HRW, though, OVP bears no responsibility for its failure to get through to the government.
Even when complimenting the government, such as in its police reform effort, where the government invited NGOs associated with the opposition, HRW manages to turn it into a backhanded compliment. According to HRW, "the inclusion of representatives from NGOs [on the police reform] was a rare recognition of their work." (p.213) Such a claim, though, is false on the face of it, if one considers how extensively the government has previously worked with civil society groups in the constitutional assembly process (which HRW acknowledges elsewhere), in its urban land reform program, in the creation and modification of the communal council law, and a great variety of other projects.
Nonetheless, HRW keeps stressing that the police reform process was an exception ("that proves the rule" of NGO harassment) and hammers the point of official harassment home with the Attorney General's investigation into the role that Carlos Ayala, a Human Rights lawyer, might have had in the April 2002 coup attempt. Even though there are almost a dozen human rights groups in Venezuela, each working with many lawyers, HRW seems to believe that this one case, which is admittedly based on thin evidence, is proof of the persecution of human rights advocates in Venezuela. Not only that, no formal charges were ever filed against Ayala, which makes it even more difficult to say that the investigation represents some sort of effort to silence him, especially when the investigation actually had the opposite effect, of giving him far more visibility than he ever had before the investigation was launched.
Next is the case of the NGO Súmate, another supposedly non-partisan NGO that received funding from the U.S. government-funded National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The Attorney General filed a suit for conspiracy to subvert the government against Súmate because it received funding from a U.S government-funded group for engaging in partisan electoral activity. According to HRW, this represents another case of NGO intimidation because even if Súmate used the NED funds for the recall referendum, this is "not an act of subversion." On the face of it, this argument is plausible, but if the Attorney General believes he (or she now) can make a case that Súmate used it to influence one side over another in the referendum, then they have the right to take the case to court. In the end, the case was dismissed on technical grounds, though, which just indicates that the court system is independent and not subservient to Chavez or the Attorney General.
Finally, to further support their argument that the Chavez government is "harassing" human rights NGOs, HRW complains about the sometimes strong language Chavez uses to criticize some of their work. As everyone knows, Chavez's rhetoric can often be over the top, but that this point should receive so much space in a report on human rights problems gives further credence to the notion that HRW believes its mission of combating serious human rights violations in the Americas has been accomplished and now the most pressing human rights issue it can find is the strong language of the president of Venezuela.
Legislation to Interfere in NGO Functioning
With regard to the HRW claim that the Chavez government is trying to undermine critical NGOs by passing legislation that would restrict their ability to raise funds from foreign sources, HRW is openly questioning the Venezuelan people's right to determine the extent to which foreign powers should be allowed to shape Venezuelan civil society. Still, once again HRW is chasing a non-issue because, as its report admits, Venezuelan legislators shelved the proposed law at the urging of the EU. This is hardly the action of a government intent on undermining the free functioning of civil society groups.
HRW then proceeds to criticize a Supreme Court ruling that states that groups that receive foreign funding cannot be considered part of Venezuelan civil society for purposes of constitutional requirements to include such groups in certain constitutional processes, such as the nominating process for the Electoral Council directors or the Supreme Court judges. Such a critique is laughable, though, because it implies that for such sensitive processes Venezuelans ought to accept the shaping of their institutions by powerful and wealthy foreign funders who could easily turn typically underfunded third world civil society groups into their puppets. In contrast, the United States, for example, currently has extensive regulations to prevent just that kind of thing from happening, known as FARA (Foreign Agent Registration Act). Venezuela still has nothing of the kind in its laws.
Conclusion
After taking apart each section, we can see that the report actually contains only a handful of valid concerns. These include the potential weakening of Supreme Court autonomy because of the National Assembly's ability to remove judges with a simple majority vote, the lack of an independent regulatory body for the broadcast media (CONATEL), and the lack of clear guidelines for which union has the right to bargain collectively when there is more than one union. However, these outstanding issues in the effort to create a better Venezuela pale in comparison with what has already been achieved if one considers the atrocious shape institutions were in before Chavez, when Supreme Court rulings went to the highest bidder, when the media was free to operate in the interest of its private owners and not the public, and when unions were completely dependent upon the government and a hopelessly corrupt leadership.
Human Rights Watch's special report on Venezuela—probably the most extensive study HRW has ever conducted on Venezuela—bears absolutely no relation to the actual situation of human rights in that country. Anyone unfamiliar with Venezuela will almost automatically conclude that the report's length and depth of reporting must mean that the human rights situation in Venezuela is very serious. But a close reading of the report itself shows that most of the points it makes are extremely weak.
Political discrimination in Venezuela, while a persistent problem throughout its history must be seen in the context of the massive sabotage of state institutions. The supposed lack of Supreme Court independence is not credible if one considers that the court regularly makes decisions against Chavez and his supporters. The private mass media's supposed restrictions bear no relationship to constant stream of invective this media hurls at the government on a regular basis. The accusation that unions lack of collective bargaining freedom appears as little more than the defense of the "right" of a corrupt union leadership to maintain its power. Finally, the government's supposed "aggressively adversarial approach" to civil society becomes a non-issue if one considers the weaknesses of HRW's arguments in this area.
In other words, upon closer examination, practically all of HRW's accusations dissolve into nothing more than smoke and mirrors. Just as Vivanco's comments about the report seem to indicate, the real purpose of this report was to discredit the Chavez government, to show that it is "no model for anyone." It is this reaction, though, which suggests that it is precisely because Venezuela is serving as a radical alternative model that has shaken Venezuela's and the world's elites to the core, that elite-sponsored institutions such as Human Rights Watch see a need to discredit it.
[i] A Decade Under Chávez: Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela, by Human Rights Watch, September 18, 2008 (http://hrw.org/reports/2008/venezuela0908/)
[ii] See: "José Miguel Vivanco's Background," letter to the editor, Venezuelanalysis.com, October 10, 2008 (http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/letter/3868)
[iii] "A Decade Under Chávez", Human Rights Watch, p.2
[iv] "All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis," article 5 of the 1993 Vienna Declaration, signed by all 171 participating nations.
[v] Also, the report claims to be published on the ten-year anniversary since Chavez was first elected as president. However, that anniversary won't be until December 6, 2008. It is thus almost three months early.
[vi] Only in 2005 did HRW release a longer special report on a Latin American country, on "Hidden Abuses Against Detained Youths in Rio de Janeiro" (June, 2005) 392 pages.
[vii] "Venezuela no es modelo para nadie," September 21, 2008, El Universal
[viii] ibid.
[ix] See Venezuela's MDG page on the UNDP website: http://www.mdgmonitor.org/factsheets_00.cfm?c=VEN&cd=862 and the planning ministry's data: http://www.sisov.mpd.gob.ve/metas_milenio/
[x] "Political allegiance was the passport to jobs in the public sector [before Chavez], as well as government contracts and services." p.14, HRW report
[xi] The HRW report cites the case of FOGADE, in which 80 persons lost their job, but where a labor court determined that their dismissals were illegal (p.21-23); one employee of the National Council of Frontiers (p.24); the National Electoral Council where some volunteers lost their positions as poll workers (p.25-26); a cooperative that did not get a government contract (p.27-28); and the opposition controlled public employees union FEDEUNEP, which documents "200 dismissals, 400 employees subjected to pressure tactics, and 180 transfers." (p.16)
[xii] There are at least two million public employees according to Venezuela's National Statistics Institute (INE - www.ine.gov.ve).
[xiii] I do not call it a "strike" because it was also a lockout by the upper-management and it involved a clear effort to sabotage the industry (such as by blocking the harbors, denying access to crucial passwords, and even destroying equipment).
[xiv] Just a cursory glance at any of the newspapers or TV news programs of the time (which were almost all opposition) would prove this point beyond any doubt.
[xv] "Venezuelan Opposition Accuses Oil Company President of Illegal Campaigning," by Gregory Wilpert, Venezuelanalysis.com, November 3, 2006. HRW also cites Chavez, who said around the same time, "PDVSA workers are part of this revolution, and whoever is not should go somewhere else, go to Miami." (p. 31) However, suggesting that people who don't like the government should leave and firing them are two completely different things.
[xvi] This based on my conversations with PDVSA employees.
[xvii] Latinobarometro, Informe Anual 2006, p.80 (www.latinobarometro.com). In Colombia and Brazil 53% responded that their judiciaries did "good" or "very good work", while in the Dominican Republic it was 58% and in Uruguay 59%. Unfortunately, the time series of how Venezuelans evaluate their judiciary going back to 1998 is not available online.
[xviii] See, "Venezuela: Judicial Independence Under Siege," where HRW spends most of its report analyzing the slow progress in the reform of the judicial system. Also, see my critique of this report, "Has Human Rights Watch Joined Venezuela's Opposition?"
[xix] The editor of Últimas Noticias, Eleazar Díaz Rangel, one of Venezuela's most respected journalists, says about the supposed lack of freedom of speech in Venezuela during the Chavez era, "No one can present examples of news that was censored as a result of governmental action." What directors of the major Venezuelan private media are "actually complaining about is having lost the privilege of being the owners of freedom of expression [in Venezuela]," adds Rangel. (http://www.aporrea.org/medios/n122013.html, Oct. 10, 2008)
[xx] "Chávez also made up his media deficit by using presidential authority to order all stations—including private television and radio stations—to interrupt programming without prior warning and broadcast his speeches and other government events live, often for hours on end, at peak viewing hours." (p.70)
[xxi] Unlike the "court-packing law," HRW calls the social responsibility law by its actual name, instead of the nickname the opposition gave it: the "muzzle" law.
[xxii] The fine was against Teodoro Petkoff's newspaper Tal Cual, where HRW tries to argue that the case was unfair and the fine of $50,000 too high. The newspaper hardly had any problems paying the fine, though, because it did some fundraising to do so and because Petkoff is married into one of Venezuela's richest families.
[xxiii] The only case that resulted in a three-year prison sentence was the one against General Francisco Usón, which indeed seems like a draconian sentence that was handed down by a military court martial. The rules under which this verdict was reached, though, pre-date the Chavez government and seem to be normal in the region for this type of military proceeding. Latin America's militaries are extremely sensitive to public criticism from within the ranks. This does not excuse it, but it does call into question whether this case is representative of a supposed effort to muzzle the press.
[xxiv] HRW dismisses all too facilely the impact these events had on Chavez and his supporters when it says that the coup provides "a pretext for a wide range of government policies that have undercut the human rights protections established in the 1999 Constitution." (p. 1)
[xxv] For a more detailed discussion of the RCTV case, see: "RCTV and Freedom of Speech in Venezuela," by Gregory Wilpert, Venezuelanalysis.com, June 2, 2007.
[xxvi] HRW ignores this even though it cites an article about this finding in footnote 421 (p.147): Kiraz Janicke, "Venezuela Removed from ILO List of Labor Union Freedom Violators," Venezuelanalysis.com, June 20, 2008, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/3574
[xxvii] Of course, HRW does try to cast aspersions on the CNE too by falsely claiming, "In 2003 the government disregarded the nominating procedures established in the constitution and allowed the Supreme Court to designate the directors of the CNE, raising additional doubts about the CNE's autonomy." (p.147) First, it is the National Assembly that nominates the CNE. Second, the AN did not "disregard" the procedure, but could not reach a two-thirds majority for appointing the CNE members. The Supreme Court stepped in (while it was still evenly divided between opposition and Chavez supporters) to appoint the board because of the constitutional crisis the lack of a CNE represented. The resulting CNE membership reflected the balance of power in the National Assembly at the time, so that Chavez sympathizers had a one-vote majority on the CNE.
[xxviii] E-mail from María Padrón, of October 9, 2008.
[xxix] The constitution uses the word "organize" (art. 293, no. 6) when referring to elections of unions, professional associations, and political organizations. However, in practice this has always been interpreted as optional and as a supervision, as can be seen by the fact that political parties have often held elections without CNE organization or supervision. Also, contrary to HRW's claim (p.144, fn. 406), article 95 of the constitution does not mandate that union officials be elected once every three years and that they cannot be reelected. This is part of the Organic Labor Law (art. 434), which, again contrary to another HRW claim, does not specify that union leaders cannot be reelected.
[xxx] Email from María Padrón, Oct. 9, 2008. HRW says that new rules that have not yet been made public would make supervision optional, but according to the CNE the existing rules already make them optional. Rather, the new rules, which Padrón says are currently receiving finishing touches, merely clarify this optional status of supervision and make the supervision itself more "flexible." Also, the new rules will reduce the time-span between request and the CNE's certification, from 90 days to 50 days.
[xxxi] Apparently HRW interviewed a former CNE director of union affairs, but this is not the same as speaking to someone who actually represents the CNE.
[xxxii] More unions have been registered and have reached collective bargaining agreements in Venezuela during the Chavez era than was the case before Chavez, according to Labor Ministry statistics. (http://www.mintra.gov.ve/)
[xxxiii] In addition to treating the management relatively well, PDVSA President Rodriguez signed a generous collective bargaining agreement with the three main unions shortly before the shutdown.
[xxxiv] The percentage of the economically active population incorporated into Venezuela's social security system has increased from 23.9% in 1998 to 31.2% in 2007. Those over 60 years old who receive a pension increased even more dramatically, from 16% in 1998 to 40% in 2007. (Source: Ministry of Planning and Development: http://www.sisov.mpd.gob.ve/indicadores/)
[xxxv] See the Latinobarometro reports, which regularly show that Venezuelans are more politically active and engaged than almost any other people in Latin America or than in any time prior to Chavez. (www.latinobarometro.com) One could perhaps argue that this high level of politicization is due to the polarization that supposed restrictions on political activity has caused. However, when asked how highly satisfied Venezuelans are with their democracy, 59% report that they are satisfied, compared to 37% for all of Latin America. Only Uruguay has a higher percentage, at 66%. (Latinobarometro 2007, informe anual, p.80)
(Source: http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/19165)
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